More Balanced Interpretation of US “Transformation” Fair Use Test gives Rightsholders Better Leverage to Protect their Works

Photo: Author

A couple of recent cases in the US involving (mis)appropriation of copyrighted photographs indicate the tide may be changing with respect to the interpretation of what constitutes fair use, moving from a very liberal interpretation of “transformation” that has been used in recent years to justify unauthorized reproduction of copyrighted works by making them into “something (allegedly) new”, to a more balanced interpretation where the rights of the original creator/rightsholder are given greater weight. These cases are Andy Warhol Foundation v Goldsmith, decided by the US Supreme Court in May of 2023 and now, just last week, two cases (Graham v Prince and McNatt v Prince) in New York District Court. These involved photographers Donald Graham and Eric McNatt who had sued prominent appropriation artist Richard Prince and two well-known galleries, Gagosian and Blum & Poe, for copyright infringement. A final judgment was entered in these cases wherein Prince was found liable for willful infringement of the photographs, required to pay damages totalling five times the value of the infringing works he sold, plus paying the plaintiff’s legal costs, while also being restrained from reproducing, modifying, or distributing the contested artwork that was developed from the appropriated photographs. This is a big deal for photographers and other creators whose work is appropriated by others without authorization on the pretext of “transformation”. It could even have a ripple effect outside the US.

Last week my blog post was about photography, looked at through a historical lens from a copyright perspective. Photographers initially had a struggle to gain copyright protection for their works, at least in the US, but for many years now have enjoyed the benefits of such protection. However, just because photographs are recognized as copyright protected works doesn’t mean that infringement does not occur on a regular basis, or that photographers have not had their work appropriated without authorization as a result of court rulings interpreting what constitutes fair use (in the US).

For those readers not immersed in the minutiae of copyright, what follows is a brief explanation about fair use in the US and fair dealing in Canada. (Others may choose to skip to the next paragraph). Fair use is the provision in US law that allows users to reproduce parts of copyrighted works without permission or authorization from the rights holder, subject to various limitations and conditions. Unlike in Canada or a number of other countries where legal exceptions to copyright are based on a specified list of “fair dealing” purposes, the US fair use list is only illustrative. There is a four-part test in the US that courts use to judge whether an unauthorized use constitutes fair use. The four factors that are weighed are; (1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work. The “transformation test”, which has been an important factor in determining fair use in the US in recent years, comes in under the first category of the purpose and character of the use. Transformative use has been interpreted by US courts to mean the addition of new expression or meaning to an original work to create something new with a different purpose. Parody, which is both a fair dealing exception in Canada and one of the illustrative fair use categories in the US, is such an example where the original work is transformed to give it a new and different meaning. But transformation in the US can involve much more than just parody. The 2015 Google Books case (Authors Guild v Google Inc) where Google was sued for copyright infringement for unauthorized scanning and display of copyrighted works was decided, in Google’s favour, on the basis of “transformation”. The US Court of Appeals found that, “Google’s making of a digital copy to provide a search function is a transformative use, which augments public knowledge by making available information about Plaintiffs’ books without providing the public with a substantial substitute for matter protected by the Plaintiffs’ copyright interests in the original works…”. Notably Google, in settling an earlier case with US publishers, had agreed to limit the public display of a copied work to no more than 20 percent of its contents. The transformative use argument has been used as a fair use defence in a number of US copyright cases, including some involving photography. In these cases, the entire photograph was taken without authorization but then “transformed” by the addition of some new content.

One notable such case is Cariou v Prince, finally decided on appeal in 2013. In this case, Richard Prince successfully claimed fair use for his adaptation of photographs taken by French photographer Patrick Cariou. Prince did a series of paintings that incorporated photos of Rastafarians taken from Cariou’s book Yes, Rasta. The Appeal Court found that Prince’s paintings were not only sufficiently transformative to be different works, but they did not compete with the original in the marketplace. This case was part of a trend where US courts successively widened the interpretation of fair use based on a liberal application of the transformation principle.

The antidote to Cariou is the more recent Warhol v Goldsmith case, mentioned above. In this case, celebrity photographer Lynn Goldsmith sued the Warhol Foundation for copyright infringement in 2017 after she learned that her 1981 photograph of the noted singer-songwriter-musician Prince, who died in 2016, (not Richard Prince the artist, just to confuse things), had been used by Warhol (who himself died in 1987) to create a series of 14 silk screen images back in 1984. At the time, Goldsmith had been paid $400 by the publisher Conde Nast for a one time use of her photograph as an artist’s reference for Warhol to create an image for a Vanity Fair article about Prince, Purple Fame, published in November 1984. However, she was unaware that Warhol had created a whole series of prints from her photo. Years later, Vanity Fair paid the Warhol Foundation $10,000 for use of another of the prints in the series, Orange Prince, in an article to mark Prince’s death. Goldsmith was neither paid nor credited. She sued (actually countersued) for infringement after the Foundation sought a declaratory judgment that the creation of the series was fair use. It was an uphill battle for Goldsmith against a very wealthy and well-known Foundation, but in the end she won. The US Supreme Court decided in May of 2023 that Goldsmith’s copyright had been infringed—but only in the one instance regarding the use of Orange Prince, which was seen as a market substitute for Goldsmith’s original photograph. The ruling was 7-2 with Justice Sotomayer writing “Goldsmith’s original works, like those of other photographers, are entitled to copyright protection, even against famous artists”. 

The doors of transformative use, swinging wide open for the past couple of decades, had just closed a bit. It is not irrelevant to note that the transformative use argument is the main fair use defence put forward by AI developers to justify their unauthorized scraping and ingestion of copyrighted content to train generative AI algorithms. Now, on the heels of the Warhol v Goldsmith decision, we have the outcome of the two photographer’s cases against Richard Prince and the galleries. This suggests that the seemingly open-ended “transformation” standard in the US is changing, or at least that the Supreme Court’s Warhol decision is sending a message that open season on photographers (and other creative works) by appropriation artists may be coming to an end.

One of the two photography cases against Richard Prince goes back almost eight years, to about the time that Prince prevailed in the Cariou case. Graham, whose 1998 photograph “Rastafarian Smoking a Joint” was appropriated by Prince, launched his suit in 2016. McNatt’s suit, for infringement of his photograph of musician Kim Gordon, came four years later. Last year Richard Prince tried to get the cases dismissed, but the judge refused. Prince had added very little to the photographs, mostly some gibberish text, yet the “artworks” were sold for substantial sums and exhibited in the prestigious Gagosian Gallery, a co-defendant.

The cases did not go to trial by jury. On January 25, a final judgement was entered by the parties and accepted by the court in which Prince agreed to pay the damages, which were far in excess of what statutory damages would have been. While Richard Prince’s attorneys are claiming that the artist did not admit infringement, the fact that he decided to avoid going to trial and agreed to the damages is a pretty realistic appraisal of what the likely outcome of a trial would have been. Unlike a “settlement”, which the two photographers refused, a “final judgement” is not subject to a confidentiality agreement as to the terms. According to legal counsel representing the photographers, they rejected a confidential settlement (where damages could have been higher) because they wanted the appropriation issue exposed. They succeeded.

It is impossible to know precisely what impact the Warhol/Goldsmith case had on this outcome, but it is surely not coincidental that after almost eight years of litigation (in the case of plaintiff Graham) that Richard Prince decided to put this behind him and cut his losses just months after the Supreme Court’s decision. After Warhol, the Prince case marks another example of some restoration of balance to the interpretation of transformative use. It is not enough to simply add a few features to an original work, and claim it is somehow “transformed” into something entirely different. The lawyer representing the photographers described this as a David versus Goliath case, where a couple of individual photographers took on a major artist and gallery–and won. This demonstrates that fair use as applied in the US clearly has limits and that even the rich and famous can be called to account.

It remains to be seen whether this trend, which started with Warhol, will continue but it is a positive sign for artists wanting to protect their work from unauthorized reproduction and appropriation. The Warhol case has no direct legal impact outside the United States, of course, but it has been taken note of elsewhere. It could mark a turning of the tide. Proponents of further widening copyright exceptions in Canada by modifying fair dealing criteria to be illustrative, as in the US, rather than prescriptive as is currently the case, (by inserting “such as” when describing fair dealing categories) will take little comfort from this. The false allure of more permissive unauthorized copying propped up by the US transformative use doctrine has already seeped across many borders. Now perhaps the counter trend will also spread.

With respect to the Warhol case, one Canadian IP lawyer has statedI think SCOTUS’s application of fair use to the facts, in this case, will be persuasive to Canadian courts when they have to apply fair dealing to similar facts.” While the transformation doctrine does not directly apply in Canada, it has some applicability with respect to parody. We shall see in time what the long-term impact may be. But from the perspective of creators everywhere, reinserting some much-needed balance into the US fair use transformation standard is a welcome and important development as copyright law continues to evolve.

