The Online Streaming Act or Dairy Supply Management: Which one should Canada Surrender to the US in CUSMA Trade Negotiations? Or is it a Question of Putting Some Water into the Wine of Both?

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Should Canada give up the Online Streaming Act (OSA) in forthcoming CUSMA negotiations in order to preserve dairy supply management, as a former Vice Chair of the CRTC, Peter Menzies, suggested in a Globe and Mail oped earlier this month? Perhaps he was just being deliberately provocative although the question hits one of the raw nerves of Canadian politics. The cultural community– particularly in Quebec–would be enraged if this happened. But then if supply management is watered down to allow more imports from the US, especially in dairy, the dairy farmers–particularly in Quebec–will be equally enraged. Which group has the greater political clout? In both cases, Quebec-based interest groups have a card to play denied to others in Canada. It is called the Bloc Quebecois, and if enough support bleeds from the Liberals to the Bloc, that could just open the way to the Conservatives to form the national government they so desperately crave. The cultural mavens in Toronto have little choice; either support the Liberals or face a worse fate when those Conservative cowboys from Alberta take the reins of power.

The Quebec cultural community which insists that measures are needed to ensure that foreign streamers both contribute financially to support Canadian content (Cancon) and ensure that Cancon (when expressed in French) is “discoverable”, has yet another card up its sleeves. It is called Bill 109, Quebec legislation (that is probably ultra vires since broadcasting clearly falls within federal jurisdiction) that purports to regulate the discoverability of French-language cultural content in the digital environment. If Canada gives way on the Online Streaming Act in CUSMA negotiations, watch Quebec fill the void. So where does all this leave the Carney government? Between a rock and a hard place.

It is true, as Menzies has pointed out, that the CRTC has been very slow, plodding even, in dealing with implementation of the OSA. It may even be overwhelmed, with inadequate staff as he suggests. The fact that implementation is still a work in progress makes it easier for the US government to bring pressure to stop or at least to modify rollout of the legislation, whereas other objectives mentioned in recent USTR hearings, such as changes to the Bank Act to benefit US financial institutions or measures to terminate supply management would require significant legislative and regulatory change to undo measures that have been in place for decades. Best to nip it in the bud, or to kill it in the egg, as they say in Quebec.  

Canada’s planned introduction of a Digital Services Tax (DST) is a prime example of a nipped-in-the-bud policy. A DST deals with tax avoidance measures implemented by large digital multinationals by taxing their in-country revenues rather than their manipulated profits. Some countries, such as the UK, France, Spain, Italy etc had already implemented a DST before Trump’s return to office and seem to have got away with it, even though Google, Microsoft, Amazon, META and others of that ilk have the Trump Administration’s ear. Canada intended to implement a DST several years ago but dithered and dragged its feet, finally passing legislation in 2024 that would have brought a DST into effect on June 30, 2025, backdated to 2022 when the law should have been put into effect in the first place. Unfortunately for Canada, the implementation date fell right in the middle of the Trump tariff war and Canadian efforts to negotiate some relief. But rather than postponing implementation yet again–and using the possibility of a future DST as negotiating collateral–Canada “bravely” announced it was going ahead with implementation (regardless of the consequences). Until it wasn’t. Trump tweeted that he was cancelling trade negotiations with Canada because of the DST and voilà, over a weekend, the DST was cancelled (on June 29, 2025).

Trade talks resumed and actually appeared to be making some progress with respect to sectoral tariffs such as steel until the next excuse Trump found to end them. This time it was over Ontario’s World Series free trade ads that ran on US television, using Ronald Reagan’s words from a 1980s era speech praising free trade and condemning protectionist tariffs. The content of those ads may have been accurate, but the result was one of Canada’s more prominent “own goal” moments. While Doug Ford may have derived some brief satisfaction from getting under Donald Trump’s skin, the steelworkers of Sault Ste. Marie, who might have benefited from a rumoured sectoral deal on steel, have been paying the price. I think this fiasco helps explain the public anger of US Ambassador to Canada Pete Hoekstra (who surely wins the 2025 “Bull in a China shop” award) who crudely vented his frustration that a deal so close to fruition got blown out of the water through Premier Doug’s ill-considered initiative.

