Tag: CRTC

The CRTC Streaming Announcement, and CUSMA: An Update (It’s Changing by the Day)

Flags of Canada, the United States, and Mexico arranged together.

Image: Shutterstock

Scarcely was the ink dry on the blog I posted on Monday, June 1, when things began to happen. The next day Canada officially informed the US and Mexico that it wished to renew CUSMA, and Dominic Leblanc, Minister responsible for Canada-US Trade (among several other responsibilities) went to Washington to meet with US Trade Representative Jamieson Greer. There he was given the laundry list of US grievances which surely included the Online Streaming Act (OSA) and in particular the CRTC decision to impose a 15% levy on the Canadian revenues of large foreign (read US) streamers to fund domestic Canadian production (only some of which the streamers could use at their discretion). The day after that, June 3, the Carney government announced that it would be providing “direction” to the CRTC to review its decision, on the basis that additional costs imposed on the streamers would likely be passed on to Canadian consumers.

To sweeten the pot, the government announced the creation of a $600 million annual fund to “provide stability and immediate support to Canada’s audio and audiovisual sectors”. This is to offset the funding the streamers may no longer be contributing, including the initial five percent contribution still held up in the courts owing to a legal appeal. Six hundred million dollars is a good chunk of change; it’s about the same amount the streamers would have contributed based on CRTC calculations estimating that the original five percent levy (currently suspended pending a decision from the Federal Court) would have generated $200 million annually. This would suggest either that the streamers may not be expected to make financial contributions or that their contributions will be additional to the base amount. Even though the government has thrown a lot of money at the problem, this has not satisfied the cultural sector however. The Coalition for the Diversity of Cultural Expression (CDCE), a major cultural industries umbrella group, has just issued a press release calling Ottawa’s request for the CRTC to reverse course “a major setback for cultural sovereignty”. The CDCE doesn’t mind the offer of $600 million. It’s just that such funding is at the whim of the government of the day whereas embedded funding through regulation of online streamers would be part of the broadcasting regulatory framework and thus more predictable and reliable.

As for the argument that a levy on the streamers would be passed on to consumers, Howard Law in his blog MediaPolicy.ca points out that “Netflix upped the price on its standard plan from $14 monthly to $15 in 2020. Then to $16.50 in 2022. Then to $19 in 2025. That was twice the rate of inflation.” But of course, no-one could blame the government for these increases. That was just greedy old Netflix. The streamers will price their product at whatever level is optimal from their perspective, just like any other business. If they price themselves too high, people will find alternatives, either a competing service or (horror of horrors), a pirated feed. The industry is well aware of the limits of consumer tolerance, particularly in this age of stressed household finances. Nonetheless, the Carney government’s “concern” for consumers is good politics.

Why didn’t the government just tell the CRTC what rate to set? By statute the government does not have the authority to reverse or overrule CRTC decisions in matters other than the issuance of broadcasting licences (the CRTC being an independent quasi-judicial body), but the government does have the authority to issue policy directives as to how legislation is to be implemented. What that guidance will be, Heritage Minister Marc Miller (the point person on this file), was not willing to say except that the amount of the streamer’s contributions would be reduced. By how much, we do not know. However, he hinted they would still be required to contribute. Once again, the CRTC will need to consult stakeholders and hold hearings. There is lots of wiggle room (or room for further negotiations with the streamers).

There was no mention of the CUSMA negotiations being a factor in the government’s decision but if you don’t think CUSMA was in play, you have been living on another planet. Nonetheless, the action the government has taken suggests it has learned a lesson from its previous policy reversal on the Digital Services Tax, when it scrapped the legislation on the very eve of implementation to appease the Trump Administration and get CUSMA negotiations back on track. That concession achieved absolutely nothing. In the case of the Online Streaming Act (OSA), it will continue in force as legislation for which the CRTC is required to develop implementing regulations. The government has signalled flexibility but has not rescinded the authority of the CRTC to regulate streaming services in Canada, nor has it definitively exempted the streamers from making a financial contribution or meeting discoverability requirements. It thus retains the OSA as a bargaining tool, something it could have done with the DST if it had only suspended the imminent application of the tax instead of withdrawing it completely. Once burnt, twice shy. Its action on the CRTC decision is exactly what it should be doing, signalling flexibility but retaining the essentials of the policy as a bargaining chip.

The other significant development on the trade negotiations front, announced coincidentally on the day that Leblanc and Greer were meeting in Washington, was the announcement by the US Trade Representative’s Office that they will be imposing tariffs ranging from 10 to 12.5 percent on over 60 sixty countries who allegedly either don’t block goods produced with forced labour or do so inadequately. Canada is one of half a dozen countries in the latter category, along with the EU. Everyone else completely fails on this score, according to USTR. Not a single country is exempted although “only” 60 of the US’s major trading partners are targeted. There will be hearings to examine the USTR announcement but the results are a foregone conclusion.

I mentioned in my earlier blog post this week that the Trump Administration will do whatever it takes to justify its unilateral imposition of tariffs, whether or not this is in violation of bilateral and multilateral treaties. Once its “fentanyl tariffs” imposed under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), were overturned by the US Supreme Court, the Administration resorted to whatever other excuse it could find, including using both national security (Section 232 of the Trade Act of 1962) and balance of payments (Section 122 of the US Trade Act of 1974) as pretexts. These are “temporary” measures authorized by Congress to address specific emergencies. The Trump Administration has made a mockery of these remedies, employing them on the flimsiest of pretexts. But even these measures are time limited, (although for some the time can be measured in years). However, the Section 122 tariffs imposed in lieu of the IEEPA tariffs after they were overturned will expire in July so Trump and USTR had to come up with another justification in US domestic law to maintain their import tariffs. The answer was trade in products produced with forced labour. Suddenly, most of the world’s trading economies are accused of allowing goods produced with forced labour to undermine international markets, so sixty countries must be punished by the US through the imposition of tariffs on their exports to the US. This ludicrous misuse of Section 301 of the US Trade Act is clearly for purposes other than dealing with forced labour.  