© Hugh Stephens, 2024.

We All Remember the Iconic Photo of the Last Spike, But Who Was the Photographer?

Photo by author: Revelstoke Railway Museum

A lot of discussion recently has revolved around AI technology and its impact on artistic, musical, and literary creators. This is an evolving and important issue. However, for this week’s blog, I am going to go back to an earlier technology, photography, and look at its connection to creativity and copyright, especially in the Canadian context.

Photography’s entry into the copyright world was not without controversy. For some it was merely a mechanical process, not worthy of protection. But unlike AI-created works (as opposed to works created by humans with some assistance from AI), photography did and does allow human creators to express and interpret the world around them, albeit using a mechanical device.

As many know, in the US it was the arresting Civil War photos of Mathew Brady that convinced the US Congress to add photography to the list of works protected by copyright in 1865,  but it was not until almost twenty years later that this was confirmed by the courts in the Burrow-Giles Lithographic Company v Sarony case in which professional photographer Napoleon Sarony convinced the US Supreme Court this his posed photographs of Oscar Wilde embodied protectable elements of creative expression. The lithographic company had reproduced and sold 85,000 prints of Sarony’s photo without authorization.

In Canada, although photographs were first officially referenced in Canadian legislation in the Copyright Act of 1868, enacted right after Confederation, legal scholar Myra Tawfik, in her meticulously researched new work, “For the Encouragement of Learning”, notes that even though photographs were not mentioned in legislation they were accepted for copyright registration as early as 1859 and in fact became the second largest genre of protected works in the period from 1859 to 1867. (Tawfik, 254-55). Photography also allowed visual artists to gain some protection for their artwork since at the time, prior to 1868, the law did not protect paintings and sculptures. For example, well known artist Cornelius Krieghoff registered photographic representations of a number of his paintings.

One famous photograph that I do know was copyrighted was the famous 1885 depiction of Donald Smith, (later graced with a somewhat more esoteric honorific moniker as Lord Strathcona), driving the supposed last spike of the CPR (Canadian Pacific Railway) to complete Canada’ first transcontinental railway. The copyright was likely registered by the man behind the camera, Alexander (Alex) Ross. I have seen this particular photograph many times as it is one of the more iconic photos in Canadian history. It was seized on by historian Pierre Berton as the inspiration for his 1971 book, The Last Spike, once a popular read along with many of his other historical works. However, I was never aware the photo was copyrighted, nor had I ever seen it labelled as such, nor did I know anything about the photographer, until I stumbled over it in the Revelstoke Railway Museum this past summer.

Back in the day, Revelstoke was a major maintenance centre on the CPR mainline where eastbound steam engines prepared for their long ascent through the mountains. It still plays an important role in track maintenance for the mile long freight trains that now roll through town. It has an interesting museum, with a steam locomotive, various bits of rolling stock and lots of artifacts. In one of its halls, I came across the familiar Last Spike photo, with the word “Copyright” clearly marked on it (as you can see from my photo of the photo). This immediately caught my eye and made me wonder about the person who had been up in the mountains that day (November 7, 1885) and captured this event for posterity.

In the photo, Smith is seen pounding in the last spike (an ordinary iron spike; no precious metals for the cash-strapped CPR) at Craigellachie (45 kilometres west of Revelstoke) in the Monashee Mountains to complete the CPR’s coast-to-coast construction. Smith was a senor Director of the CPR and the most senior company representative present, with neither the company president nor the Governor-General, the Marquess of Lansdowne (whose actual name was Henry Charles Keith Petty-Fitzmaurice, a tad fancier than just plain Mr. Smith), being available to travel to BC for the ceremony. Smith had already had a successful business career by this point and later went on to achieve further prominence through politics and philanthropy, personally raising a cavalry regiment for the South African War, named after him. Lord Strathcona’s Horse is now a regular-force armoured regiment in the Canadian Army. Smith (Strathcona) also served for many years as Canadian High Commissioner to the UK. Others in the photo are the white-bearded stern looking railway engineer and surveyor Sandford Fleming (with top hat), later known as the “Father of Standard Time Zones”, William Cornelius van Horne, the American General Manager of the CPR (later its President) and Sam Steele of the NorthWest Mounted Police, who later became the first Commanding officer of the Strathcona’s when they were formed in 1900. (Fleming, van Horne and Steele were all later knighted by Queen Victoria). There is also a young boy, Edward Mallandaine, who had thrust himself into the picture just before the photographer snapped it. Mallandaine, who was actually 18 at the time although looking much younger, went on to a career as an architect, and was a founder of the City of Creston, BC, living until 1949. All these facts, names and faces are quite well known, but what of the photographer?  

According to the Canadian Encyclopedia, Calgary-based Alexander Ross was a last minute stand in for the expected photographer who did not show up. Ross (born 1851) was originally from Pictou, Nova Scotia and took up photography in his twenties and with his younger brother formed Ross Brothers Photography. It was successful and in 1878 won first prize for photography at the Nova Scotia Provincial Agriculture and Industrial Exhibition in Truro. He subsequently left Nova Scotia and moved west, joining a partner, John Best, to form Ross, Best and Company. In the latter half of the 1880’s Ross became well known for many photographs of Indigenous peoples, particularly from the Blackfoot nation. Many of these photos are an indelible record of a seminal time in history. However, Ross closed his studio in 1891 and died at the early age of 43 three years later. The CPR must have licensed the photograph from Ross as it disseminated the image widely to promote the railway, or perhaps the company owned the copyright as a commissioned work. At the time Ross took the photo, it would have remained under copyright until 1913 with a possible extension to 1927. Under new legislation introduced in 1921 and enacted in 1924, the copyright would have been extended to 1935. But of course, it is now in the public domain, notwithstanding the prominent display of the word “copyright” on the print in the Revelstoke Museum. The Museum’s copy must be an old one, probably inherited from the former CPR passenger station.

In Canada, copyright registration was first entrusted to the Department of Agriculture when the Dominion government was established in 1867 and legislation (The Copyright Act of 1868) was passed to protect “any book, map, chart or musical composition, or any original painting, drawing, statuary, sculpture or photograph”, as well as etchings, designs, engravings or prints for a period of 28 years from the date of creation, with the possibility of adding an addition 14 years (for a total of 42) if applied for prior to the expiration of the original term. This was consistent with British legislation current at the time.

The 1921 Canadian Copyright Act extended the term of protection to 50 years from date of creation and in the late 1990s further revisions provided photographs with the same degree of protection as other forms of creativity, that is to say the lifespan of the author plus 50 years. Further revisions were made in 2012 to place copyright ownership of commissioned photographic works taken by freelance photographers in the hands of the photographers by default rather than in the hands of clients. Previously, freelance photographers had to request that clients assign the copyright of commissioned works to them as part of contractual terms. (The copyright on photographs taken for an employer as part of an employment contract remains with the employer). More recently, (December 30, 2022) the term of protection in Canada was extended to the lifespan of the author plus 70 years.

Early photographers in Canada, such as Ross and Geraldine Moodie (“Geraldine Moodie and her Pioneering Photographs: A Piece of Canada’s Copyright History”) took all the appropriate steps to protect their work, in the case of Moodie going to inordinate trouble given her remote location. We are lucky they did. Photographic images bring history to life and without the person behind the camera capturing the scene with their artistry, the image of the Last Spike would not be there to remind us of the enormous nation-building and business enterprise that came into being 150 or more years ago at Craigellachie.

© Hugh Stephens, 2024. All Rights Reserved.

Artificial Intelligence and Copyright: The Canadian Cultural Community Speaks Out

Image: http://www.shutterstock.com

The extended period set by the Canadian Government (through Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada, ISED) for response to its consultation paper on Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Copyright closed on January 15. We will start to see a flurry of submissions released by participants while ISED digests and assesses the input it has received. One of the first is the submission from the Coalition for the Diversity of Cultural Expression (CDCE), which represents over 360,000 creators and nearly 3,000 cultural businesses in both French and English-speaking parts of Canada. CDCE’s membership includes organizations representing authors, film producers, actors, musicians, publishers, songwriters, screenwriters, artists, directors, poets, music publishers—just about every profession you can think of that depends on creativity, and protection for creative output. The CDCE submission highlights three key recommendations, summarized as follows;

  • No weakening of copyright protection for works currently protected (i.e. no exception for text and data mining to use copyrighted works without authorization to train AI systems)
  • Copyright must continue to protect only works created by humans (AI generated works should not qualify)
  • AI developers should be required to be transparent and disclose what works have been ingested as part of the training process (transparency and disclosure).