But what about supply management? Canada should be taking a long, hard look at the wisdom of continuing to defend this 1970s policy that almost every other country has since abandoned. Instead, it should use the CUSMA negotiations as the reason to ditch a monopoly that protects a few chosen producers of supply managed commodities at the expense of consumers and the rest of the economy. Unfortunately, that won’t happen because of Canadian political realities but there is still scope for some wiggle room. In recent years, Canada has been forced as part of its trade negotiations to open slivers of the dairy market to EU countries, CPTPP trading partners, and to the US through the CUSMA. The dairy industry screamed blue murder but was paid off for having to face a bit more competition. As part of liberalizing as little as possible, Canada routinely plays games with its commitments by awarding import quotas to the same domestic dairy industry with which exporters of dairy products to Canada are competing. Some additional foreign cheese and dairy products become available to consumers but in effect the fox is in charge of deciding which chickens get let in, and at what price. Even though this policy is an albatross around Canada’s neck, such is the power of the dairy industry (which is reputed to control the outcome of no less than eight ridings in Quebec) that all political parties support keeping supply management off the table in all trade negotiations, and passed legislation to this effect. In a political environment where the government is one vote short of a majority, risking the ire of Quebec dairy farmers is a risky business.

Does that mean that supply management is completely off the table and instead there should be another sacrificial lamb, such as domestic broadcasting and cultural policy, as Peter Menzies has suggested? This is a doubtful proposition. Despite all the posturing about supply management being “off the table”, there will almost certainly be some concessions to the US, even if it is only in the way the tariff free import quotas are managed. The Carney government will claim it is defending supply management, while making some tweaks to the system. It can do the same for cultural industries. Defend the essence but find compromises that US industry can live with.

Like supply management, the Online Streaming Act also has wiggle room in its implementation. Already we have seen the CRTC announce changes to Cancon definitions that introduce greater flexibility and go some way toward meeting the concerns of the (largely US-based) content streamers, while preserving elements of protection for Canadian production. (Canadian makeup and hair design artists will be happy as use of their services adds an element of “Canadianness” to a production that could be useful in meeting the Cancon definition. This just goes to show that you can never discount the influence of a specific lobby). While the US has laid out some maximum wish-list objectives, including withdrawal of the Online Streaming Act (as well as the Online News Act), there are domestic political realities in Canada that will constrain Canadian trade negotiators from sacrificing the cultural sector to gain other objectives, just as there are with regard to supply management. The US may hold a big stick in the negotiations, but Canada is not without cards to play. It just has to be careful how to play them, and when mobilizing support inside the US to do so in a way that does not offend the touchy amour-propre of Donald Trump.

The end result for Canada will not be water or wine, but rather how much water to allow into the wine. Some dilution will be necessary but at the end of the day, for domestic political reasons (particularly in Quebec), the liquid in the glass still will still have to resemble wine more than water. This applies equally to cultural industries and broadcasting as well as to supply management. It is far from an either/or situation.

© Hugh Stephens, 2026. All Rights Reserved.

The Year That Was: Looking Back at Copyright Issues in 2025

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In last year’s annual retrospective, I commented that just about the only significant copyright story in town was the impact of AI on copyrighted content. There were three primary dimensions, unauthorized use of copyrighted content for AI training, copyright infringing outputs produced by AI platforms and whether works produced by or with AI qualify for copyright protection. The first two elements, especially the unauthorized use of copyrighted content for AI training, continues to be the big story in 2025. Little has changed in terms of the fundamental issues, although this year there were two key court rulings in the US that provided some legal guidance. These were the Bartz v Anthropic and Kadrey et al v META cases, both decided within hours in the same courthouse in San Francisco, but by different judges. As I noted in a blog post at the time, in July, the results were a very mixed bag. (Hold the Champagne: The Two AI Training/Copyright Decisions Released in the US Last Week Were a Mixed Bag for AI Developers). While both judges found the copying of copyrighted works to train AI algorithms “transformational”, and thus tending toward fair use, in the Anthropic case the AI developer was castigated for initially using two pirate data bases (Library Genesis, aka LibGen, and Pirate Library Mirror, aka PiLiMi), as source material. This use threatened to result in hundreds of millions of dollars in statutory damages for authors whose works were included in these databases (if they had registered their works with the US Copyright Office). Thus, it was with no great surprise that the world learned in September that Anthropic had agreed to a $1.5 billion settlement to bring an end to the case. (When the End Does Not Justify the Means: Anthropic’s $1.5 Billion Lesson). In the Kadrey case, the judge suggested the plaintiffs should have made a stronger market dilution argument, which might have overridden the transformation finding. (New AI works produced based on unauthorized inputs of copyrighted works will devalue and dilute the market for the original works). That theory has yet to be fully tested.