While the US does have a robust regime to block the import of products produced with forced labour, it is far from perfect itself. According to the Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives, a labour oriented self-declared “progressive” publication, last year the Trump administration cancelled around $577 million from the Bureau of International Labor Affairs (ILAB) in grants allocated to various programs meant to promote labour rights abroad. Also, products produced for private companies by prison labour in the US have been a concern. Last year, the University of Toronto produced a report “Uncovering US Prison Labour in Canadian Supply Chains” that concluded “the Canadian supply chain has many likely linkages to prison-made goods from the US, particularly in the automotive and food sectors.”

Canada’s hands aren’t completely clean either. Prime Minister Carney has just announced his government will introduce new legislation this month to strengthen the current Canadian ban on imports made with forced or child labour. However, while forced labour is a real issue, the USTR action is not only hypocritical, it also demonstrates the lengths to which the Trump Administration will go to use any pretext or legal loophole it can find to impose tariffs. Even if Canada had the tightest regime in the world to prevent the import of products produced with forced labour, this would not stop the US from using this, or some other pretext, to fill the tariff gap created by the collapse of the fentanyl tariffs. When the fentanyl tariffs were first announced, Canada responded by creating a “fentanyl czar” and equipping the RCMP with new Blackhawk helicopters for improved surveillance, among other measures to beef up border security. While useful, this did not exempt Canada from US tariff punishment. It wasn’t about fentanyl; it was about imposing tariffs on a trading partner that had naively expected CUSMA rules to be followed.

This has been one of the problems with CUSMA.  While—remarkably considering what has been going on in Washington– much of the trade conducted between Canada, Mexico and the US under the CUSMA/USMCA/TMEC agreement continues tariff-free (for now), the sectoral exceptions introduced by the US based on contrived grounds (e.g. the imports of fentanyl from Canada) raise the question of whether the US really intends to honour what it has agreed to, or will agree to in future. That is also a point I made in Monday’s blog when examining the issue of the Cultural Exception to CUSMA (Article 32.6) and whether the US would try to use it to impose retaliatory tariffs on Canada. Using Article 32.6 against Canada would likely fail “legally” (i.e., the OSA is not a violation of the terms of CUSMA, and therefore Canadian action to implement the legislation would not need to be justified by Article 32.6), but then the US could find another excuse if it really wanted to take action. Fentanyl, national security, forced labour, smoke from Canada. Take your pick.

Assuming the US agrees to extend CUSMA/USMCA through renegotiation, a lot will be up for grabs. For example, the US apparently wants to further increase the percentage of US and North American content in automobiles traded under the Agreement. While a good idea in principle, will it make US or North American vehicles more competitive? Maybe Article32.6, the Cultural Exception that applies only to Canada, will disappear. While in theory cultural industries in Canada can be exempted from the terms of the Agreement, the penalty for doing so is so draconian that the Exception is really more of a political fig-leaf than a policy reality, although it may salve Canadian pride. Canada for its part will want some assurances that the sectoral “national security” tariffs on steel, aluminum and lumber will be lifted and not reimposed on a whim. Whatever eventually happens, some sense of economic certainty and security will be the goal.

Right now, things are changing by the day. Stay tuned for the next update. It could be tomorrow!

© Hugh Stephens, 2026. All Rights Reserved.

The Recent CRTC Decision on US Streamers and CUSMA

Will the CRTC Decision Requiring US Streamers to Make Additional Financial Contributions to Canadian Production Lead to Retaliatory US Tariffs Impacting Other Sectors because of CUSMA’s Cultural Exception Clause?

Should Canada Rescind the CRTC Decision Now to Facilitate CUSMA Negotiations?

Logo of the CRTC (Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission) featuring stylized lettering and a circular design.

Summary

Since this is a long post on a complex subject, here is the very short version of my answers to these two questions, the Executive Summary if you will. On the first question, I posit that the CRTC decision is not a violation of the terms of CUSMA, and therefore Canada does not need to justify the CRTC measures by using the shield of the Cultural Exception, which if applied could legitimize US tariff retaliation. That is not to say that I agree with the CRTC decision in all its aspects, nor that the Online Streaming Act might not become a bargaining chip in the renegotiation of the Agreement. For the US to justify tariff retaliation on the basis that Canada was using the Cultural Exception as a shield would require a determination by a trade panel. That is most unlikely to happen. Given the general US disrespect for the CUSMA Agreement since the advent of Trump 2.0 and the way in which the US has ridden roughshod over the protections that the Agreement was supposed to provide, the niceties of its text seem largely irrelevant. US streamer’s hopes of securing protection under the CUSMA have been undermined by aberrant US trade policy. As for whether the Carney government should walk back provisions of the Online Streaming Act to facilitate CUSMA renegotiation, the Digital Services Tax climbdown illustrates well the folly of unilateral concessions. The US can wield a big stick, but Canada is not without cards to play. When you are playing with a master bluffer, don’t fold your hand early. That’s the short version. For more detail, read on.

The CRTC Announcement

Since the CRTC announced on May 21 that, among other requirements, it will increase the mandatory contribution to be made to Canadian productions by large foreign streamers (those generating in excess of $100 million annually in Canada) from 5 percent of their Canadian revenues to 15 percent, commentary—largely in the form of criticism– has come from all sides. The CRTC decision itself is not the easiest to understand even with its embedded graphic. The Motion Picture Association-Canada did not mince words;

“The Motion Picture Association strongly condemns the CRTC’s decision to impose unprecedented, unnecessary, and discriminatory investment obligations on American streaming services operating in Canada. This burdensome framework unfairly targets global streamers with requirements that directly violate Canada’s obligations under the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA).”

MPA-Canada and some individual streaming services have already challenged the initial five percent “downpayment” levy on the basis that the requirement for streamers to pay for local news (one of the allocations of the initial levy, not repeated in the new CRTC regulations) is a discriminatory measure exceeding CRTC authority because none of the streamers even produce news coverage. The plaintiffs also argue that the levy constitutes a tax, which is beyond the competence of the CRTC. Indeed, the taxation angle was repeated by Opposition Leader Pierre Polievre who accused the CRTC of imposing a tax that would ultimately be paid by Canadian consumers. He demanded that the Carney government overrule the CRTC, something the government says it does not have the authority to do. If pushed, however, it could of course amend or withdraw the legislation, the Online Streaming Act, that is behind the CRTC actions.

