My Appointment to the Copyright Board of Canada

Wooden gavel resting on a circular base in front of a Canadian flag featuring a copyright symbol.
Image: Shutterstock (AI assist)

I am pleased to announce that tomorrow, November 1, I will take up an appointment as a Member (Part-Time) of the Copyright Board of Canada—assuming that my security clearance is approved that is. I think I will clear that bar since, in a previous incarnation with the Department of External Affairs, which later became the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, I was allowed to read some fairly sensitive stuff (I am not even going to mention the topics). Nor have I become radicalized in the years since I left government employ!  Nonetheless I trundled down to the offices of The Corps of Commissionaires in Victoria a couple of days ago to have my fingerprints taken, no doubt a sensible precaution. The appointment is for four years, (God-willing) and subject to “good behaviour”. I can’t do much about the God-willing part but with regard to behaving well, I intend to follow the rules.

Because of this appointment, I am also announcing that I am stepping back from writing this blog on a weekly basis, as I have done for the past ten years. It has been an amazing experience. As a result of researching and writing content for the weekly blog posts based on copyright issues not just in Canada and the US, but globally, I have not only expanded my knowledge of copyright and the issues surrounding it, (there is always more to learn) but have met some really wonderful, knowledgeable, interesting and helpful people, some virtually, some in person.

I want to thank all of my readers for your interest, loyalty and engagement. The blog will stay “live” and, who knows, I may even be tempted to wade in on some topic from time to time. After all, the issues surrounding AI and copyright, not to mention many others affecting the creative community and users of copyrighted content, are not going away any time soon. But for now, I am putting it on the back burner, “on pause” if you will. I want to be able to dedicate myself fully to my new responsibilities.

The role of the Copyright Board as many (but perhaps not all) readers will know is to perform certain specific functions as mandated by legislation, specifically Section 66 of the Copyright Act. It does not play a role in formulating or developing copyright policy. For a full explanation of what the Board does, you can visit its website, but briefly the main functions can be described as;

  • Approving tariffs for content where rights are managed by collective societies; eg. royalty rates for playing or performing music in various contexts
  • Settling individual cases where parties disagree; and
  • Granting licences for the use of content when the rights owners are unlocatable.

Many countries have similar boards. The US counterpart is the Copyright Royalty Board, although the useful role of granting licences for use of orphan works (unlocatable copyright owners) which is a function of the Copyright Board of Canada is not available in the US, nor is such a function performed by analogous Boards in any other country, as far as I know.

The Board is an administrative tribunal composed of not more than five members, chaired by a sitting or retired judge of a superior court. The current Chair is the Hon. Luc Martineau, a retired judge of the Federal Court of Canada. Members can be full or part time. At the present time, all are part-time appointees with the exception of the Vice Chair who is also the chief executive officer of the Board and has supervision over and direction of the Board and its staff. The staff has expertise in legal, economic and administrative matters. Its rulings can be appealed to the Federal Court.

The Copyright Board has a specific and important role to play within the copyright ecosystem. It maintains fair and equitable royalties for both rightsholders and users of copyrighted material, through a timely and transparent process based on solid legal and economic principles. I am delighted to be able to join the organization and look forward to working with distinguished colleagues in the furtherance of its mandate.

Hugh Stephens, 2026

Authors Are Being Spammed with Automated Pitches to Promote their Books to Readers: Another Manifestation of Unauthorized Copying by AI Platforms

Various hands holding colorful books against a light background.

Image: Shutterstock

It seems as if almost every other day I receive another one, a somewhat convincing personal pitch to help me promote my 2023 book “In Defence of Copyright” to readers and thus potential purchasers. The pitches come from various sources but are almost always signed by a woman for some reason. The writer professes a strong interest in wanting to help me promote the book. “Amelia” (attractive picture), an “author success partner” was particularly committed to getting me on board. She talked about the many attributes of the book, its timeliness and potential and the importance of the topic. After she had immersed herself in my book, she began building a customized marketing strategy to help the book find its audience because, after all, “This book deserves to reach creators, policymakers, educators, and anyone concerned about the future of creative work in the digital age”. How flattering! What was this strategy and how much would it cost me?

A “Visibility Plan” was prepared that had a range of options, ranging from a few hundred dollars to a couple of thousand. At the basic level, the plan would “fix the storefront” by optimizing its profile on Amazon and Goodreads and inserting keywords and category positioning language. This “campaign” would last for 15 days. The next step, at roughly double the price, was to deal with “reach, momentum and carriage” would include Amazon KDP (Kindle Digital Publishing) advertising, Amazon best seller positioning and book club distribution. But the granddaddy was Option Three, at roughly double the price again, to include everything included in the first two levels plus Amazon short book trailers, author website design and social media management. Not surprisingly Option Three was recommended.