While none of these recommendations are surprising, and from my perspective are eminently reasonable, I am sure we will also see a number of submissions arguing that, “in the interests of innovation”, access to copyrighted works is not only essential but should be freely available without permission or payment. OpenAI, the motive force behind ChatGPT—and the defendant in the most recent high-profile copyright infringement case involving AI (When Giants Wrestle, the Earth Moves (NYT v OpenAI/Microsoft)—has already staked out part of this position. In its brief to the UK House of Lords Select Committee looking into Large Language Models (LLMs), a key technology that drives AI development, the company says;

“Because copyright today covers virtually every sort of human expression–including blog posts, photographs, forum posts, scraps of software code, and government documents–it would be impossible to train today’s leading AI models without using copyrighted materials (emphasis added). Limiting training data to public domain books and drawings created more than a century ago might yield an interesting experiment, but would not provide AI systems that meet the needs of today’s citizens.”

OpenAI claims that it respects content creators and owners and looks forward to continuing to work with them, citing among other things, the licensing agreement for content it has signed with the Associated Press. But failure to reach a licensing deal with the New York Times is really the crux of the lawsuit that the media giant has brought against OpenAI and its key investor Microsoft. If reports are true that OpenAI’s licensing deals top out at $5 million annually, it is not surprising that licensing negotiations between the Times and OpenAI broke down over such lowball offerings.

As for the CDCE submission to ISED, it recommends that the government refrain from creating any new exceptions for text and data mining (TDM) since this would interfere with the ability of users and rightsholders to set the boundaries of the emerging market in licensing. No copyright exemption for AI is what the British government has just confirmed, after playing footsie with the concept for over a year. Apart from the examples of the licensing deals that OpenAI has with the Associated Press and German multimedia giant Axel Springer, the CDCE paper notes a range of other recent examples of content owners offering access to their product through licensing arrangements, including Getty Images, Universal Music Group and educational and scientific publishers like Elsevier. The paper also urges the government to avoid interfering in the market when it comes to setting appropriate compensation, leaving it to market players or, where the players can’t reach agreement, to the quasi-judicial Copyright Board.

In my view, licensing is going to be the solution that will eventually level the playing field, but to get there it will require that major content players lockout the AI web-crawlers while pursuing legal redress, as the NYT is doing. This will help to open the licensing path to smaller players and individual creators who don’t have the resources available to employ either technical or legal remedies. (The issue of what has already been ingested without authorization still needs to be settled). As for the tech industry’s suggestion that creators can opt-out of content ingestion if they wish, CDCE rightly points out that this is standing the world on its head, and would be contrary to longstanding copyright practice. Not only is it impractical in a world where what goes into an AI model is a black box (thus the imperative for transparency) but it is like saying a homeowner has to request not to be burgled, or else can expect to become a target.

On the question of whether AI generated works should be granted copyright protection, CDCE points out the double-standard of proposing an exception to copyright for TDM for inputs while claiming copyright protection for AI generated outputs. The need for human creativity is a line that has been firmly held by the US Copyright Office, pushing back on various attempts to register AI-generated (as opposed to AI-assisted) works. Canada has not been quite so clear cut in its position, owing to the way in which copyright is registered (almost by default, without examination) in Canada, as I pointed out in this blog post (A Tale of Two Copyrights). While AI generated works have received copyright protection in Canada (Canadian Copyright Registration for my 100 Percent AI-Generated Work), this is more by oversight than design, given the way the Canadian copyright registration system works.

Thirdly, we turn to transparency, a sine qua non if licensing solutions are to be implemented.  If authors don’t know whether their works are being used to train AI algorithms, or can’t easily prove it, licensing will fall flat. CDCE calls for publication of all content ingested into training models, disclosure of any content outputs that contain AI, and design of AI models to prevent generation of illegal or infringing content. This is similar to requirements already under consideration in the EU.

CDCE also makes the important point that it is not just copyright legislation that defends individual and collective rights against the incursions of AI and big AI platforms. While the Copyright Act offers some protection to creators, privacy legislation is important for all citizens. As the UK Information Commissioner has pointed out in a recent report, the legal basis for web-scraping is dependent on (a) not breaching any laws, such as intellectual property or contract laws and (b) conformity with UK privacy laws (the GDPR, or General Data Protection Regulation), where the privacy rights of the individual may override the interests of AI developers, even if data scraping meets other legitimate interest tests.

Finally, there is the question of the moral rights of creators that can be threatened by misapplication of AI, whether it is infringement of a performer’s personality or publicity right, distortion of their performance or creative output, misuse of their works for commercial or political reasons or any of the other reasons why copyright gives the creator the right to authorize use of their work.

Quite apart from the question of AI, there are of course other outstanding copyright questions that need to be resolved urgently, including the longstanding issue of the ill-conceived education “fair dealing” exception that has undermined if not permanently damaged the educational publishing industry in Canada. This exception needs to be narrowed to allow users continued unlicensed access to copyrighted materials under fair dealing guidelines for study, research and educational purposes but to limit institutional use to situations only where a work is not commercially available under a license from a rightsholder or collective society. While this issue requires looking back and fixing something that is already broken, policy making with respect to AI and copyright needs to anticipate the future and “do no harm”, while requiring AI developers to open up their black boxes and respect existing rights. This should be achieved by maintaining and protecting the rights of creators in ways that will facilitate market-based licensing solutions for use of copyrighted content by AI developers, while ensuring that creative output remains the domain of human beings, and not machines.

© Hugh Stephens, 2024.

There’s a Good Reason it’s not called “Artificial Creativity”

Image: Shutterstock

There has been lots of ink spilled over the issue of Artificial Intelligence (AI) developers free riding on the backs of creators by copying and ingesting their content without permission to produce AI “created” content, output that sometimes competes directly in the market with the original work. The most recent high-profile case involving this process is the complaint brought by the New York Times against OpenAI and indirectly Microsoft. Last week, I wrote about that case here. (When Giants Wrestle, the Earth Moves: NYT v OpenAI/Microsoft).

AI developers defend themselves by arguing, in the US context, that their actions constitute fair use. They claim that what they’re doing is no different from, say, an art student studying works by the Old Masters, imbibing inspiration from them, and then producing their own original work. The result of the AI process, they argue, is the same. It is creating something new through a “transformative” process such as the one that happens when a creator (artist, writer, composer, or other creator) takes inspiration from early works but then produces something new and original. The new work constitutes their own expression of the idea of which the earlier work was but a representation. However, there is a fundamental flaw with this argument when it comes to AI.

The argument presupposes that all creativity is merely a new combination of existing knowledge. Is creativity merely a rearrangement of what came before or is there an additional X factor introduced when something new is created? Does this X factor exist in AI-created works, or is AI exclusively based on the corpus of existing knowledge? Judging by the way it is trained, one must conclude it’s the latter. The algorithm is fed vast amounts of existing content that it regurgitates in response to prompts. Sometimes the inputs are not evident, especially if there are vast numbers of them; sometimes they are all too evident as in the case of ChatGPT producing virtually verbatim excerpts from the New York Times. But in neither case is it apparent to me that anything truly “new” or “creative” has been produced. An AI algorithm is not a proxy for the human brain or for human creation.

Even with vast numbers of inputs scraped from the internet—the good, bad and the ugly—an AI machine can only produce what it has been exposed to. Sometimes it produces a mish-mashed version of what it has been fed, where individual inputs are not obvious. At other times it resorts to total plagiarism, and at yet other times it produces a pale and shallow imitation of the original. So why not go to the original? Moreover, the conclusions AI draws from the data it has been trained on can be, and often are, completely wrong from a factual point of view. The NYT complaint outlined convincingly how AI can just make up answers from its database when it doesn’t have the facts. I suppose you could say this shows an element of “creativity”, but it is creativity of a blind and completely irresponsible kind.

In reflecting on this, I am thinking of my own modest efforts at creativity, particularly my recent book, “In Defence of Copyright”. As an AI machine would do, I consulted a lot of sources (but did not copy their work other than to register the content in my brain and make a few notes where I wanted to cite something specific.) I then stitched together a narrative that drew on a lot of existing knowledge, with proper citations and credit of course. However, along the way, as part of the writing process, elements of personal creativity inevitably crept in. Personal experiences that only I have had influenced my thinking and conclusions. No one else could have produced this work in exactly the same way, even if I had given them all my reference materials. The shaping of the book came from me.  I decided what to put in and what to leave out. I decided the order of the presentation. I decided how various points would be expressed, what the tone would be, and what particular terms and references to use. And I drew the conclusions in the book. Could an AI “machine” have done this?

If I had put in the prompts, “write me a book explaining what copyright is and how it works, why it’s important, covering its history and current challenges, providing some examples of controversies in copyright law along with some case studies and entertaining anecdotes”, AI would have produced a generic version but I doubt that the work would bear much similarity to my expression of these ideas. It would have a pastiche of ideas of others but without the X factor of personal interpretation.  

If you want something “new” and truly creative, with new insights and elements, don’t rely on AI. It can’t create what it has not been fed, although it can get the content wrong. AI has no true creative capabilities; in my view it is simply an artificial reorganization of existing ideas.