Others were also quick to criticize, including University of Ottawa professor Michael Geist who published the day after the CRTC announcement, pointing out that the Online Streaming Act is already in the crosshairs of the US in the lead up to negotiations to renew the CUSMA/USMCA. Indeed, US Ambassador Pete Hoekstra, who seems to be unable to fathom why Canadians might be upset at a US Administration that has routinely broken the rules it agreed to under Trump 1.0 with the renewal of NAFTA (not to mention the 51st state nonsense), immediately called the CRTC decision “making a bad situation worse”. Geist followed up with another post titled “From Levy to Liability: Why Canada Risks Facing Hundreds of Millions in Retaliatory Tariffs Due to the CRTC’s Online Streaming Act Ruling”.

Copyright Ownership Issues

Now, I am not here to try to justify the CRTC’s Canadian program expenditure announcement, which is a complicated beast. While I believe a legitimate argument can be made that participants in the Canadian broadcast space should be expected to support Canadian content and Canadian production to a certain degree, I have a problem with the requirement that prevents the funders from owning and exploiting, as they see fit, the product they have invested in. I know this view is not shared by many in the Canadian content industry. Part of the CRTC decision involves an obligation to spend 30 percent of their contribution on what is described as “enhanced partnerships”. This is CRTC-speak for production partnerships where Canadians hold the majority of the copyright in the programming.

This would seem to reverse the flexibility in defining Canadian Content (CanCon) that was introduced by the CRTC late last year. As I explained in a blog post last November, the revised CanCon definition outlined by the CRTC for broadcasting and streaming purposes allowed for up to 80% of the copyright in a production to be held by a foreign enterprise, subject to some other CanCon requirements such as the director and screenwriter both being Canadian. This was designed to encourage co-productions, and was a slight relaxation of the hardline rules that required foreign streamers to contribute to Canadian productions but then denied them the right to own and exploit the copyright (including distribution rights) in those productions. Now whatever flexibility that was introduced has been rolled back; at least one streamer production contribution dollar in three must be invested in a production where the rights are held by someone other than the funder, with that person having to be a Canadian. This is despite the fact that the production might have qualified as Canadian (story, director, location, music etc) in every other way. The purpose of the levy is clearly not to promote Canadian content but Canadian production.

Do the CRTC Measures Violate CUSMA Obligations?

While I, like Michael Geist and others, have concerns that the CRTC decision has flaws, and may be indeed become an additional irritant to be dealt with during the forthcoming CUSMA negotiations, my main quibble is with the argument that Canada will face millions in retaliatory tariffs under the CUSMA framework because of the CRTC mandated contributions. Prof. Geist and others are recycling the argument put forward by a US industry group, the Computer & Communications Industry Association (CCIA), claiming that the CRTC decision violates the terms of CUSMA, specifically, Article 14.10 that refers to investment performance requirements;

“No Party shall, in connection with the establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, conduct, operation, or sale or other disposition of an investment of an investor of a Party… impose or enforce any requirement, or enforce any commitment or undertaking…to achieve a given level or percentage of domestic content”

CCIA argues, echoed by Michael Geist, that given this situation, Canada will therefore be required to defend its action by means of the Cultural Exception clause (Article 32.6). This is an “escape clause” that says;

This Agreement does not apply to a measure adopted or maintained by Canada with respect to a cultural industry.

Broadcasting meets the definition of a cultural industry. However, if the CCIA is right and Canada falls back on the Cultural Exception, this is itself a problem because in that case the US would be entitled to retaliate (take a measure of equivalent commercial effect) in any sector. In other words, the automotive, aluminum, steel, mushroom or maple syrup industries, or any other, could be lumbered with retaliatory US tariffs as a result of measures applied to US streamers that are discriminatory or otherwise non-compliant with CUSMA.

If the measures are non-compliant or discriminatory, that is. If they are not, Article 32.6, the Cultural Exception, does not apply and therefore there would be no grounds for the US to retaliate. (Not that the need to respect the terms of CUSMA would stop them, as I discuss below). In the past, I have argued that the Cultural Exception is not applicable. This is because Article 14.10 refers to investment (Chapter 14) whereas streaming services fall under a different chapter of CUSMA, cross-border trade in services (Chapter 15). National treatment (non-discrimination) applies to cross-border services, and the streamers are in fact treated more favourably than their equivalent Canadian streaming counterparts. You can read all about it here.

But what if I am wrong? My interpretation has not been tested in “trade court”, which in the case of CUSMA (Chapter 31) allows for a state-to-state dispute settlement process through establishment of arbitration panels. The US could call for such a panel but could also simply assert that Canadian actions were in contravention of the Agreement and that Article 32.6, the Cultural Exemption, applied. This would allow for the application of retaliatory tariffs. However, under the terms of the Agreement, Canada could challenge the US assertion, and so, in effect there could ultimately be a panel review to determine the outcome.

US Trade Actions to Date

That is how the Agreement is supposed to work, but that process is now effectively irrelevant given that the US has violated both its terms and spirit several times, basically arrogating to itself the right to do anything it pleases. The so-called “fentanyl” tariffs were the first such example, where the US imposed a 25 percent tariff on Canadian goods on the specious pretext that Canada was responsible for “the extraordinary threat posed by illegal aliens and drugs, including deadly fentanyl” which “constitutes a national emergency under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA)”, according to an announcement issued by the US Embassy in Canada.  Quite apart from the fact the US is responsible for enforcing its own border security, not Canada or Mexico, Canada was the source of less than 1 percent (between 0.1 and 0.2 percent in fact) of illegal fentanyl flowing to the US. More fentanyl probably flowed the other way. The IEEPA tariffs were subsequently struck down by US courts as being an unjustified usurpation of the taxing power of Congress.