Another unsolicited pitch opened with the following, “Congratulations on the sharp insights, critical acclaim, and timely necessity of In Defence of Copyright, it is an extraordinary feat to craft a work of legal and cultural commentary with such a fierce, compelling hold on its readers.” Gosh, even more flattering. This service offered an eclectic range of services that included ”A bespoke, deep-dive narrative review sent directly to our community of dedicated readers”, a dedicated live online session focused on the book, an “exclusive, behind-the-scenes summary of anonymous reader insights on your book’s thematic impact”, what was called “C-Suite and Curator Introduction” which would apparently introduce the work to a private network of literary curators, book club syndicators and collection builders and, finally, “tailored promotional artwork” which could, if I wanted to pay the freight, include a 3D image of the book and long-term placement within a curated collection for the remainder of 2026.

What these pitches and a number of others I have received have in common is that they are specific to my book. They include multiple references to the content, themes, analysis, case studies etc. to the point that if one wanted to suspend judgement, you could almost be convinced that the people behind the promotion had actually read the book. But we all know that is not how it works. “In Defence of Copyright”, like hundreds of thousands of other copyrighted books, has been scraped and ingested by AI, without my knowledge or permission. The AI is then used to produce a reasonable summary of the book in support of the sales pitch. The website Writer Beware is a great source of information about the cruel world out there, particularly the blog post “Return of the Nigerian Prince Redux: Beware Book Club and Book Review Scams“ , which goes into some detail as to how the promotional offers actually work (or don’t). My experience with these promotions is fairly recent (perhaps I should be flattered that I have finally “joined the club”), but it has been going on for a couple of years, if not longer.

I am not saying that in some cases the services offered would not be provided. Possibly some promotional tweaking would actually take place, probably using some sort of automated system, but whether this would produce any noticeable bump in book sales, and whether the investment in these promotional efforts would pay off, is quite another question. The buyer has to decide this for themself. The business model employed by the book promoters is not dissimilar to automated cold calling with promotional offers; most recipients will simply ignore the messages, or they will go to spam. However, a certain number of people (me included, out of curiosity) will engage. An even smaller number will be converted to paying customers. However, if your initial outreach is AI driven and automated, even a one percent conversion rate can make the promotion worthwhile.

In my blog post last week, I talked about collective societies or CMOs (collective management organizations) as one possible solution to enable individual authors to have some control over how their works are used and to get compensated for that use. I believe that the “ART principles” (authorization, remuneration, and transparency) should apply, but this is not happening. Not only are authors getting no compensation for the use of their work in feeding the AI machine, but the unauthorized ingestion process is being weaponized against them by highlighting AI-driven analysis of their work to convince them to engage with automated promotion services.

The automation of the process can produce some amusing outcomes, however. Even though an AI platform may be adept at summarizing a work, it can still make rookie mistakes such as the pitch I recently received to promote “The Cambridge Companion to Gay and Lesbian Writing”, allegedly a work I had edited. Like the pitch on “In Defence of Copyright”, it contained flowery language about what an important work it was (in the field of queer literature), citing some of the key features of the work while pointing out how a bit of promotion would help it reach readers who really counted. A bit of digging revealed that this work was indeed edited by a namesake, Hugh Stevens, who is apparently an expert in this field and a senior lecturer at University College London. However, not only did the AI wrongly attribute Dr. Stevens’ work to me, but it couldn’t even differentiate between Hugh Stephens and Hugh Stevens, an annoying blind spot for many people that I have been fighting against all my life. Perhaps in this case the AI platform was not to blame; just the careless human being operating it?

Anyway, all I can say is that all the promotional spam I and other authors receive daily or weekly is annoying. Reaching out to book clubs and getting your work prominence on Goodreads are no doubt useful things to do, although in my case I don’t think many book clubs are interested in the ins and out of copyright (although a group of budding authors might find a quick overview of the topic to be useful). But I would submit that you can do a lot of your own marketing, with a good website and active outreach. While the spam is annoying, even more outrageous is the fact that it is a regular reminder to authors that their work has been copied and used to feed the AI machine without permission or compensation.

© Hugh Stephens, 2026. All Rights Reserved.

Collective Licensing of Copyrighted Content for AI Training and Use: Do CMOs Have a Role?

Illuminated sign reading 'CMOs Collective Licensing' in a modern urban setting with people walking in the foreground and a large decorative 'AI' structure in the background.
Image: Shutterstock (AI generated)

Is there a role for collective licensing and Collective Management Organizations (CMOs) in the licensing of AI, both for training (engaging the reproduction right) and use (distribution, publication, communication to the public and performance), and if so, what is that role? As the battle over AI’s use of copyrighted content for training and delivery of results continues globally, taking on different manifestations in different countries (some legal, some legislative, some consultative), rightsholders have argued that voluntary licensing is the best way forward. I argued just that point in a recent blog posting (AI Training and Copyright: It’s a Global Problem—and There is a Global Solution).