While the Anthropic settlement seemed large in absolute terms, many criticized it as just another cost of doing business that failed to protect authors. But that is what licensing is, a cost of doing business. The damages could have been larger than the settlement, so Anthropic made a strategic decision to settle. Given the precedent, META must be worried given the clear evidence that its top executives gave the green light to use LibGen for training purposes despite internal warnings about the risk of doing so. (Is it Ethical to Use Pirated Content for Commercial Purposes? META Thinks So). The Anthropic decision gave impetus to ongoing licensing discussions between AI developers and content owners, especially large corporate rightsholders, like news media, music labels and big studios, such as Disney. The list of companies striking significant licensing deals with AI developers, either for AI training or outputs containing derivative content, is rapidly growing. Meanwhile lawsuits, such as New York Times v OpenAI, continue in lieu of settlement agreements.

Outside the US where the “fair use” doctrine along with its transformation interpretation doesn’t apply, there are also lawsuits against AI developers (in Canada and India for example). However, in these “fair dealing” countries AI developers are in a potentially tighter spot. In many countries there is no statutory exception to allow unauthorized access to copyrighted content for AI training, commonly known as text and data mining (TDM). Where there is such an exception (as in the UK or EU), it is confined to very specific circumstances such as non-commercial research, or else it requires that rightsholders be provided with an opt-out mechanism. Given these inconvenient facts (and their inability to rely on fair use arguments outside the US), AI developers have been mounting a full-court press to have TDM exceptions introduced into national legislation using the pretexts that a) everyone is doing it (which is certainly not true) and b) if governments don’t create an exception allowing TDM for AI training, all those AI development funds will flow elsewhere. In other words, throw rightsholders and creative industries under the bus in order to chase some ephemeral AI research funds. Australia has just rejected this binary approach, announcing that a TDM exception will not be part of its review of copyright laws to help address the needs of the AI industry. A number of Asian countries are reviewing the need for a TDM exception, but are rightly being very cautious not wanting to sacrifice the vital cultural and economic interests their creative sectors represent. Canada is another country without a TDM exception, a situation that has made OpenAI jittery since they are being sued in Ontario Superior Court by a consortium of Canadian news publishers for copyright infringement, bypassing Technical Protection Measures (protected paywalls) and breach of contract. OpenAI has been trying to get the case moved to the US by challenging the jurisdiction of the Canadian court, so far unsuccessfully.

Just as lawsuits in the US are providing the impetus for settlement discussions between AI developers and rightsholders, lawsuits against the AI industry outside the US will potentially have the same effect. The big story of 2025 is how many licensing agreements have been already reached. Even META, which in Canada and more recently Australia insisted it doesn’t need news content and would not pay for it, has reached a news media licensing deal with a number of companies including USA Today, People, CNN, Fox News, The Daily Caller, Washington Examiner and Le Monde. Back in 2021 META agreed to license news content in Australia as a result of the introduction of the Australian News Media Bargaining Code, but when Canada enacted a similar provision, it refused to do so and evaded the obligation to pay for local news by blocking it on its Facebook and Instagram platforms. Subsequently, when the Australian Code came around for renewal this year, META balked. Australia is still contemplating its next steps and while it is treading carefully, indications are that it is prepared to move against META.

One reason why Australia is moving carefully is the Trump factor. Trump’s erratic behaviour including the tearing up of the established rules of international trade is the second big copyright theme of 2025, after AI’s predations and encroachments. Not that Donald Trump knows much about copyright or understands it, but in his broadsides against trading partners and the international trading system, copyright industries inevitably become caught up in his web. Whether it is threatening tariffs on movies filmed outside the US, regardless of the fact that the largest slice of the box office comes from non-US sources and many films are either co-financed by offshore producers or require non-US settings (Trump’s Threatened Tariffs on Hollywood Films Produced Outside the US: The Medicine Could be Worse than the Disease), or taking aim at the policies of other countries that may have a digital or content component, like the Digital Services Tax in Canada,and its Online News Act, Trump is unpredictable and often off-target. His initial tariff measures against Canada included everything from steel to autos, based on the specious “national security” argument that there was a flood of fentanyl coming into the US from north of the border (actually about 0.2% of the total in 2024), but so far he has not specifically targetted the cultural industries. That may all change as the negotiations for renewal of the CUSMA/USMCA begin in the new year and as Canada struggles to redefine “Canadian content”.