Not daunted, the Trump Administration has turned to other legislation, such as Section 232 of the US Trade Act of 1974, to impose tariffs on Canadian steel, aluminum, cars, furniture such as kitchen cabinets, and lumber on the basis that such imports threaten US national security. In addition, Canadian goods that do not have a CUSMA certificate of origin are subject to tariffs under Section 122 of the US Trade Act that deals with balance of payments issues. Then there is the Canadian financed Gordie Howe Bridge that the Trump Administration seems to want to keep in limbo because the owner of the competing bridge is a large Trump donor. I could go on, but the point is, the terms of the USMCA/CUSMA seem to exercise very limited restraint on the Trump Administration. Therefore, why would the Administration care whether Canadian measures imposing a levy on US streamers to fund Canadian productions fall under the Cultural Exemption or not? They don’t. If they want to impose a tariff, they’ll find a pretext.

Should Canada Rescind the CRTC Ruling to Facilitate CUSMA Renewal?

From a trade negotiating perspective, for Canada to roll back the CRTC decision now would be a tactical mistake. Look what happened to the planned implementation of a Digital Services Tax. Long planned, with an implementation date well publicized a couple of years in advance, and with the revenue already booked, the Carney government got cold feet and at the last minute cancelled the tax. This was supposedly to get CUSMA negotiations restarted. As I described it at the time, it was a “humiliating climbdown” to mark Canada Day, 2025. Yes, negotiations resumed for a few weeks until the US pulled the plug once again to signal its displeasure with Ontario Premier Doug Ford’s TV ads during the Super Bowl that enlisted Ronald Reagan to fight tariffs. The DST climbdown achieved nothing. That lesson appears to have been learned. The Canadian Government has made it clear it is not prepared to pay an “entry fee” to begin CUSMA discussions, and will not make concessions simply to get to the table. So, from a trade policy perspective, why should it pull the Online Streaming Act, or intervene with the CRTC?

This is not to say the CRTC got this decision 100 percent right. It is also not to say that, hypothetically, elements of the Online Streaming Act might not be on the chopping block as part of an eventual CUSMA 2.0 deal. That is assuming the US can be trusted to implement what it agrees to. As the smaller partner, Canada has always relied on the US sense of justice, respect for the rule of law and a willingness to surrender some sovereignty for greater overall economic and political security as reasons to expect that the US will honour what it agrees to. Under the Trump Administration, that faith has been shaken. The US streaming industry has every right to invoke the supposed protection of CUSMA and to seek protection under the Agreement. The problem is that the current US Administration has so brutally abused the CUSMA framework as to make it scarcely credible. The streamers are being sideswiped by the aberrations of US trade policy.

But back to the topic at hand. Will the CRTC decision on streaming lead to the imposition of hundreds of millions of dollars in retaliation by the US? Probably not, although such an outcome is not impossible. If it happens, it won’t be because of the Cultural Exception clause in CUSMA, but because the US can wield a big stick and will do so if it suits the mood in the White House at any given time. Canada, however, has some cards to play, to use a Trumpian analogy, and those cards (energy security, critical minerals, lower-cost inputs to US industry such as aluminum, specialty steel, and car parts) are important to the US. The Carney government is playing a waiting game on CUSMA negotiations and renewal. The decision on US streamers is just one more element in this high-stakes poker game. When you’re playing with a master bluffer, you don’t fold your hand before the game is over.

© Hugh Stephens, 2026.

The CRTC’s “Rube Goldberg” Definition of Canadian Content (CanCon): More Complicated..but Also More Flexible

An old television displaying the words 'CANCON REDEFINED' over a background of the Canadian flag.

Since it is frequently in the news, it’s worth asking the question. What is Canadian Content (Cancon)? It can be many things to many people. Unlike pornography, you don’t always know it when you see it. Blogger Michael Geist illustrated the problem well a few years ago with his Cancon quiz. If you want to do well in the quiz, select just about any production that the general public is likely to regard as Canadian– i.e. based on a book written by a Canadian, starring a prominent Canadian actor or notably taking place in Canada–as not qualifying as certified Cancon. Then select all the obscure productions you have never heard of including several with no identifiable connection to Canada as certified Canadian content. You will be a winner! This perverse outcome is because of the way the system is set up, as I have written about in previous blogs, such as this one (Unravelling the Complexities of the Canadian Content (Cancon) Conundrum).

In brief, up to now Cancon has been primarily defined by the number of points (out of 10) that a production accumulates, in addition to other factors such as the requirement that it be produced by a Canadian and reach a minimum 75% production expenditure in Canada (except for co-productions). Cancon is defined in regulation by no less than three entities, Telefilm Canada for co-productions, the Canadian Audio-Visual Certification Office (CAVCO), part of Heritage Canada, to determine eligibility for subsidies, and the broadcast regulator, the CRTC, with respect to meeting Cancon broadcast quotas. All use the points system, with some productions requiring 10/10 to obtain maximum subsidies, while most others  meeting a minimum 6/10 requirement. Points are awarded for the positions in the production filled by Canadians, such as the writer, director, performers, director of photography, production designer, music composer and picture editor. For CAVCO productions, the copyright must also be held by a Canadian producer for a minimum of 25 years. The actual story and its setting are completely irrelevant. In short, it is more of an industrial than a cultural policy, based on the assumption that if Canadians are in charge, they will produce content that reflects Canada. It often doesn’t work out that way.

Now the CRTC has updated its definition of Cancon as part of the implementation of the Online Streaming Act, which brings streaming services in Canada under the oversight of the broadcast regulator. Foreign streaming services over a certain revenue threshold are being required to make a financial contribution to Cancon (although they are challenging this in court) and may be required to promote Cancon on their services (“discoverabilty). The CRTC cannot impose broadcast quotas on an à la carte streaming service, whether domestic or foreign, thus the financial contribution and likely discoverability requirements. The survival and promotion of Canadian content, both domestically and internationally, is at the core of the legislation. Thus, the CRTC’s new definition of Cancon is very relevant.

If you thought the definition was going to get simpler, think again. However, it has been updated to incorporate new positions in productions, like a showrunner, plus those responsible for costume design, make-up artists, and hair artists. But not all productions, especially those in Québec, have all these positions, especially the new category of showrunner. As a compromise, having a Canadian showrunner will be worth an optional 2 bonus points, but if you don’t have one you won’t be penalized. What exactly is a showrunner? There is a lengthy CRTC definition related to the position being the creative leader of a production, managing the production process etc. With respect to costume design, make-up and hair artists, if collectively all these positions are filled by Canadians the production will garner another bonus point. If a production does not utilize all of these positions, it must fill the ones that it does with Canadians to get the optional point. Is Canadian makeup and hair design different from non-Canadian? I wouldn’t have thought so, but there you go. As I said, it is an industrial policy as much as a cultural one.