Voluntary licensing avoids the necessity for lawsuits, fair use or fair dealing determinations, and legislative amendments to change copyright law with all the unintended consequences that may entail. It also has the advantage of being multi-jurisdictional (assuming a broad licence is available), avoiding issues arising from different national iterations of copyright law, and provides both the tech and creative communities with a stake in AI development. It gives rightsholders control over the content they own or have created and, normally, a revenue stream. In some cases, such as licensing of prominent audio-visual repertoire, ongoing news content, or iconic images, that revenue flow could be substantial. In others, such as the licensing of an individual literary or musical work, the revenue might be minimal, but the issue of authorization would still be addressed. However, there is a fundamental issue associated with licensing the content of individual creators. In a practical sense, how do you do it? How do you reach all those individual or small rightsholders? This is where collective licensing could have a role to play. But it’s complicated (see here and here) and comes with problems as well as solutions.

Some AI developers, such as Anthropic in Australia, have proposed various options, such as an extended compulsory licence as the way to deal with the myriad of small rightsholders. The AI industry would pay into a central fund that would be used to compensate rightsholders who would be represented by a sectoral CMO, whether or not they were actually members of that organization. While a compulsory licensing scheme is one way to provide some revenue to small rightsholders, it removes one of the fundamental rights inherent in copyright, the author’s right to control the use of their work. Dealing with this problem requires rightsholders to opt-out, which is both technically difficult to implement and imposes a reverse-onus on rightsholders.

A fundamental principle of copyright law is that rightsholders have the right to authorize use of their work and should not have to exercise an opt-out proviso to prevent unauthorized use. Earlier this month a broad coalition of international news publishers wrote to Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese urging Australia to reject the kind of scheme that Anthropic is proposing, pointing out that such measures would be in violation of several international treaty commitments, would destroy the voluntary AI licensing markets that are rapidly developing and would establish Australia “as a location to launder infringement worldwide”.

In Canada, the umbrella cultural group Coalition for the Diversity of Cultural Expression (CDCE) has put forward three pillars governing the use of copyrighted content in the AI industry, which it calls the “ART principles” 1) authorization 2) remuneration and 3) transparency. Transparency is key because to date almost no-one outside the AI companies themselves knows exactly what the companies have ingested (reproduced) as part of their training, although it is far to assume “just about everything”. For many ingested works, the AI crawlers have absorbed the content on a “one and done” basis, that is they have used the content as cannon fodder as they scooped up vast quantities of data to train their bots. In other instances, involving use and re-use of the content, or what is called “Retrieval Augmented Generation”, the bot goes back to the original unauthorized reproduction of the work to extract information to provide answers to queries from users.

I tested this out with my own book “In Defence of Copyright“. I asked Google’s Gemini (I don’t subscribe to other AI services) a number of relatively obscure questions about the book. It had no difficulty whatsoever in providing quite detailed answers, and then asking me if I wanted more information, providing several suggestions as to what I could ask. To be able to respond in this manner, it was clear to me that the full work (not just the samples available through Amazon) must have been copied and ingested. No one asked my permission, I did not know the work had been copied, nor was I remunerated. None of the ART principles was followed. This story is repeated for probably just about every work under copyright ever published.

As I am a member of Access Copyright, the CMO for literary works in Canada, I wondered if it could help. Unlike its US and UK counterparts, Access Copyright does not offer a licence for AI training but is exploring the issuance of end-user licencing that would cover AI use. In the UK, the counterpart to Access, the Copyright Licensing Agency (CLA) announced the launch of an AI training licence last year, while the Copyright Clearance Center (CCC) in the US now offers an AI Systems Training Licence. Australia’s Copyright Agency does not have a licence for AI training but has extended its annual business licence to encompass AI uses. For example, this enables business licensees to allow staff to include third-party content in prompts in AI tools used in the workplace. The CLA and CCC also offer similar licences for use of AI by businesses.

Access Copyright told me it has chosen to focus on end-user licensing (rather than focusing on the AI companies themselves) because that is where it sees potential: business users feed copyright-protected content, owned by varied rightsholders, into AI platforms every day.  These uses are dispersed and decentralized, unmonitored and unknown. A collective licence helps to alleviate the risks associated with these uses, by authorizing the use and remunerating the creators. In any case, since AI companies have already ingested most works available digitally (and are now embarked on copying and then pulping historical works available only in hard copy), it is questionable if there is really much of a market left for licensing literary works for AI training. That train may have already left the station. I am not planning on “In Defence of Copyright” generating any AI revenues for my retirement. 

There is, however, another role for CMOs beyond offering licences for use of member’s works, and that is to enforce members’ rights. SOCAN, the Canadian music collective which, according to its website represents “over 200,000 songwriter, composer, and music publisher members” has just launched a lawsuit against music streaming service SUNO alleging that the company’s generative AI platform is “producing and streaming outputs that replicate human-created musical works without consent or payment, and as a result has infringed the performing rights in musical works in SOCAN’s repertoire”. In other words, the suit is focused on outputs, rather than inputs, as discussed here. It wants SUNO (and presumably other streaming services) to license content in its repertoire (plus pay damages of $10 million for the 150 infringed works). It also wants an injunction from the court requiring SUNO to take down the infringing works. The suit is similar to one that SOCAN’s German counterpart recently won against SUNO and is based on infringement of the performance right. Music is of course different from a published work, which may be read only once by a consumer while music tracks are consumed over and over again. There are also differences in the rights embedded in the works.