And while I am on the topic of creativity, even though I swore that unlike in the past I would not be tempted this year to comment on the annual hyperbole about works coming into the public domain, like Disney’s Steamboat Willie, I am going to succumb. Willie has managed to capture the usual facile press attention devoted to the annual crop of works that fall into the public domain in the US each January 1. I was provoked to make these comments by an interview on CBC radio in which a law professor at UBC, after providing a balanced and thoughtful overview of what Willie’s entry into the public domain in the US means in Canada, and how those wishing to use Willie’s image to create new works need to be careful, then waxed on about how meaningful this was because it would unleash a flood of creative derivative works based on the 1928 cartoon version of Mickey. A horror version, where Mickey as Willie is depicted as a violent slasher, is one of the first out of the gate  It is directed, I am ashamed to say, by a Canadian. Variety has a story about another equally inane production, this one American, in which Mickey torments a group of unsuspecting ferry passengers. How has the world been able to survive without these creations until now?

Our professor, who is a comic book fan, enthused about how exciting it will be when Superman enters the public domain. Superman derivatives will then be freely produced by all these people waiting to clip his wings. Superman was first published by DC Comics in 1938 so it will be a while before his image will be defaced by “creators” seeking to, in effect, free ride on the reputation of a successful character who has been developed over the years by the rights-holder. Of course, the idea of a flying human with supernatural powers cannot be copyrighted. It is the expression of that particular idea, in this case in the personality of Superman, that is protected. The existence of a range of other superheroes, including some who can fly, such as Captain Marvel and Green Lantern, is ample proof of this. So why do all these creative people, who now have access to all kinds of technology to produce content attractive to consumers, need to exploit an existing character, and make it do weird and out-of-character things? Because they are not truly creative!

A true creator would invent a new character, not exploit one where all the heavy lifting of building name recognition has been done by someone else. Successful writers may be inspired by the works of other authors, but they don’t wait until those works fall into the public domain and hijack the characters and reputation of the work to produce a warmed-over version of the original. I can’t understand why supposedly creative people are so obsessed by well-known works falling into the public domain, especially if they have the name Disney associated with them. Is it because they need the crutch of the Disney reputation to get anyone to pay attention to works that hardly matter—and lack much creativity?

Anything for a quick buck, I guess, using the veneer of “creativity” to justify what is really a paucity of imagination. AI is not all that different. It can produce content that is “good enough” for some routine and mundane purposes, but in doing so it risks stifling true creativity. AI needs to be harnessed for the greater good, not allowed to become the dominant producer of content, in the process threatening to replace true and original creation. Once the well of human creation dries up, there will be no water to lubricate the AI machine. We need to manage AI carefully or face the consequences of a cultural drought.

© Hugh Stephens, 2024

When Giants Wrestle, the Earth Moves (NYT v OpenAI/Microsoft)

Image:www.shutterstock.com

There is no better way to start out the New Year, 2024, with a commentary on Artificial Intelligence (AI) and copyright. It was the big emerging issue in 2023 and is going to be even bigger in 2024. The unlicensed and unauthorized reproduction of copyright-protected material to train AI “machines”, in the process often producing content that directly competes in the market with the original material, is the Achilles heel of AI development. To date, no one knows if it is legal to do so, in the US or elsewhere, as the issue is still before the courts. The cases brought to date by artists, writers and image content purveyors like Getty Images have not always been the strongest or best thought out. In one instance, the plaintiffs had not even registered the copyright on some of the works for which they were claiming infringement, a fatal flaw in the US where registration is a sine qua non in order to bring an infringement case. That may have been the most egregious example of a rookie error but in general the artists’ and writers’ cases have not gone too well so far, although the process continues. Some cases are on stronger grounds than others. Here is a good summary. The Getty Images case will be an interesting one to watch. And now the New York Times has weighed in with a billion-dollar suit against Open AI, and Microsoft. The big guys are now at the table and the sleeves are rolled up. The giants are wrestling.

What is at issue could be nothing less than the survival of the news media and the ability of individual creators to protect and monetize their work. It could also open a pathway to legitimacy for the burgeoning AI industry. The ultimate solution is surely not to put a halt to AI development, nor to put content creators out of business. It is to find a modus vivendi between the needs of AI developers to ingest content in order to train algorithms that will “create” (sort of) content–assembled from vast swathes of input–and the rights of content creators. While training sets are generally very large, some of the input can be very creator-specific and the output very creator-competitive. This is where the New York Times comes in.

The Times, like any enterprise, needs to be paid for the content it creates in order to stay in business and create yet more content. If its expensively acquired “product”, whether news, lifestyle, cooking, book reviews or any of the other content that Times’ readers crave and are willing to pay for, can be obtained for free through an AI algorithm (“What is the most popular brunch recipe in the NYT using eggs, bacon and spinach”, or “What does Thomas Friedman think of…..”), this creates a huge disincentive to go to the source and undermines journalism’s business model, already under severe stress and threat.

The Times is one of the few journals that has managed to thrive, relatively speaking, in the new digital age at a time when many of its competitors are dying on the vine. According to Press Gazette, the New York Times is the leading paywalled news publisher, with 9.4 million subscribers. (Wall Street Journal and Washington Post are numbers two and three respectively). You need to pay to read the Times, and why not? But paying for access does not give you the right to copy the content, especially for commercial purposes. (The Times offers various licensing agreements for reproduction of its content, with cost dependent on use). Technically, all it takes is one subscription from OpenAI and the content of the Times is laid bare to the reproduction machines, the “large language models”, or LLMs, used by the AI developers. The Times has now thrown down the gauntlet. Its legal complaint, 69 pages long, makes compelling reading. If there ever was a “smoking gun” putting the spotlight directly on the holus-bolus copying and ingestion of copyright protected proprietary content in order to produce an unfair directly-competing commercial product that harms the original source, this is it. It’s a far cry from earlier copyright infringement cases brought by some artists and writers.

While you can read the complaint yourself if you are interested (recommended reading), let me tease out a few of the highlights. After setting out the well-proven case for the excellence of its journalism, the Times’ complaint notes that while the defendants engaged in widespread copying from many sources, they gave Times’ content particular emphasis when building their LLMs, thus revealing a preference that recognized the value of that content. The result was a free ride on the journalism produced at great expense by the Times, using Times’ content to build “substitutive products” without permission or payment.

Not only does ChatGPT at times regurgitate the Times’ content verbatim, or closely summarizes it while mimicking its style, at other times it wrongly attributes false information to the Times. This is referred to in AI circles as “hallucination”, something the complaint labels misinformation that undermines the credibility of the Times’ reporting and reputation. Hallucination is a particularly dangerous element of AI produced content. Rather than admitting it doesn’t know the answer, the AI algorithm simply makes it up, complete with false references and attributions all of which make it very difficult for the average reader to separate fact from fiction. This misinformation is the basis of the Times’ complaint for trademark dilution that accompanies various other copyright related complaints of infringement. Concrete examples of such misinformation are provided in the complaint.

So too is ample evidence of users exploiting ChatGPT to pierce the Times’ paywall, by asking for the completion of stories that have been blocked for non-subscribers. There are concrete examples of carefully researched restaurant and product reviews that have been replicated virtually verbatim. Not only is the Times’ subscription model undermined, but the value it derives from reader-linked product referrals from its own platform bleeds to Bing when the product is accessed through Microsoft Search enabled by ChatGPT. Examples are given of full news articles based on extensive Times’ investigative reporting being reproduced by ChatGPT, with only the slightest variations. These are not composite news reports of what is happening in Gaza, for example, but a word-for- word lifting of a Times’ analysis of what Hamas knew about Israeli military intelligence. The Times’ complaint makes for chilling reading. AI’s hand has been caught firmly in the cookie jar.

What does the Times want out of all of this? The complaint does not specify a dollar amount, while noting the billions in increased valuation that has accrued to OpenAI and Microsoft as a result of ChatGPT. However, it asks for statutory and compensatory damages, “restitution, disgorgement, and any other relief that may be permitted by law or equity” as well as destruction of all LLM models incorporating New York Times’ content, plus, of course, costs. If the Times gets its way, this will be a huge setback for AI development as well as for OpenAI and Microsoft, but of course it may not come to that. The complaint notes that the Times had tried to reach a licensing deal with the defendants. OpenAI cried foul, expressing “disappointment”, and noting that they had been having “productive” and “constructive” discussions with the Times over licensing content. However, to me this is a bit like stealing the cookies, getting caught red-handed and offering to negotiate to pay for them, then crying foul when your offer is rebuffed. The Times has just massively upped the ante, making the potential licensing fees much more valuable.