Here is another example of what is starting to look like very much like a Rube Goldberg machine, with add-ons, exceptions, secret doorways and special conditions. For animated productions, the Commission will now award 2 points (instead of 1 point) for each of the key creative positions Director, and Scriptwriter and Storyboard Supervisor, when filled by Canadians. There are various other tweaks; for animated productions, the Commission will award the points noted below for the following key creative positions, when filled by Canadians; Director (2 points; previously 1 point); Scriptwriter and Storyboard Supervisor (2 points; previously 1 point); and First Voice (or first lead performer) and Second Voice (or second lead performer) (1 point each; previously 1 point for one or the other, but not both). It goes on. For animated productions, the Director OR Scriptwriter and Storyboard Supervisor, and either the First Voice (or first lead performer) OR Second Voice (or second lead performer), and Key Animation AND Camera Operator must be Canadian. There’s more, adding Visual Effects Director and Special Effects Director to the list of key creative positions in a film, adding one bonus point if both are Canadian.

If all this has your head spinning, be assured that this stuff is of intrinsic interest to the industry but of not much relevance to Canadian consumers. What Canadian consumers want are Canadian stories in Canadian settings. On this score, there is a bit of a breakthrough, recognizing the importance of these factors for the first time. It is only a small opening but is the first time that location depicted in a film has been included as a factor in assessing Canadian content, as well as points for the source of the story.

The Commission will award 1 bonus point where identifiable Canadian characters and identifiable Canadian settings are included in a production, but all lead characters (up to 5 main fictional characters in dramatic productions) must be identified as Canadian or members of First Nations, Inuit or Métis in Canada and all persons on screen in non-dramatic productions (presenters, musicians, dancers) might likewise be Canadian, First Nations, Inuit or Métis (as if the latter were not, by definition, Canadian). As for location, “The location of the story must be set in Canada. The story or narrative must take place entirely in an identified Canadian city/region/province/territory. The location can be identified by a Canadian landmark or by identification on screen or otherwise identified overtly in the narrative or text of the program.”

All this for one lousy point! If you want to incorporate a visual reference to a place outside Canada (for example, one’s homeland for immigrant Canadians) could you do it in a dream scene if the dreamer’s bedroom has a shot of the CN Tower through the window. Not clear. But it is a start toward recognizing that settings, characters and stories are relevant to Cancon. A bonus point will be awarded for a production based on a Canadian story and another point for using Canadian music.

Finally, on the copyright front where the current CAVCO policy requires a Canadian to control the copyright for 25 years, there is mixed news. In a recent blog post, I argued that the CRTC should not impose a Canadian copyright restriction if the goal is to get foreign streamers to produce more Cancon for distribution abroad. Content is softpower. Content exported abroad not only helps cover the cost of production, it projects an image of Canada to the world through Canadian stories. To penalize foreign producers by preventing them from acquiring copyright in productions they have financed or partially financed, should they wish to acquire it, is shortsighted in my view. The CRTC took account of this concern but also had to listen to the instructions it received from government requiring it to consider the need to support Canadian ownership of intellectual property.

The end result is a compromise; Canadians must retain at least 20% of the copyright ownership in a program. In other words, up to 80% of the copyright in a production can be held by a foreign enterprise. In such cases, however, the production must accumulate at least 80% of possible points and the director and screenwriter must be Canadian. Where there are greater degrees of Canadian copyright ownership, some of these requirements are relaxed. There will be no minimum copyright retention period. A recent blog on MediaPolicy.ca goes into more detail on this.

Finally, there is the question of AI, just about the only point in the CRTC decision picked up by the mainstream media. The new positions created to increase the point count have to be staffed by humans, not AI. The rest of the CRTC package was likely too difficult to compress into something readable for the average news consumer.

What does this all add up to? An incredibly complex and bureaucratic system yet that is, believe it or not, a bit more flexible with respect to defining Canadian content than previously. It is a result of the classic compromises that must be made between idealism and reality, between promoting Canadian content in a bubble and ensuring its presence in the real, competitive world. It attempts to strike a balance between heavy lobbying by domestic constituencies such as Canadian independent producers and licensed broadcasters, and the foreign streamers that increasingly dominate the market. It tips the balance a bit more toward being a cultural than an industrial policy, but from the point of view of the average Canadian, is about as arcane as a bureaucratic process can get.

As noted, it is a Rube Goldberg machine with many levers needing to be pulled to get to the desired end, often by the most complicated route possible. But the Commission had little choice given that the current Cancon policy was clearly outdated. Maybe at the end of the day, we will actually get more recognizable Canadian content that finds audiences both domestically and internationally, on a variety of platforms. And while purist Canadian nationalists may disagree, if the new policy encourages additional investment in Cancon from the streamers, that can only be a benefit to Canada.

© Hugh Stephens, 2025. All Rights Reserved.

If anyone is not familiar with Rube Goldberg and his penchant for drawing overly complicated solutions to simple problems, this link will provide more detail.

The Online Streaming Act: Dealing with US Industry Concerns (The Cancon Factor)

A vintage television set displaying the Canadian flag.