How and what impact collective licensing will have on the further development of AI, and the livelihood of creators, is still being explored. Rightsholders need to retain control. However, coming back to my initial question as to whether there is a role for collective licensing and for Collective Management Organizations (CMOs) in the licensing of AI, I submit that the answer is “Yes”. Figuring out exactly how to do it is the tough part.

© Hugh Stephens, 2026. All rights reserved.

Does (or Did) the Rule of the Shorter Term (RST) Apply in Canada? A Mystery for Copyright Aficionados

Scrabble game board showing the words 'RULE OF THE SHORTER TERM IN CANADA' created with wooden letter tiles

Image: Author

In my last blog post, I got well down into the copyright weeds with a post on the Rule of the Shorter Term (RST) and how, in particular, it can impact copyright protection for US works in Europe. (For example, even though the EU applies the RST it can be overridden by bilateral treaties). The Rule of the Shorter Term is a provision that allows countries to deny national treatment (defined as treating foreign goods, services and intellectual property no less favourably than domestic equivalents) to authors from other jurisdictions when those jurisdictions maintain a term of protection that is shorter than the one provided in the original country. As a result it substitutes reciprocal treatment (i.e. tit-for-tat) for national treatment.

In that post, I noted that the US, unlike EU member states, does not apply the RST. In other words, the US accords the same treatment to foreign works as it does to US works even if the foreign country offers a lesser term of protection in comparison to the US. Although there is an optional provision for application of the RST in the Berne Convention, to which the United States is a party, international treaties are not considered self-executing in the US. As a result, unless enacted into US law, provisions of the Convention have no force and effect. And there is no reference in US law to the RST. (The Wikimedia Foundation has a long discussion of the issue).

But what about Canada? My conclusion is that like the US, Canada does not apply the Rule of the Shorter Term, although for a number of years it did–but only with respect to works of joint authorship. Why this was the case remains a mystery to me, but I will try to unravel it below.

In Canada, like the US, treaties are also not self-executing, thus requiring domestic legislation for implementation. The Copyright Act doesn’t or didn’t mention the Rule of the Shorter Term per se but until 2022 applied an RST-like limitation. Strangely, this was limited to works of joint authorship. Toronto music lawyer Paul Banwatt examined this issue in his blog, The Music Lawyer, (A Copyright Mystery – The “Rule of the Shorter Term” and the Public Domain in Canada) a few years ago. Banwatt was researching whether the song “Always”, by Irving Berlin, was still protected in Canada while being in the public domain in the US. Banwatt highlighted and discussed Section 9(2) of the Copyright Act of Canada which, (at the time he was writing his blog), said;

“Authors who are nationals of any country, other than a country that is a party to the Canada–United States–Mexico Agreement, that grants a term of protection shorter than that mentioned in subsection (1) are not entitled to claim a longer term of protection in Canada.”

This was a clear denial of national treatment for foreign works (other than those from the US or Mexico) if the country of the author granted a term of protection less than that accorded to works in Canada under Subsection (1) of Section 9. That subsection (in 2021, when Banwatt was writing) referred solely to joint authorship and stated that “copyright shall subsist during the life of the author who dies last, for the remainder of the calendar year of that author’s death, and for a period of fifty years following the end of that calendar year”. The only exception was for situations where the identify of both authors was unknown.

Thus, Section 9 (2) limited the rights of foreign authors to claim the full period of protection under the Canadian Copyright Act if their country provided for a shorter term than in Canada, but exempted authors from the US and Mexico from this restriction. Interestingly, Section 9(2) has since been deleted from the Act. It was removed on December 29, 2022, the same day that Canada extended its term of protection from life of the author plus 50 years to life of the author plus 70 years. This must mean that authors and co-authors from all Berne countries (including the US and Mexico) now enjoy a period of protection of life plus 70, with the clock ticking from the year of the demise of the last living co-author for joint works. Therefore, it seems reasonable to conclude that the RST no longer applies in Canada. But did it before 2022, and if so, why was this the case?

Earlier versions of the Copyright Act dating back a couple of decades included Section 9(2) but with the exclusions from it tied to NAFTA, signed in 1993, rather than CUSMA/USMCA, which came into effect in 2018. NAFTA granted both Mexico and the US national treatment for intellectual property (Article 17.03). Even though Canada only had a “life plus 50” term of copyright until the end of 2022 (when Section 9(2) was deleted), for some reason it was necessary to enshrine in legislation an exemption from application of the Rule of the Shorter Term to Mexican and US works (but only of joint authorship) as a result of the national treatment obligations taken on in both NAFTA and CUSMA. This suggests that Canada must have been applying the RST to works from countries offering less than Canada’s then “life plus 50” term (if the work was one of joint authorship). In the absence of any language to the contrary, it would seem that works of sole authorship were not subjected to the RST-like rules, and thus there was no reason to exempt the US and Mexico from them.