The irony is that the use of NYT material by OpenAI or indeed other platforms like Google or Facebook potentially brings some advantage and drives some business to the Times, while obviously also providing commercial benefits to the AI program, search engines or social media platforms. The real question will be how that proprietary content is used, and how much is paid to use it. A similar issue is being played out in another context, most recently in Canada with Bill C-18 where news media content providers wanted the big platforms (Google and Meta/Facebook) that derive benefit from using or indexing that content to pay for accessing it. The result in Canada was both a standoff and a compromise. Facebook blocked Canadian news content rather than pay for it, while Google agreed to create a fund for access by the news media in return for being exempted from the Canadian legislation.

The NYT-OpenAI/Microsoft lawsuit is a different iteration of the same principle. Businesses that gain commercial advantage from using proprietary content of others should contribute to the creation of that content, either through licensing or some other means such as a media fund. The most logical outcome of the Times’ lawsuit is almost certainly going to be a licensing agreement. Given the seemingly unstoppable wave of AI development, meaningful licensing agreements would seem to be the best way to ensure fairness and balance of interests going forward.  

A Goliath like the New York Times is in a much better position to make this happen than a disparate group of writers and artists. Indeed, there are logistical challenges in being able to license the works of tens of thousands of content creators. In an earlier blog post, I postulated that perhaps copyright collectives might find a role for themselves in this area in future. In my view, ultimately the only logical solution to the conundrum of respecting rights-holders while facilitating the development of AI is to find common ground through fair and balanced licensing solutions. The wrestling giants of the NYT and Microsoft may help show the way.

© Hugh Stephens 2024. All Rights Reserved.

DM@X in Toronto will be discussing the big Canadian content issues of 2023 and 2024

Used with permission

Around this time of year, I typically write a blog post looking back at the big content issues over the past year and peek forward at the coming 12 months, in Canada, the US and elsewhere.  There is no doubt that the biggest issue can be summarized in just two letters—AI (Artificial Intelligence)–its role in society, it potential misuse, and the challenges and, yes, opportunities that it presents to creators. But there are a number of other key issues as well, particularly if we direct our focus to Canada. These include payment for use of news content by dominant online platforms (i.e. the Online News Act, Bill C-18), the extent and nature of the contribution expected of foreign streamers to funding Canadian content production (i.e. the Online Streaming Act, Bill C-11)–along with a likely revised definition of what constitutes Canadian Content (CanCon)–plus online safety, and the future of digital media. Happily all of these topics, along with AI and Cultural Expression, will be explored in depth at the 10th annual DM (Digital Media)@X (the Crossroads) conference, to be held January 19-20, 2024 at the Faculty of Music (Walter Hall in the Edward Johnson Building), on the University of Toronto campus.

DM@X began back in 2015 as a one-day event, largely focussed on digital challenges in the music industry but also including such now-dated topics as “the rise of Netflix” (and Spotify).  Since then, it has grown in strength and reach, including during the COVID hiatus where the proceedings were online, reaching a wider audience. But this year, real-life networking will once again take place. 

The conference will lead off with a report from the strategic communications research firm Nordicity,  reviewing revenues, employment and future trends in the digital media universe in Canada. This will be followed by what promises to be an interesting discussion on how CanCon should be defined, featuring Doug Barrett, Adjunct Professor of Media and Entertainment Management at York’s Schulich School of Business and a prominent entertainment lawyer for more than two decades at McMillan LLP, Valerie Creighton, CEO, Canada Media Fund, and Richard Stursberg,  former President of the Canadian Cable Television Association, Telefilm Canada and head of English services at the CBC, as well as being the author of The Tangled Garden, a Canadian Cultural Manifesto for the Digital Age. Day 1 closes with a panel on how streamers should fund Canadian content, referring to C-11, the Online Streaming Act, featuring former CRTC commissioner and communications lawyer Monique Lafontaine, MediaPolicy.ca blogger Howard Law, and Michael MacMillan, CEO of Blue Ant Media.

Day 2, Saturday, opens with a discussion of the online harms legislation, which is having some difficulty getting out the gate, followed by a panel on C-18, the Online News Act. Then the conference looks at interactive advertising, new developments in digital journalism and the role of social media in online streaming. The keynote luncheon address, explaining where the CRTC stands with its full agenda, will be delivered by CRTC Commissioner for Ontario Bram Abramson. After lunch there will be a panel on AI featuring Stephen Stohn, producer of the Degrassi series and Neal McDougall, Assistant Executive Director of the Writers’ Guild of Canada, moderated by none other than yours truly. The final two panels will be on how broadcasters can support Indigenous, black and other racialized creators, and on the future of personalized audio streaming featuring Xavier “X” Jernigan, Spotify’s AI DJ and Head of Cultural Partnerships. While I haven’t listed every speaker and moderator (and with apologies to those I missed), the full program is available here.

You can register here for $515.  However, the student rate is only $75.  And registrants who are affiliated with one of the educational or creative institution sponsors (of which there are many), can register for just $185.    

While DM@X will present a great opportunity to examine many of the topics that captured the attention of the content community this year, not everyone will be in Toronto in January so let me offer a quick recap of the issues from my perspective. As mentioned earlier, the big issue—globally—was AI and the impact that it will have on creators and creative industries. Generative AI burst on to the creative scene in 2022, through creation of both images and texts that resembled to a greater or lesser extent original works that had been used to train the AI algorithm. Inevitably this unauthorized ingestion of copyrighted content was going to be challenged in the courts, and 2023 saw a spate of such cases. First out the gate was a suit by Getty Images against Stability AI in the UK, while another was brought by a group of artists in the US against Stable Diffusion, as I wrote about here. These were followed by lawsuits launched by a number of writers against text copying by AI firms. The Hollywood writers’ strike, where screenwriters and actors fought to control the impact of AI on their profession, was another example of creatives trying to come to grips with the AI challenge. In the US, after rejecting several attempts to obtain copyright registration for AI-generated works, the US Copyright Office (USCO) organized a series of public consultations and at the end of August formally announced a study on copyright law and policy issues related to AI. Canada was a bit slower off the mark but announced its own consultation on AI and copyright in October, with submissions requested by January 15, 2024.

Canada and the US have followed very different paths when it comes to recognizing copyright in AI-generated works. The USCO  has been firm that it will not register works where the content has been generated, rather than just assisted, by AI. In Canada, by contrast, the Canadian Intellectual Property Office will issue a copyright certificate to just about any work, computer generated or not, as long as no- one else has registered a similar work, as I proved when I applied and received a copyright certificate for my 100% computer-generated work earlier this year. Meanwhile efforts are taking place to reach some sort of international consensus on the rules for use of AI, ranging from input and output copyright issues to its potential misuse in a number of areas, where AI when improperly used can lead to invasion of privacy, race or income biases, fake news, manipulated images, appropriation of the right of personality and many other possible harms.

Other key issues very much in the news in Canada were, as mentioned earlier, online news (Bill C-18), online streaming (C-11) and Canadian content (CanCon). This latter issue will be addressed by the CRTC as it develops regulations to implement the Online Streaming Act. Both C-18 and C-11 became law in 2023 after a fairly lengthy legislative process. Much work, however, remains to be done regarding the implementing regulations. In the case of C-18, after Meta’s refusal to comply with the intent of the bill by blocking Canadian news on its platform, a deal was cut with Google to bring them onboard with the legislation although it is fair to say that the final outcome was likely not what many in the news media had expected when the bill began its journey through Parliament.

All these topics, and more, will be thoroughly examined at DM@X. If you are interested in digital content issues in Canada, this conference is not to be missed.

© Hugh Stephens 2023. All Rights Reserved.

Winnie the Pooh’s Copyright (and Other) Wars

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I am sure you are all familiar with the books by the British writer A.A. Milne about Winnie the Pooh-bear and his friends, Eyeore, Piglet, Kanga, Roo, Rabbit, Owl, Tigger, and their adventures with Christopher Robin, who was Milne’s son. You have probably read the stories to your own children or had them read to you when you were young or, if not, you have likely watched a Disney film on Winnie the Pooh at some time. Books about Winnie and his friends are likely to be in Christmas stockings again this year.

Milne wrote Winnie-the-Pooh in 1926 followed by two sequels, Now We are Six, a year later, and The House at Pooh Corner in 1928. The books have enjoyed enormous popularity over the years and have been translated into over 50 languages. The Latin translation of Winnie the Pooh by Alexander Lenard (“Winnie Ille Pu”) is the first foreign language book to have been on the NYT Best Seller list and, perhaps needless to say, the only one in Latin. Given the interest in Milne’s works, early in 2024 we are going to be treated to breathless announcements by advocates of the public domain, such as the Center for the Study of the Public Domain at Duke Law School celebrating the fact that the third of Milne’s Pooh books, The House at Pooh Corner, where the character Tigger was first introduced, will be entering the public domain in the US. (It has already been in the public domain in Canada since 2007 but will remain under copyright in the UK until 2026). As I wrote when the original Pooh work entered the US public domain almost two years ago (Winnie the Pooh, the Public Domain, and Winnie’s Canadian Connection), this predictable but essentially meaningless crowing over books or works entering the public domain feeds the false narrative that a book falling under copyright protection is somehow “locked up” and unavailable to the public.