Image: Shutterstock

Last month I wrote about the spectre of US trade retaliation against measures impacting or possibly impacting US streaming services as the Canadian Radio-Television and Telecommunications Commission (CRTC) proceeds with implementation of the Online Streaming Act (formerly Bill C-11). The Computer & Communications Industry Association (CCIA), a US trade association that includes, among others, Amazon, Google, Meta and Apple, has taken aim at this process, claiming it is discriminatory and violates Canadian commitments under the CUSMA/USMCA, the trade agreement that replaced NAFTA. A core element of CCIA’s argument is that the very concept of Canadian content (Cancon) is discriminatory because it violates Article 19.4 of CUSMA which calls for “national treatment” of a digital product;

“No Party shall accord less favorable treatment to a digital product created, produced, published, contracted for, commissioned, or first made available on commercial terms in the territory of another Party, or to a digital product of which the author, performer, producer, developer, or owner is a person of another Party, than it accords to other like digital products”

What is Article 19.4 intended to cover? As an example, if rules are imposed prohibiting digital products from causing harm to children, the same rules should apply to both domestic and foreign products. However, do special requirements regarding Cancon audiovisual or music products (such as airtime quotas on radio or possible “discoverability” requirements for streamers) constitute discrimination against US digital products? Maybe. Is all music and AV content fungible or is Cancon somehow different, i.e. not a “like digital product”? If Cancon is “different”, what is it that differentiates it? That is not an easy question to answer because of the many criteria that go into determining whether a product is considered Canadian for regulatory purposes.

I took a stab a couple of years ago at explaining how Cancon is defined (“Unravelling the Complexities of the Canadian Content (Cancon) Conundrum”). For AV products, it is basically a combination of four elements; production control, copyright and distribution rights, creative positions and production spend. The CRTC definition and the definition used by the Canadian Audio-Visual Certification Office (CAVCO), which distributes certain tax credits, are slightly different with the latter being more stringent. For music there is the MAPL system. As explained by the CRTC, to qualify as Canadian content, a musical selection must generally fulfil at least two of the following conditions: M (music): the music is composed entirely by a Canadian; A (artist): the music is, or the lyrics are, performed principally by a Canadian; P (performance): the musical selection consists of a live performance that is recorded wholly in Canada, or performed wholly in Canada and broadcast live in Canada, and L (lyrics): the lyrics are written entirely by a Canadian. The CRTC is proposing that the “P” criteria be dropped owing to changing patterns in the music industry, notably the many Canadian artists recording outside Canada, such as in Nashville.

Qualifying as Cancon is complicated, but it has value. Cancon certification provides access to various subsidies and funds as well as providing a product that meets airtime and broadcast obligations, where and when they exist. In the aftermath of the enactment of the Online Streaming legislation, a key question is whether streamers (like broadcasters) will be required to meet certain content quotas, if indeed it is even feasible to impose content quotas on streamers. The different delivery model, where it is the consumer who “pulls” content from a broad menu rather than a broadcaster who “serves up” a given offering, makes it almost impossible to impose content quotas. Theoretically, you could require a streamer to make available a specified inventory of Cancon, or even to promote Cancon (referred to as “discoverability”), but there is no way of making consumers actually watch or listen to Canadian productions. Trying to apply a 20th century broadcast model of regulation to 21st century streaming is not a good fit. Regulators around the world are grappling with this reality. One of the arguments for imposing an expenditure requirement on streamers, both domestic and international, to support the creation of Cancon is to compensate for the lack of applicability of content quotas in a streaming environment.

A core feature of certified Cancon at present is that it cannot, by definition, be produced by a non-Canadian regardless of whether all the creative talent (writers, directors, performers, designers, composers etc.) and production spend would otherwise meet Cancon criteria. There is a complicated formula that awards points for creative roles filled by Canadians, with a specified number of points required to qualify under different programs.  The fact that a non-Canadian production may be a Canadian story filmed in Canada with Canadian actors is irrelevant with respect to Cancon certification. In short, the colour of the money (the production company) is a determining factor. Additionally, under CAVCO rules, a foreign studio or producer cannot hold the intellectual property, (the copyright) in a Cancon production. A Canadian production company must be the copyright holder for all commercial exploitation purposes for a minimum of 25 years.

As part of implementing the Online Streaming Act, the CRTC was instructed to review the definition of Cancon. The Commission subsequently held public hearings in which ownership of copyright became a key issue. Opinions ranged from expanding the CAVCO requirements to all forms of Cancon to eliminating copyright ownership as a factor. The streamers, who now have (contested) financial obligations to fund Cancon, generally prefer to own copyright in productions. It is not a surprise that they object to being required to fund Cancon productions while being denied the opportunity to own and exploit the rights. Supporters of a more restrictive Cancon definition point out that foreign streamers are free to license Cancon qualifying productions from the Canadian rightsholder. However, a restrictive definition tied to financing and copyright ownership eliminates the possibility of direct financing by foreign streamers and could mean they would in effect be paying twice, first by contributing to the Fund that financed the production and second, by paying to acquire the rights. Moreover, there is no guarantee that the rights would be available on acceptable terms.

Those advocating for a comprehensive Cancon definition that includes financing and IP ownership as factors argue this is necessary to create and maintain a viable Canadian industry. But such restrictions have two effects. First, if copyrights must be retained, this removes from Canadian producers/rightsholders the ability to sell the rights at a time of their choosing (and possibly use the funds to produce more Cancon). Not all productions will have a sustaining revenue stream over time. It should be left to the producer to judge whether to cash out now or license the product while retaining ownership. Second, requiring that the producer be Canadian for a production to be certified as Cancon disincentivizes foreign streamers from self producing content showcasing Canadian stories, artists, locations etc. They can do so but are denied all Cancon credit for such productions. The cost of such productions does not count against their required financial contribution (currently 5% of revenues) nor does the production qualify as Canadian content in terms of meeting existing (or possibly future) content quotas. If a goal of Cancon policy is to promote expressions of Canadian culture through creation of financially viable productions, disincentivizing foreign producers from putting their toes into the Cancon lake makes no sense. Production of Cancon by global enterprises like the streamers will help ensure global distribution, meeting both cultural projection objectives as well as exposing Cancon to new markets.

There is also the question of subsidies provided to producers of Cancon. Under current definitions, the US studios are not eligible to access funds earmarked to produce Cancon (even though they are required to contribute to these funds). This could be dealt with giving foreign studios “contribution credit” for self-financed Cancon productions. It’s worth noting the studios are already offered generous subsidies–euphemistically referred to as tax credits–to undertake non-Canadian production in Canada, and no-one complains about that, except Donald Trump. Trump has been rattling the chains over so-called “runaway production” and has threatened to impose tariffs on movies made outside the US.