Irving Berlin’s “Always” was not a work of joint authorship. Had it been, it would have been protected under the terms of NAFTA/CUSMA exception and be entitled to a term of “life plus 50” in Canada, which exceeded the protection the work received in the US. Being the work of a sole author, “Always” automatically benefited from Canada’s life plus 50 year term. As Paul Banwatt pointed out, “Always” fell into the US public domain on January 1, 2021, 95 years after having been published in 1925. The work benefited from repeated extensions of the US term of protection, as the US transitioned from a system based on date of publication to one based on life of the author. Based on the principle of national treatment, the work is still protected in Canada. Berlin died in 1989 (at age 101!) so upon his death his work was protected in Canada until January 1, 2040, since prolonged to 2060 when Canada extended its term of protection to “life plus 70” in 2022.

What about works from nationals of countries other than the US and Mexico? The existence of Section 9(2) in the Copyright Act from at least the 1990s through December of 2022 implies that Canada applied an RST provision to works of joint authorship from all countries except for the US and Mexico. That was during the period when Canada applied the Berne minimum rule of “life 50”. I can’t think of any countries that offered lesser protection than that, other than the United States, so perhaps this explains the presence of Section 9 (2). In practical terms it didn’t impact any country other than the US, but in the interests of legal certainty the US needed to be exempted from it to give explicit effect to NAFTA and CUSMA’s national treatment obligations. Mexico went along for the ride. Assuming this is the explanation, why did it apply only to works of joint authorship? And why was it dropped when Canada extended its term to match the current “life plus 70” term of the US and a number of other countries?

It is very plausible today to find scenarios where a country might offer a lesser term than that offered in Canada. This will occur if it follows the Berne minimum of “life plus 50” for works (either single or joint authorship), while Canada now offers a longer term. And if Canada on occasion offered a longer term of protection than in the US when it applied a “life plus 50” term, surely once it extended the term to “life plus 70”, the discrepancy would widen. So why eliminate the carve out for the US (and Mexico, unless the explanation is that with the removal of Section 9(2), there is no longer any reference to an RST in Canadian law, and thus an exemption for Canada’s CUSMA partners is now not necessary. If this is the case, however, why was Section 9(2) inserted in the first place?

This is the mystery for you copyright aficionados to solve.

1) What was the reason for including Section 9(2), the RST clause with an exemption for the US and Mexico, in earlier versions of the Copyright Act, and then dropping it when Canada extended its copyright term? and;

2) Why was the RST provision applied prior to 2022 only to jointly authored works?

Someone out there must know the answer. If so, please let me know. I will pass it along. Now let’s get out of the weeds.

© Hugh Stephens, 2026. All Rights Reserved.

Copyright Minutiae: The Rule of the Shorter Term

A brass copyright symbol overlaid with a wooden ruler that has 'SHORTER TERM' engraved on it, placed on a table with old books and documents.

Image: Shutterstock (AI assisted)

Of course there are many mainstream copyright issues to write about, notably the whole issue of how copyright and AI intersect–and the ongoing dialectic between them–but to mark Canadian Thanksgiving weekend and Columbus Day (or Indigenous Peoples Day, if you prefer) in the US, I have allowed myself the indulgence of probing an obscure corner of copyright lore. I’m going down the copyright rabbit hole to explore the Rule of the Shorter Term, and its implications. Be warned, if you don’t want to know why Steamboat Willie is protected under copyright for longer in Germany than in the US, move on now. But if this sort of minutiae intrigues you, as it does me, read on.

As I commented in my book, “In Defence of Copyright”, copyright as a concept is simple and straightforward—but its application can be fiendishly complicated. This is because of differing national legal frameworks regarding what is copyright protected—and for how long—and what is not. As most of us know, copyright is governed by an international convention, the Berne Convention of 1886, updated on numerous occasions, with its main provisions now incorporated into the rules governing the World Trade Organization (WTO). The Convention provides common minimum standards and rules, but each country is sovereign when it comes to determining how those provisions are to be applied. Add to this different copyright rules in place over the years, especially in the United States, and you get some very deep rabbit holes to explore. One of these involves the “Rule of the Shorter Term”, which I will shorten to RST.

This rule, which dates to the earliest days of Berne, is an exception to Berne’s national treatment provisions. One of the basic principles of Berne, apart from the requirement that member states acknowledge copyright without any formal registration requirements, is national treatment. This means that an author from Berne member Country A should receive the same treatment in Berne member Country B as do nationals of Country B in their home jurisdiction. For example, works of Canadian authors should receive the same protection in the US that US works enjoy. By the same token, under the principle of national treatment, US authors in Canada receive the same protection as Canadian authors do, which may be different from the standard applied in the US.