Another recent example of this fabricated frenzy are reports now appearing about the expiry in the US of the copyright on Disney’s first Mickey Mouse film, Steamboat Willie, which first appeared in 1928. (Even though this film has probably been in the public domain in Canada for a number of years, although with limited circulation lest it be inadvertently distributed in the US, the CBC could not stop itself from tooting Willie’s imminent release from copyright purgatory by running the film’s steamwhistle soundtrack on the evening news last week). With the expiry of the US copyright on Willie, that particular film will be free to use and broadcast without licence, although its value is limited as all more recent Disney versions of Mickey remain under copyright, the Steamboat Willie character is trademarked so knock-offs would still be an intellectual property infringement and, moreover, Disney made the Steamboat Willie film freely available on Youtube years ago.

But back to Winnie—and Disney. While all of Milne’s Pooh books will be in the public domain in both the US and UK quite soon, none of the Disney adaptations will lose their copyright protection for quite some time. Disney made its first Pooh film in 1966 (Winnie the Pooh and the Honey Tree) and has produced numerous sequels since, turning the characters into a major Disney franchise that, according to some estimates, generates up the $6 billion annually for the company.

But how did Disney acquire the rights to Pooh? That is a story in itself and, as often happens when intellectual property is worth a lot of money, it led to no small amount of legal wrangling. Milne held the literary copyright on the Pooh works until his death in 1956, but in 1930 the North American merchandising and recording rights to Pooh were acquired from Milne by Stephen Slesinger for $1000 (worth considerably more then than now), plus royalties on sales. Slesinger was a US radio, TV, film, and comic book producer who licensed a number of popular literary characters, including Tarzan, Buck Rogers and others. Slesinger created various Pooh-branded products–a doll, a record, a board game (marketed by Parker Brothers, in colour, which is when Pooh’s red shirt appeared for the first time)–as well as broadcasts and animation. Slesinger died in 1953 and in 1961 his widow assigned all the rights in the 1930 agreement to the Walt Disney Company.

Meanwhile, Milne died in 1956, leaving his rights to Pooh to his widow (through the Pooh Properties Trust) and three organizations: Westminster School, the Royal Literary Fund and the Garrick Club, in London. When Disney acquired the rights that Slesinger’s widow controlled in 1961, it also struck a deal with the holders of Milne’s copyrights, paying them all royalties on a semi-annual basis. The merchandising of Pooh characters was immensely profitable. In 2001 Disney bought out the rights owned by the four British entities for $350 million. Some of the proceeds went to establish a trust for Milne’s handicapped granddaughter Clare, (although Clare died in 2012, the Clare Milne Trust still exists to provide support for people with disabilities in Devon and Cornwall), while the Royal Literary Fund, which got £90 million, established a Fellowship Fund for writers.

In the meantime, things were getting hot between Slesinger’s widow (but not Milne’s family) and the Disney Corporation, influenced by changes in US law that extended the term of copyright protection in the United States. Originally, under the 1909 US Copyright Act, the US copyright in Milne’s works would have expired between 1980 and 1984 (56 years after date of publication). However, in 1976 there was a major revision to US copyright law whereby the term of protection was extended from a maximum of 56 years after publication, to the life of the author plus 50 years. Works owned by corporations (aka “works for hire”) such as the works licensed to Disney would have a protection period of 75 years from the date of publication, as a rough equivalency. Thus, in the US, Milne’s works would fall into the public domain between 1999 and 2003. However, in 1998 the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act was passed extending copyright protection for an additional twenty years, e.g. life of the author plus 70 years, or 95 years from date of publication for corporately owned works, in large part to bring the US term of  protection into line with that of the EU, as I explained here (“The Mickey Mouse Copyright Extension Myth: A Convenient “Straw Man” to Attack”). This explains why the 1926 Winnie-the-Pooh book did not enter the public domain in the US until January 1, 2022.

This is where it all starts to get really complicated. As part of the 1976 extension, some existing copyrights such as the one for the Pooh stories would become much more valuable. Therefore, the new law gave authors specified windows during which they could reclaim copyrights that had been assigned to others, so the extension period could be brought back under their control if they wished, and then presumably relicensed for an additional amount. This could be done at any time up to 1989. Thus Milne’s estate could, in theory, terminate Milne’s 1930 agreement with Slesinger–which had subsequently been assigned to Disney– and reclaim it. Given the investment Disney had put into the Pooh franchise, this constituted a serious risk for the company. Disney met with both the widow Slesinger and Milne’s son in 1983 to sort things out. As a result, the 1930 and 1961 agreements were rescinded and a new licence was issued by the Milne estate to the Slesinger Corporation, which in turn granted the rights to Disney. Presumably more money changed hands. The 1998 extension of the copyright term opened up a process of potential copyright reclamation similar to that which had occurred with the 1976 amendment, that is to say that it allowed authors to terminate pre-1978 assignments and licences where this had not already been done.

Now let’s turn to the dispute that had broken out between Slesinger’s widow and Disney subsequent to the 1983 agreement between the parties. In 1991 the Slesinger Corporation sued Disney in a California state court claiming that Disney was under-calculating royalties under the 1983 agreement. The action was dismissed, in part on the basis of malfeasance by investigators hired by the Slesinger Corporation. Slesinger then changed tactics and sued in federal court alleging trademark and copyright violation. To counter this, Disney then made an agreement with Clare Milne whereby she would try to reclaim the rights that had been assigned to Slesinger in 1930 under the 1998 extension that allowed authors to reclaim copyright in pre-1978 works. If successful, this would nullify her agreement with Slesinger and by extension, Slesinger’s subsequent deal with Disney, effectively ending Slesinger’s suit. Having reclaimed her copyright, Clare Milne would then assign her rights to Disney. But it didn’t work out that way.

Slesinger’s lawyers argued that the 1983 agreement trumped the rights of reclamation for Clare, and the courts agreed. She was unable to invalidate the 1983 agreement that had assigned her rights to Slesinger, a setback for Disney. The original case continued, with Slesinger pursuing its claims of trademark, trade dress and copyright infringement, claiming $700 million in denied royalties. In the end, after almost two decades of litigation, in 2009 Disney emerged triumphant. Among the grounds for dismissal of Slesinger’s claims was the fact that in earlier court proceedings, it had argued Disney was undercalculating the revenues for the rights Slesinger had assigned to it. Later, in contradiction of its earlier position, Slesinger claimed it had not assigned these rights to Disney and was seeking to assert them. Under the doctrine of estoppel, you can’t have it both ways. Nevertheless, while it did not win on its claim of underpaid royalties, Schlesinger continued and continues to earn royalties from Disney. And the Disney machine rolls on.

That is a lot of bother over a “bear with little brain”, but when there are hundreds of millions of dollars at stake, who gets their paws into the honey pot is important. Disney has been very meticulous in protecting its hard-won rights to Pooh, which explains its unhappiness with the Town of White River when it wanted to erect its Pooh statue back in 1989. White River is the town in northern Ontario where Winnie (short for Winnipeg) was first discovered by Canadian Army veterinarian Lt. Harry Colebourn, who bought him off a trapper in August 1914 when Colebourn’s troop train that was heading for the east coast, and eventually Britain, stopped at the small town. Winnie went on to Britain to serve as the mascot of Colebourn’s regiment and was eventually donated to the London Zoo, where a decade later he became the object of affection for one of the many children visiting the zoo, Milne’s son Christopher Robin. The rest is history—and White River in the 1980s was eager to cash in on this history. It’s other claim to fame that it was the coldest town in Canada wasn’t attracting many visitors.

At first, Disney suggested the town erect a statue to a small black bear, (a bear that looked like a real bear) similar to the one Harry Colebourn had acquired in 1914. Eventually they relented, no doubt realizing the promotional value of a Winnie statue in the town where the original Winnie had been found. That is the kind of win/win partnership demonstrated when Disney and Canada Post collaborated in 1996 to produce the Winnie the Pooh postage stamps featured at the top of this blog post.

As you can see, Winnie has gone through several wars; a series of copyright wars, the Great War and more recently the “war” for trade and technology leadership between the US and China. China famously banned Winnie from the Chinese internet after memes appeared comparing a rotund Xi Jinping walking beside a lanky Barack Obama, with both of them looking quite a bit like Pooh and Tigger going for a stroll. With all these wars under his belt, what will Pooh get up to next?

© Hugh Stephens 2023. All Rights Reserved.

CBC Investigation Documents the Challenge for Writers: Works by Prominent Canadian Authors are Included in AI Training Data (So What Happens Now?)