While I think many of the concerns of the foreign streamers could be addressed through a more flexible definition of Canadian content, I am not confident the CRTC will see it this way given the policy instructions it received from the government at the time the legislation was proclaimed. Can it comply with this guidance while not painting itself into a CUSMA corner? The Commission is directed to take international commitments into account, although there is no specific reference to CUSMA, only the 2005 UNESCO Convention on Cultural Diversity.

From my perspective it is not realistic for US streamers to expect a free ride (and they probably don’t) but Canada and the CRTC need to avoid being too greedy. They should also be flexible in defining Cancon, focussing more on the promotion of Canadian stories, music and talent and less on maintenance of an industrial policy that relies on protectionism for a favoured few. A policy that calls on foreign streamers to invest in Canadian creativity, given the revenues that they generate in Canada, is not unreasonable; denying them the ability to take a direct ownership stake in the products to which they contribute funding would be short-sighted. The policy straitjacket that exists with respect to Cancon sets up a search for draconian solutions, like the CCIA’s threats. In short, remove the Cancon handcuffs and keep the required contributions reasonable. Give credit for funds expended on content that meets Canadian artistic and cultural criteria. I think this would help blunt the frontal attack from US audiovisual streamers. Music is more complicated. Meanwhile, Canada needs to be careful not to negate any trade obligations it has taken on and avoid being forced into the Article 32.6 “cultural exemption” corner. 

But wait, I have an idea! If all else fails, there is also CUSMA Article 32.2 (b). “Nothing in this agreement shall be construed to…. preclude a Party from applying measures that it considers necessary for the fulfilment of its obligations with respect to …the protection of its own essential security interests.” If Donald Trump considers that importing kitchen cabinets from Canada threatens the national security of the United States perhaps it is not such a stretch to conclude that the preservation of Canadian culture (whatever that is) is just as essential to Canada’s national security, justifying any measures one chooses to employ. Is this a serious option? You decide.

© Hugh Stephens, 2025.  All Rights Reserved.

In writing this opinion piece, I have drawn on my background both as a former Canadian government official who has had some dealings with international trade issues over the years, as well as past experience as an executive with one of the US companies which, at the time, controlled a major Hollywood studio. (Time Warner). However, whatever “solutions” I have proposed to address US industry concerns regarding Cancon are mine alone. I hope they are a useful contribution to the debate, but I want to be clear that I do not speak for the CCIA or the streamers.

The CRTC and Online Streaming: Money Now; Details Later

Photo: Author

The first shoe has dropped for foreign online music and video streamers in Canada, at least those generating more than $25 million a year in “contribution revenues” from the Canadian market. On June 4, the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission (CRTC) announced it will be imposing “base contributions” of 5 percent of annual Canadian contribution revenues on streamers such as Netflix, Spotify, Amazon Prime, Disney + etc. as part of the implementation of the Online Streaming Act passed last year. (Canadian streamers associated with a Canadian broadcast entity, i.e. Crave, are exempt). The Act brings online streaming services under the regulatory purview of the broadcast regulator. The “base contributions” are to begin in the 2024-25 broadcast year, beginning September 1 of this year, and are expected to generate in the range of CAD$200 million annually. According to the Minister for Canadian Heritage, Pascale St. Onge, the levy is about “fairness in the system” and will be good for the streamers because it will create more content that will “most likely” go back on their platforms. So why are they not happy? (And they are not).

They are not happy because this is just the first shoe to drop, and while they now know the cost of this shoe, they don’t know what the other shoes are going to cost, what exactly those shoes will look like, or indeed whether they will be allowed to try them on. Because, you see, the rules about who can access the Funds that their money will be going into, and on what terms, have not yet been determined. Key decisions regarding the definition of Canadian content and who can own or control Canadian content (through holding the copyright) are a couple of years down the road. With those decisions could come other requirements, such as allocating a percentage of revenues to production of local content on top of the current “base contribution” to existing Funds, discoverability obligations, and possibly others.

With regard to the top-up of existing funding mechanisms, just about anybody who is anyone in film, TV or music will be lining up to get a share of the $200 million pie. The list includes (and I am not kidding) no less than 11 identified recipients named by the CRTC;  the Canadian Media Fund, the Independent Local News Fund, the Black Screen Office Fund, Certified Independent Production Funds supporting OLMC (Official Language Minority Communities), the Indigenous Screen Office Fund, FACTOR and Musicaction, a new temporary fund supporting local news production by commercial radio stations outside designated market, the Canadian Starmaker Fund and Fonds RadioStar, the Community Radio Fund of Canada, direct expenditures targeting the development of Canadian and Indigenous content and, last (and least, in terms of percentage of the funding from audio online undertakings), the Indigenous Music Office. Is anyone missing? What about the Punjabi Weather Network or the Lawn Bowling Broadcast Fund? This is micro-management gone wild.

The 5% contribution funding is divided up into various slivers, some larger than others, by the Solomons at the CRTC. As for the Minister’s optimistic belief that those making the contribution will “most likely” benefit from the content produced, I struggle to see how Netflix or Disney+ will get much out of the Independent Local News Fund (which is currently funded by Canadian cable platforms) or Francophone productions in British Columbia or Alberta. The argument, no doubt, is that this is the price for participating in the Canadian broadcast ecosystem, that now includes online streaming undertakings. Music streamers, on the other hand, will probably benefit from the development of more Canadian talent.

As a consumer of music and audio-visual content, I am also a participant in the broadcast ecosystem and already pay in various ways, through income and sales taxes, and streaming and cable (yes, I am still one of them) subscription fees. I have a hunch I am about to pay more. For several years now the AV streaming services have been on a spending spree in an attempt to grab market share. Profitability came second, but that is rapidly changing as the market matures. And that means subscription fees are going up. (Netflix is killing off the basic subscription I have had for a number of years and given me the choice of a slight price reduction if I put up with ads, or else face a roughly 50% increase in monthly subscription fees. I am still dithering). And this was before the CRTC dropped its latest bombshell. If the CTRC is going to take 5% or more of revenues, simple math tells you there are only a couple of ways to make that up, cut costs or raise prices. “Costs of doing business” inevitably get recovered from customers. If the price of supporting a viable content industry in Canada was limited to a 5% increase in my monthly subscriptions, I would gladly pay but I doubt that my contribution will be limited to 5%.