National treatment is a common standard and is one of the basic principles embedded into most international trade agreements. To ensure there aren’t major discrepancies in protection, all Berne members are expected to meet the minimum standards of the Convention, as amended over the years, including (for most works) a term of copyright protection lasting for the life of the author plus an additional fifty years. While all Berne members apply this basic standard, some go beyond it, offering a term of protection that is longer. This is the case of the EU, the US, UK, Australia, and since the end of 2022, Canada.

However, not all Berne members offer this additional period of protection. This is where the Rule of the Shorter Term (RST) comes into play. It allows Berne members to apply, as a derogation from national treatment, reciprocal treatment with respect to the additional period of protection beyond the required minimum. When the RST is applied, authors of foreign works are denied the benefit of the extra period of copyright protection if their home jurisdiction does not offer protection of a similar duration. So, for example, during the years when the period of protection in Canada for all works, foreign and Canadian, was the life of the author plus 50 years, Canadian rightsholders in the EU only enjoyed a comparable period of protection (i.e. “life + 50”) in EU member states, notwithstanding the fact that EU authors enjoyed a period of protection that was 20 years longer in their home jurisdiction. Because the US, since 1998, also bases its period of protection for current works on life + 70, US rightsholders enjoy the same protection in EU member states as domestic EU rightsholders. In fact, a primary motivation for the extension of the US copyright term twenty-five or more years ago (as I wrote about here) was to ensure that US rightsholders received equivalent protection in the EU to that enjoyed by their EU counterparts.

One of the arguments cited for Canada adopting a longer term was that Canadian rightsholders would also enjoy the longer copyright term of “life + 70” in countries that apply the RST (like EU member states), bringing potential additional economic returns to Canadian creators and industries. The US, by contrast, does not apply the RST. It accords the longer term of protection for all works, regardless of what the home country of the author does. As for Canada, stay tuned. I am saving that for a subsequent blog post.

You can look at the RST from two perspectives. One is to view it as lengthening copyright protection in certain circumstances (Canadian works now enjoy longer protection in EU countries); the other is to shorten it (Canadian works received a shorter period of protection in EU countries when Canada itself had a shorter term). It all depends on your point of view. One result of applying the RST is that when a work has fallen into the public domain in its country of origin because its (shorter) term of protection has expired, it will no longer be protected in the second country that has a longer term. So, for example, if a work entered the public domain in Canada as a result of a shorter copyright term, it would also be in the public domain in the EU notwithstanding the longer term applicable in the EU. Clear? I hope so.

As noted above, the EU explicitly applies the RST. However its application by EU member states is subject to some limitations. Even though the RST rule generally applies, it can be overridden by other considerations, such as bilateral treaty obligations. I wasn’t aware of this until I stumbled across a blog post written by a German copyright professor on the inexhaustible topic of Steamboat Willie entering the public domain. According to Dr. Lukas Mezger, while Willie entered the public domain in the US on January 1 of 2024, he will be protected in Germany for many more years. This is contrary to what I wrote in a an earlier blog post. Mea culpa.

That post discussed copyright differences between Canada and the US, one of them being when works enter the public domain. Disney’s Steamboat Willie was one example. Willie, as was widely trumpeted in the media, entered the US public domain on January 1, 2024, but in fact had become a public domain property in Canada two years earlier. This was well documented in a blog by Donald Taylor, copyright officer at Simon Fraser University.

After explaining how and why Steamboat Willie had fallen into the public domain in Canada on January 1, 2022, (the reason being because Canada’s term at that time was based on the life of the author plus 50 years, and co-author Ub Iwerks–who outlived his co-author Walt Disney by five years–had died in July, 1971), Taylor added that in Germany, which has a term of life + 70, the copyright would not normally expire until 2042. However, he added the caveat that because of the Rule of the Shorter Term, Germany would follow the practice of the home country and let Willie fall into the public domain on the same date as applied in the US, January 1, 2024. But Mezger’s blog (How Mickey Mouse entered the Public Domain in 2024 – but not in Germany) sees it differently.

His argument is that the RST is subordinate to bilateral treaties, such as the 1892 Copyright Treaty between the then German Empire and the United States. That treaty gives US works national treatment in Germany, and vice versa. After the passage of the 1891 Chace Act which offered copyright protection in the United States to works of non-US citizens subject to certain conditions like registering and printing in the US, the United States signed a number of bilateral treaties that guaranteed reciprocal national treatment. So, Steamboat Willie is protected under German law until at least 2042, or possibly later depending on who qualifies as a joint author, based on the German rule of life plus 70 years, according to Mezger. There is relatively recent legal precedent (2006) for the continued application of the 1892 treaty, limiting the applicaton of the Rule of the Shorter Term when applied to US works in Germany.