Photo: Author

The CBC—which, by the way, has just announced it will be cutting 10% of its workforce owing to reductions  in the funding it receives from Parliament, cuts that unfortunately will probably curb its investigative programming—has “revealed” that works by a number of prominent Canadian authors such as Margaret Atwood, Alice Munro, Robertson Davies, Farley Mowat, Leonard Cohen and many more (1200 in total) are included in a massive database that has been used for artificial intelligence (AI) training and research. It was the Atlantic that first reported on the extent of the unauthorized ingestion of copyrighted works by Books 3. Over 190,000 works were copied, so the 2500 works by Canadian authors represent just 2% of the dataset. Nonetheless, the Writers’ Union of Canada reports that 15% of its membership has had their works included. This should come as no surprise given the “move fast and break things” approach of the hi-tech sector, a strategy that has been demonstrated in spades during the ongoing development of generative AI.

If prominent Canadian authors are included, I can guarantee the same situation will apply to writers from any country with a strong literary tradition in addition to the US; Britain of course, Ireland, Australia, and New Zealand not to mention European literatures. As outlined by Wired, the Books 3 dataset was developed by private researchers seeking to come up with a database to compete with the one developed by OpenAI. CBC did an extensive analysis to identify the Canadian works using ISBN codes, writer’s names, and book titles.

Whether or not the use of copyrighted works to train AI programs–which in turn produce “new” works–is a violation of copyright law is still up in the air. The US Authors Guild and a number of individual authors have sued OpenAI and others for copyright infringement, although the case has not gone smoothly to date. While conceptually it is easy to understand the wrath of authors when learning that their works have been used without authorization or compensation to create “new” works that may end up competing in the market with the original, proving infringement in a court of law is still a challenge.

Lawyer and copyright blogger Neil Turkewitz has reminded us that national legislation is required to comply with international treaty commitments. Of particular relevance in considering whether copyright infringement occurs in the process of training AI on content without authorization is the “three step test” incorporated into the Berne Convention and subsequent copyright treaties such as the TRIPS commitments of the World Trade Organization (WTO). Turkewitz points out that to be compatible with international law, exceptions to copyright protection must (1) apply only in certain special cases; (2) not conflict with a normal exploitation of a work; and (3) not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the author. He argues that it is difficult to accept that machine learning is a “special case”, that it does not conflict with the author’s normal exploitation of the work, i.e. generating economic returns, and therefore the unauthorized copying that occurs in fact unreasonably prejudices (i.e. damages) the author’s legitimate interests. Although current controversies are being litigated in national courts, it is vital to keep the requirements of international law in mind.

The tech companies have taken several different positions to defend their willy-nilly scraping of copyrighted content. Many of these are outlined in submissions to the US Copyright Office as part of its current study of AI and copyright. Among the arguments advanced are;

(1) the act of reproduction falls under fair use because the output is transformative

(2) the outputs are not derivative works based on the original content

(3) requiring licensing of copyrighted content to train AI models would be impractical and too expensive

(4) some other countries are allowing unauthorized ingestion of copyrighted data so not to do so would hold back US innovation

(5) investors have already spent billions on developing AI models and to upset the model now would be economically harmful.

By the way, while the tech companies are quick to dismiss the claims of rights-holders to protect their content from unlicensed use when creating AI generated content, they are equally quick to assert that the output of AI should merit copyright protection.

Canada, although slow off the mark, is now also examining the question of how copyright and AI intersect. The CBC investigation quoted Osgoode Hall law professor Carys Craig as stating that “it’s not clear that the inclusion of works in a dataset used to train a generative AI model does constitute copyright infringement…” True, but by extension this also means it is not clear that it does not. It is for that reason that Craig and others have called for a revision to Canadian copyright law to specifically allow for text and data mining (TDM). There is currently no such explicit provision in the Copyright Act and existing elements of the Act are unlikely to lend themselves to this purpose, as pointed out by Dalhousie University law professor Lucie Guibault. Worth noting is Prof. Guibault’s argument that there should be a TDM exception to enable research where the output does not compete with the original content. She uses the example of a professor of English surveying/sampling a range of writing on a particular topic in order to prepare an analysis of that genre of writing. That work would not in any way compete with the original works.

While I am not a lawyer (as I hasten to say each time that I step into the minefield of venturing an opinion), it seems to me that there are a couple of key issues that need to be resolved by the courts. One is whether reproduction of an original work for training AI is itself an infringement, and a second is whether that reproduction results in a derivative work based on the original, particularly one that competes with or substitutes for the original.  The second point could be case specific. For example, the unauthorized reproduction of an author’s work that is incorporated into a massive database containing tens of thousands of similar inputs, and which in turn produces a computer-generated work based on that extensive database, is less likely (it seems to me) to be infringing than the copying of a dozen works of an artist to produce a computer-generated image in the style of that artist. Put another way, to what extent can the output be tied back to the unauthorized input?  The Getty Images case in the UK, where Getty is suing AI image generator StabilityAI, may produce some answers given the strong correlation between Getty’s original images and Stable Diffusion’s output images. In some instances, the latter even reproduced Getty’s watermark.

While no-one has a crystal ball in determining where all this is going to end up as a result of the current court cases in the US and Britain, I will venture one more opinion. There will be no bright line emerging from the litigation. The results will be mixed, even possibly contradictory as sometimes happens between different circuits of the US justice system. With no clear carte blanche for the tech industry, there will be a degree of financial and legal hazard hanging over the development of various applications. Equally, authors probably won’t get a definitive and unqualified ruling that will permit them to stop unauthorized and unlicensed use in its tracks. What will be the result?

The outcome will likely be a thriving marketplace for licensing content, as we are already beginning to see. Companies with proprietorial databases, like Getty Images, the New York Times, Reuters, Bloomberg and so on, will not only strengthen their ability to block webcrawlers, but will expand their licensing activities. Already the Associated Press has a deal with OpenAI, and other creators of content, including Twitter (X), are moving to the licensing model. It provides a revenue stream for creators and is a way to avoid litigation by developers. The certainty of a licence will far outweigh the risk, uncertainty, and potential cost of not having one.

However, it is one thing for large organizations like the Associated Press, with established databases, to enter into negotiations with AI developers to license content, but what about all those disparate books and authors out there whose work is being used without permission? AI developers will say that it is impossible to contact, let alone negotiate with, all those rights-holders, thus creating an unsurmountable barrier to innovation. However, we already have structures to draw on that might help solve the problem.

Copyright collectives perform similar tasks when dealing with educational users, by issuing licenses and compensating rights-holders. Could organizations like the Copyright Clearance Center in the US, Access Copyright in Canada, the Copyright Licensing Agency in the UK and similar organizations elsewhere help solve the problem? Admittedly the inclusion of one or two works among a very large training set might not yield much revenue, but a start has to be made somewhere. If over 40 of Margaret Atwood’s works are included in the Books 3 database, or 75% of the books included in the popular CBC show, Canada Reads, are included, there is a problem that needs to be fixed. Of course, it would be up to rights-holders to decide whether to empower collectives to manage their rights, and the collectives will need to decide whether they have the capacity, or it is worth their effort, to do so.

Meanwhile, the consultation process in the US, Canada and elsewhere grinds on. As the interests of various stakeholders are weighed, there is unlikely to be a silver bullet the resolves the issue to the satisfaction of all. In the end, some form of compromise position will likely emerge from the process. It will, I hope, continue to respect the basic principles of copyright while adapting it to the age of AI.

© Hugh Stephens, 2023. All Rights Reserved.

Google, News and Canada: When is Half a Glass Better Than a Broken Glass?

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The news that Google and the Government of Canada managed to strike a deal prior to the coming into force later this month of Bill C-18, the Online News Act, was not really a surprise, at least not to me. Both sides had every incentive to find enough common ground to reach an agreement. Google could ill afford to undermine its presence in the Canadian market by blocking access to Canadian news, with its chief competitor Microsoft in the wings ready to swoop in to take up the slack. And then there is reputational damage, although I doubt that Google cared much about this. It has acted as a bully willing to throw its weight around in various markets in the past and has demonstrated that if it can afford to, it will pick up its ball and leave. But with an eager, recently “rejuvenated-by-AI” player like Microsoft’s Bing standing on the sidelines, Google executives decided that getting to “yes” with the Canadian government was something they could live with, although, as always, they played hardball.

The Canadian government, in the person of the new Minister for Canadian Heritage, Pascale Ste. Onge, for its part needed a solution. Bill C-18 did not roll out as anticipated. Initially it was to be an “improvement” on the Australian solution, whereby the Australian government had muscled both Google and Facebook into reaching funding arrangements with Australian media to the tune of (although no one is sure because the details have been kept confidential by both parties) of around AUD200 million, about CAD 180 million. In the end, Australia did not designate the two platforms under its News Media Bargaining Code since, under the threat of compulsory arbitration embedded in the legislation, both Google and Meta (Facebook’s parent company) found it expedient to cut a deal with most of the Australian media players. Some were left out in the cold.