Ironically, the issue of whether the CRTC should regulate streamers was postponed for years in Canada because of aversion of what was referred to at the time as the “Netflix tax”. No-one knew for sure what that meant; it could have meant imposing sales taxes on a Netflix subscription (which has since been done), or it could have meant a levy on Netflix (which was the first streaming service to enter Canada) to fund Canadian content. But while people weren’t clear on what a Netflix tax was, they knew they didn’t like it. It became a symbol of piling yet one more nuisance fee onto consumers (“carbon tax” anyone”?) and while a small fee on a streaming subscription was unlikely to send anyone to the poor house, politicians from all parties outdid themselves by swearing to avoid any form of Netflix or internet tax.

Serendipitously, I have just finished reading Howard Law’s new book, “Canada vs California-How Ottawa Took on Netflix and the Streaming Giants”, a fascinating deep dive on Bill C-11, which became the Online Streaming Act, and its unsuccessful predecessor Bill C-10. (For those who don’t know, Howard also publishes a weekly blog, MediaPolicy.ca, another essential read for anyone interested in the Canadian media scene). Law devotes an early chapter to “No Netflix Tax 1999-2019” and then goes on to take the reader through the painful teething pains of Bills C-10 and C-11. The term “Netflix tax” has fallen out of use these days but the end result of the imposition of the CRTC “base contribution” on foreign streamers is really no different from an indirect tax.

Alternatively, if the streamers do not fund this new “base contribution” by raising prices to consumers, they will likely compensate for it by spending less elsewhere, i.e. on Canadian production, the very objective for imposing the contribution in the first place. According to MPA-Canada, in 2021-22 “foreign investment in production” (FIIP, a metric for international participation in the film and television production industry in Canada) contributed $875 million to production of Canadian content, about 13% of total financing for Canadian-owned content productions. (This is in addition to the much larger Foreign Location Shooting spend on US productions made in Canada). By comparison, the Canadian Media Fund contributed only 7% of total financing for Canadian productions. The foreign contribution to Canadian production was not far off the $1.09 billion spent by Canadian broadcasters on in-house production. A similar scenario exists in Australia, where the government is also exploring various options to require foreign streaming services to fund local production. Yet the streamers are currently the leading source of production funding for Australian adult drama. In Australia, streaming services invest more in this drama than public, commercial and subscription broadcasters combined, despite having no legal obligation to do so.

What does the US government think of the CRTC’s announcement? That will depend on how hard the foreign streamers push the US Administration to intervene, and right now it is not clear what they will do. Part of the issue is those other dangling shoes. The outcome might not be all that bad for the streamers if they are given fair access to the content they will be required to fund. After all, they need to spend on content to fill their pipeline. But the terms of what payback they will get from their required investments are not clear. A lot will depend on what amount of spend the Commission imposes on foreign streamers for production of Canadian content (Cancon), and how Cancon is defined.

Right now, the Canadian content definition is a complicated formula, set by different funding and regulatory bodies, as I outlined in a blog a couple of years ago,  (see “Unravelling the Complexities of the Canadian Content (Cancon) Conundrum”) and as Law outlines in his book. The core is the infamous points system, based on the nationality of key players in the production, plus amount of local spending. In addition, one of the current conditions for a production to be considered Canadian—and thus qualify for tax credits (funding)–is that the copyright and catalogue rights must be held by a Canadian (normally the producer) for a minimum of 25 years. However, the CRTC does not impose a copyright requirement when defining Cancon for broadcast quota purposes. Will this continue when the Commission finally gets around to addressing this issue? That shoe is still hanging there.

If the Cancon definition is tweaked in such a way that the foreign streamers are required to spend a set percentage of local revenues on Canadian content, but at the same time are excluded from being able to acquire such production (i.e. restricted to licensing content they have already invested in), this will be a problem. It is one thing to apply strings when a producer is applying for tax credits (AKA a subsidy). It is quite another to be required to fund production but be excluded from recouping a return on that investment in a way that makes most sense for the funder. With the Cancon definition shoe still dangling, trying to enlist the US Administration to bring pressure on Canada right now may not be the best strategy. Not that this has stopped some of the usual suspects, like the National Foreign Trade Council and the US Chamber of Commerce from weighing in. Their comments are no doubt a marker for future reference if needed. CUSMA/USMCA obligations need to be kept front and centre.

As I noted in an article last year, (“Could or Would the US Retaliate Against the Online Streaming Act (C-11) Now That it is Law?”), “the CRTC must be mindful that foreign streamers who contribute to Canadian productions need to be able to access, acquire and distribute them on an equal footing with Canadian streamers, who face no such limitations”. The CUSMA/USMCA trade agreement requires that cross-border digital services be dealt with on a national treatment basis, i.e. accorded no less favourable treatment than Canadian streaming services. The current proviso that exempts Canadian streaming services associated with a Canadian broadcaster from the 5% levy on revenues is not an auspicious start, but we will have to wait to see what happens.

Regarding the link between Cancon and copyright ownership, I know there are people in the industry in Canada whom I respect who argue this is very important to maintain cultural sovereignty. They feel strongly that it is essential for Canadians to hold the copyright in productions to avoid becoming just service producers. They have a point, although there are other considerations that need to be borne in mind. A Canadian producer should be able to hold the copyright (and assume the risk that the production may not be big earner in future) if they wish, or else assign it, take the money and move on to the next project without the government putting its thumb on the scale of commercial negotiations. And it is not unreasonable for those who provide the funding and invest in a project to be allowed to negotiate commercially on how the asset is exploited.

The CRTC’s June 4 announcement can be considered a down payment or perhaps a first shot across the bow, depending on how you want to look at it. We are in for months, if not years, of more consultations. The CRTC’s own announcements project consultations into 2026, well past the next election. There will be several more shoes to drop, and the political landscape could well change. In the meantime, the streamers will have to start paying into a mixed bag of Funds as directed by the CRTC. As for those all-important details about the regulatory framework, they will come later.

© Hugh Stephens 2024. All Rights Reserved.