This copyright trivia as to how long a work is protected in one country versus another, and whether the Rule of the Shorter Term applies, has actual practical consequences. In one well researched case, a publisher of public domain books in the US, Devault-Graves, sought to republish three of J.D. Salinger’s lesser-known essays that had fallen into the public domain in the US. This had occurred because Salinger had neglected to renew the initial 28-year term of US copyright that prevailed at the time (the 1940s). Instead of enjoying a further 28 years of protection from date of publication, the works had inadvertently fallen into the public domain.

The Salinger Estate (Salinger died in 2010) went to court in 2015 to try to stop the republishers, but finally conceded that the essays in question were indeed in the US public domain. Having secured victory in the US, Devault-Graves decided that if the works were in the public domain in the United States, under the Rule of the Shorter Term they must be in the public domain in a number of other countries (i.e. those applying RST rules). They selected Germany as their test case–an unfortunate choice for them–and sought a publisher there. The Salinger Estate opposed. A German court dismissed the Devault-Graves claim that the RST applied in Germany to the works in question, based on the 1892 bilateral treaty. The three Salinger essays remain protected in that country.

Apart from the inconvenient existence of the 1892 German-US Copyright Treaty that limits whether the Rule of the Shorter Term is applied to US works in Germany, there is another widely accepted “convention” referred to as “potential term” that can also affect the period of protection for US works abroad. Although it does not formally exist in the Berne Convention, it is a further limitation on the application of the RST to US works. Potential term refers to the full term of protection that a work would receive under Berne’s “life + 50” principle, absent any formalities. One of the basic tenets of the Berne Convention is that copyright should be granted without any formality, such as registration. Until the revision of the US Copyright Act in 1976, the United States required formal registration to establish copyright, plus also required a formal renewal within a strict time limit in order to access the permitted 28-year extension.

Before the registration requirement was eliminated, many copyrights in the US lapsed due to the low renewal rate. Others lost copyright because of some technicality involving registration. For example, if the © mark, plus year, was printed on the jacket of a book rather than inside the book, a copyright registration would fail. Given that Salinger’s loss of copyright in his three essays was the result of a technical oversight involving failure to renew, under the “potential term” concept, copyright protection should not be lost as a result of faulty registration; it should last (in Berne Convention countries other than the US) until the year 2060, 50 years after Salinger’s demise and for a futher twenty years after that for countries that apply the “life plus 70” rule, (assuming the longer period of protection was in effect in those countries in 2010, the year that Salinger died).

The irrelevance of US copyright cancellations regarding limits on the protection of US works abroad was confirmed in an exchange of letters between the US Commissioner of Patents, Robert Stoll, and the Deputy Director General of WIPO, Shozo Uemera in 1989 when the US joined Berne. The Rule of the Shorter Term (RST) would not apply in other Berne signatory countries when US copyrights were denied or truncated on the basis of fault or negligence in registration. That principle was upheld by a French court in 2009.

So there it is, a tramp through the copyright weeds. If you are a real glutton for punishment, and want to drill down further, I recommend “International Copyright: The Introduction”, by Paul Edward Geller. It is “only” 230 pages long.

Now, what about Canada and the RST? That will be the subject of a future blog.

© Hugh Stephens, 2026. All Rights Reserved.

Peppa Pig’s Global Reach, Assisted by the English Courts

Sign for Peppa Pig World featuring cartoon characters Peppa Pig, George, and their family against a blue sky.

Image: Shutterstock

Anyone with young children, or grandchildren, must be familiar with Peppa Pig, the anthropomorphic pig with the plummy British accent, surrounded by a porcine family and a range of other animals. Originally produced in 2004 by the British animation studio Astley Baker Davies, it was subsequently acquired by the Canadian media company Entertainment One, with control later passing to Hasbro in 2019 when the US company acquired Entertainment One. The animation style is simplistic, and the characters look as if they could have been drawn by young children. It is wildly popular globally, which of course makes it a prime candidate for knock-offs.

While there is no copyright restriction on producing a cartoon series based on a family of pigs, or other animals for that matter, there are certainly protectable elements in an original production that could result in litigation if infringed. This is precisely what happened regarding a remarkably similar, and also popular (48 billion views worldwide) production about a wolf family. The show, known as Wolfoo, is produced in Vietnam by the animation company SConnect, which bills itself as a “beacon of innovation”. Hasbro disagreed, and in 2022 brought suit in England for copyright infringement. Although Wolfoo is about a wolf family, and is voiced (in English) by actors with an American accent, its storyline and animation style is remarkably similar to Peppa. It looks plagiarized, to say the least, but plagiarism is not copyright infringement. What is copyright infringement is SConnect’s use of Peppa Pig sound recordings, including character dialogue and sound effects, in creating a competing product.

This interesting case was recently highlighted in its newsletter by Copyrightlaws.com, a top-rated copyright education site offering information and courses for those interested in learning more about copyright. Various legal firms have also written on the case but one of the most comprehensive accounts is from Simkins LLP in London, based on the summary judgment ruling issued in June of this year.