Canada decided that instead of allowing the platforms to strike deals under threat of legislation, it would pass legislation requiring them to self-designate (with consequences if they didn’t), and then allow an exemption if they were able to come up with suitable agreements with media partners. Various amounts of funding were tossed around, from a high of almost $330 million from the Parliamentary Budget Officer (PBO) to $234 million when Meta was part of the calculations, of which $172 million would be from Google. This number came from calculating 4% of Google’s annual Canadian search revenue. The PBO estimate was contained in a report that was focussed on the implementation costs for the government departments involved and the $330 million estimate of revenues to the media sector was almost a throwaway line, not substantiated in the report. To date, Meta has not come onside nor does it look likely that it will do so since it has already complied with the legislation (in legal terms if not in spirit) by blocking any links to Canadian news on Facebook and Instagram. Meta appears to have made a corporate decision that it can live without providing access to news for its users, and not just in Canada. It is retiring its “news tab” in the UK, France and Germany, and will likely not renew the deals it made earlier in Australia, perhaps a case of buyer’s remorse. Unfortunately, the timing of the Canadian legislation gave it the perfect opportunity to walk away from some voluntary content deals it had signed in Canada.

The sum that Google will pay has now shrunk considerably, to $100 million annually, not chump change to be sure but a considerable discount from the numbers that were being bandied about just a few months ago. This money will go into a central fund that one or more media collectives will allocate, through negotiations with Google, all under the watchful eye of the CRTC. The allocation will presumably be done on the basis of costs of maintaining journalists and on the number of journalists employed by media outlets. If the allocation is based exclusively on numbers of journalists, the broadcasters and especially the CBC will reap the lion’s share. The Minister is already musing about a need for “clarification” of guidelines so that the national public broadcaster, which already receives an annual allocation from Parliament of $1.27 billion does not walk off with most of the funding. There are many needs from the national newspapers, which are struggling mightily, to weeklies and bi-weeklies in small towns that are falling by the wayside, to new digital startups that are trying to fill the gap. A couple of small victories are that the funding will be indexed to inflation and the government has the right to re-open the deal if Google reaches a more favourable arrangement in another country. (This almost guarantees that they won’t).

Is anyone really happy with this state of affairs? It appears not. There is some new money for media outlets but not the bonanza that they were led to believe they were going to get. Google’s existing financial support programs for journalism already reached with some media outlets will be folded into the $100 million. One key goal of C-18 was to level the playing field between a giant global corporation like Google and Canada’s relatively small media players by including the threat of compulsory arbitration if Google was not willing to reach fair deals, but now the only negotiation will be how the $100 million pot is to be divided. Google is probably not entirely happy because it will be paying for linking to content, even though it claims its payments are for helping publishers. It is distinction without a difference but is part of Google’s theology that links on the internet are somehow sacrosanct and can’t be touched, removed or blocked (except when Google decides to do it, that is) lest this somehow “break the internet”.  

On the other hand, a lot of media outlets that Google probably wouldn’t have bothered to deal with, including equity-seeking outlets, will have a chance to seek some funding. And the funding is assured, protected by this agreement and backstopped by the legislation. Google can’t just walk away or pull funding from certain outlets. Reaction among various media seemed to be one more of relief than delight, although the Toronto Star has called the $100 million cap “disappointing”.  As for the opposition Conservative Party, they have criticized the Trudeau government for caving in to big tech, which is a bit rich since the Conservatives spared no opportunity to oppose and obstruct C-18 when it was going through Parliament, and indeed voted against it.

Google will undoubtedly be facing demands in other countries for contributions to news media. While Google News Showcase has been around for a while, it is controlled by Google; they decide who they will deal with how much they will pay. In the US, the Journalism Competition and Preservation Act (JCPA) almost made it through Congress last year, allowing US media to negotiate collectively with Google without running afoul of anti-trust laws. The JCPA, while supported by the US News Media Alliance, is not everyone’s favoured solution. It has notably been opposed by some smaller, local news outlets in the US. Google will now likely try to adopt the Canadian “central fund” model. The rest will be up to arm-twisting and seeing who blinks first.

Canada was too big to ignore but perhaps not big enough to corral Google effectively. The lesson here may be that you don’t want to get too far out in front of market and political developments, or you set yourself up for a fall. The Online News Act was an ambitious piece of legislation designed to try to come to grips with a real problem, the domination of online advertising by monopolistic tech giants to the obvious detriment of a healthy Fourth Estate. What has been salvaged is not nothing, but it is less than hoped for. Was the ultimate goal attainable? We will never know. Neither the Canadian government nor journalism sector wanted to run the risk of seriously calling Google’s bluff. Its hubris knows no bounds, and the game of Russian roulette was not worth the candle. Still half a glass is better than a broken glass. Let’s hope Canadian journalism uses this cash infusion wisely.

© Hugh Stephens, 2023. All Rights Reserved.

Canadian Writers Speak Up: It’s Time to End the Education Sector Rip-off (600 Million Pages Unfairly Copied Annually)

Used with permission

November 30 is the “day of action” for Canadian writers and publishers. Writers across the country are writing the government and their MPs urging them to pass legislation to stop the great educational rip-off, being the uncompensated copying of 600,000,000 pages per year that has been taking place in the education sector since education was added as a fair dealing exception under the 2012 revisions to the Copyright Act. When that amendment was enacted, the educational sector outside Quebec, including Ministries of Education and post secondary institutions, started terminating their licensing agreements with the writers’ and publishers’ copyright collective, Access Copyright (AC), and unilaterally declared that the amount of copying they had previously paid for under licence, such as up to ten percent of a work, one chapter in a book, one article in a journal. etc, now constituted–from their perspective—fair dealing, and they would no longer pay writers for using their materials under an AC licence. 

To assert the rights of its members, Access Copyright brought a lawsuit against York University, and won in the first instance at the Federal Court, which ruled that York’s self declared fair dealing guidelines for use of materials in the copyright collective’s repertoire were anything but fair. That ruling was appealed by the university, which then won on a technical point (whether they were required to compensate Access Copyright under so-called “mandatory tariffs” provisions) although the original ruling on whether York’s guidelines were fair under the Copyright Act was not overturned. The case went to the Supreme Court which upheld the appellate court’s decision regarding the enforceability of tariffs and given that, concluded they did not need to rule on the question of the fairness of the guidelines relied on by York. After years in the courts, the situation is still in limbo. What is needed is a legislative amendment clarifying that fair dealing for educational purposes can be invoked by institutions with respect to copyrighted works only when no commercially available alternative exists. That is what was recommended by the all-party Standing Committee on Heritage in its 2019 report “Shifting Paradigms“.

The universities, backed up by groups such as the Canadian Federation of Library Associations, claim there is no need to change anything as they pay hundred of thousands of dollars per year in direct licensing fees to publishers, allowing them to use digital materials freely. Their argument is that the shift to digital materials has made an Access Copyright reproduction licence unnecessary and obsolete. They argue that if they were to pay for an Access Copyright licence, they could be paying twice for the same material. This is plain wrong, a total fabrication.

The amendment proposed by the Standing Committee on Canadian Heritage would capture both direct licences issued by some publishers as well as the broad reprographic licence issued by AC so there would be no double counting. While it is true that some publishers offer direct licences for their material to universities and colleges, many do not, especially smaller Canadian publishers. Yet it is these works that the post secondary institutions are copying and distributing to students in both hard copy and, increasingly, in digital formats under their so-called fair dealing guidelines. 

The education sector claims that their use of materials represented by AC has declined significantly. It may no longer represent the 6 million pages annually that was documented in 2015 for the Access v York case (the total includes copying by the K-12 sector as well as post-secondary institutions). It may be more, or it may be less. There used to be a proven way to find out the accurate number of annual pages copied, and that was to participate in the Copyright Board of Canada tariff setting process. The Board would adjudicate the amount of copying that needs to be compensated and set the “tariff” to be paid. But the Supreme Court has undermined the role of the Copyright Board by stating that tariffs are not enforceable. The government should also amend the Act and strengthen the role of the Copyright Board to ensure that universities cannot avoid their responsibilities to compensate authors for widespread copying of their works by opting out of collective licensing obligations even though using materials that are covered by these licences.

Despite the undisputed large amounts spent by post secondary institutions on direct licensing, this does not cover the uncompensated copying of non-licensed content that is still occurring every day on Canadian campuses (outside Quebec where an agreement is in place). The “day of action” is designed to highlight this injustice which has resulted in a diversion of revenues that has seriously undermined the Canadian publishing sector and the incomes of writers. 

The Trudeau government has a lot of issues on its plate but this reform is long overdue. The fix is simple: narrow the loose wording of the education exception so that it applies to students, not to large institutions that are taking a free ride on the backs of Canadian writers and publishers.

© Hugh Stephens, 2023. All Rights Reserved.