Initial complaints against SConnect were for passing off and copyright infringement, including breach of trademark, but were then narrowed down to charges of infringement of copyright in sound recordings. This was arguably the most straightforward to prove. At issue was not the copyright in the underlying sounds (which, for example, could have involved the voice actors), but the recordings themselves made by the Peppa Pig production company. The case had several interesting aspects. It depended on expert spectrographic analysis to identify the infringements (which proved irrefutable), the court allowed evidence based on “sampling” of a number of Wolfoo YouTube recordings rather than requiring proof that all Wolfoo productions before a certain date were infringing, and finally, the court’s injunction was applied internationally. With respect to this point, the Copyrightlaws newsletter noted that,

“The…injunction, which orders the removal of all existing Wolfoo videos (over 30,000) and prohibits the uploading of future videos, applies not only to the UK as a jurisdiction but also to the whole of the EU and to any countries covered by relevant international treaties and conventions. Additionally, the court stated that the injunction is also flexible enough to apply to any nations that might join such treaties and conventions in the future. This provides incredibly broad coverage for this kind of injunction…”

(The newsletter adds it should be noted that this conclusion is case-specific and does not necessarily set a precedent for future lawsuits.)

It is this international reach I want to focus on, specifically the “why” and “how”.

The “why” is based on the “principle of similarity”, which, under certain circumstances, allows for the application of UK law to acts committed in foreign jurisdictions if the foreign laws governing those acts are similar to the law governing such acts in the United Kingdom. In the Peppa Pig case, there were two elements of alleged copyright infringement, reproduction (which the court accepted had taken place in Vietnam) and communication to the public, which in addition to the UK took place widely, (the EU, US, Canada, Bangladesh, Ghana, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Malawi, Malaysia, Malta, New Zealand, Pakistan, Singapore, Taiwan and Thailand were specifically mentioned). The defendant’s position was that since copyright laws are of national origin, and differ from country to country, British law and an English court ruling could not apply outside the UK, and moreover, the claimants (Hasbro) had not proven infringement under any foreign laws.  

This argument failed. The court did not directly apply British law to jurisdictions outside the UK. Instead, it applied British law to infringements that–although they had taken place outside the UK–damaged a claimant that was registered and did business in Britain.  A remedy for these damages could be widely applied because, based on the principle of similarity, all the jurisdictions in question had similar laws (with respect to infringement of the communication right), according to the English court. This included the EU, since the UK had aligned its copyright legislation with EU standards prior to Brexit. As for other countries, they adhered to relevant international conventions, such as the 1961 Rome Treaty and the World Performances and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT) which required them to protect such rights.

The location of where an infringement occurs is important with respect to judicial jurisdiction as Getty Images learned when it brought a copyright infringement case against Stability AI in the UK. While Getty proceeded with the case to mixed results, it dropped its primary copyright claim against the AI company because it was evident that the training (i.e. reproduction) had taken place outside the UK. The location of the AI servers where the reproduction takes place is not a definitive jurisdictional factor, however. In the case of Toronto Star v OpenAI, the Ontario Superior Court determined it had jurisdiction to hear the case despite the fact that the actual unauthorized reproduction (copying) took place outside Canada. It so ruled because there was a real and substantial connection between the nature of dispute, the parties concerned, and the jurisdiction of the court. For example, OpenAI does business in Ontario and its terms of service for Ontario users constitute an Ontario contract.

In the Peppa Pig case, the English court exercised jurisdiction because some of the alleged infringement (communication to the public) had taken place in the UK and a UK entity was pleading damages. The court determined that UK consumers were “targeted” because (among other factors) no attempt was made to geoblock UK viewers, and Wolfoo programs contained UK advertising. The defendants argued that Wolfoo was aimed only at US and Vietnamese audiences. Having established that it had jurisdiction, the court then extended its remedy in the form of an effective global injunction.

So much for the “why”. What about the “how’? How can an English court impose its decision on a Vietnamese company operating in multiple international jurisdictions? First, SConnect has assets in the UK which could be in jeopardy if it does not comply with the injunction, as the company would be in contempt of court. More significantly, there are practical distribution considerations. Wolfoo is largely distributed via YouTube, owned as I am sure everyone knows, by Google. And although Google/YouTube is not named in the injunction, it is not going to stick its neck out for a company like SConnect and thumb its nose at the English court, for the obvious reasons that it also has major commercial interests in the UK. That is not to say that Google would not resort to litigation to prevent what it saw as extraterritorial reach by a foreign court  (see, for example, the Equustek case in Canada here, here, and here).  That case went to the Supreme Court of Canada. But in the end Google lost—and complied.

SConnect claims the UK court decision will not affect its future development of the Wolfoo brand, despite its compliance with the injunction. If so, the company will need to move forward on the basis of true innovation, not free-riding and infringement. Peppa, the porcine snorter has demonstrated her global reach, not just in popularity among young children in many different cultures, but even when it comes to slapping down an errant wolf.

© Hugh Stephens, 2026. All Rights Reserved.