There are industry groups in the US that claim provisions of the Online Streaming Act violate the terms of the CUSMA/USMCA by discriminating against US content providers, and that the only way Canada can justify these provisions is to invoke the cultural exception clause of the CUSMA. This would allow the US to retaliate in any sector with equivalent commercial effect. I have questioned this interpretation but we will probably never know who is right because the Online Streaming measures are unlikely to be challenged by the US prior to the start of CUSMA/USMCA renegotiations in early 2026. In those negotiations, the US will almost certainly take aim at various elements of cultural legislation like Online News and Online Streaming, along with other issues like dairy supply management. These may or may not be subject to negotiation as part of the renewal of CUSMA, if indeed the US or Canada are prepared to renew it.

Even if Canadian actions are consistent with the terms of the Agreement, this is essentially meaningless given the way the Trump Administration operates, as demonstrated earlier this year when Trump overrode various tariff free commitments in the Agreement on the basis of unilaterally declared national security concerns. These included the specious fentanyl trafficking claim mentioned above. Not only did the miniscule numbers give the lie to this assertion but the US claim somehow made Canada responsible for ensuring the security of the US border. As professor Fen Hampson of Carleton University has eloquently pointed out, the fate of CUSMA/USMCA depends not so much on where the economic interests of the United States lie, but on the fickle and unpredictable whims of Donald Trump personally.

As we head into 2026, there will be more Donald Trump uncertainty affecting copyright industries, more AI disruption, more lawsuits, more settlements and more licensing agreements to avoid lawsuits and settlements. That’s a pretty safe prediction based on looking back on 2025.

© Hugh Stephens, 2025. All Rights Reserved.

The Online Streaming Act: Dealing with US Industry Concerns (The Cancon Factor)

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Last month I wrote about the spectre of US trade retaliation against measures impacting or possibly impacting US streaming services as the Canadian Radio-Television and Telecommunications Commission (CRTC) proceeds with implementation of the Online Streaming Act (formerly Bill C-11). The Computer & Communications Industry Association (CCIA), a US trade association that includes, among others, Amazon, Google, Meta and Apple, has taken aim at this process, claiming it is discriminatory and violates Canadian commitments under the CUSMA/USMCA, the trade agreement that replaced NAFTA. A core element of CCIA’s argument is that the very concept of Canadian content (Cancon) is discriminatory because it violates Article 19.4 of CUSMA which calls for “national treatment” of a digital product;

“No Party shall accord less favorable treatment to a digital product created, produced, published, contracted for, commissioned, or first made available on commercial terms in the territory of another Party, or to a digital product of which the author, performer, producer, developer, or owner is a person of another Party, than it accords to other like digital products”

What is Article 19.4 intended to cover? As an example, if rules are imposed prohibiting digital products from causing harm to children, the same rules should apply to both domestic and foreign products. However, do special requirements regarding Cancon audiovisual or music products (such as airtime quotas on radio or possible “discoverability” requirements for streamers) constitute discrimination against US digital products? Maybe. Is all music and AV content fungible or is Cancon somehow different, i.e. not a “like digital product”? If Cancon is “different”, what is it that differentiates it? That is not an easy question to answer because of the many criteria that go into determining whether a product is considered Canadian for regulatory purposes.

I took a stab a couple of years ago at explaining how Cancon is defined (“Unravelling the Complexities of the Canadian Content (Cancon) Conundrum”). For AV products, it is basically a combination of four elements; production control, copyright and distribution rights, creative positions and production spend. The CRTC definition and the definition used by the Canadian Audio-Visual Certification Office (CAVCO), which distributes certain tax credits, are slightly different with the latter being more stringent. For music there is the MAPL system. As explained by the CRTC, to qualify as Canadian content, a musical selection must generally fulfil at least two of the following conditions: M (music): the music is composed entirely by a Canadian; A (artist): the music is, or the lyrics are, performed principally by a Canadian; P (performance): the musical selection consists of a live performance that is recorded wholly in Canada, or performed wholly in Canada and broadcast live in Canada, and L (lyrics): the lyrics are written entirely by a Canadian. The CRTC is proposing that the “P” criteria be dropped owing to changing patterns in the music industry, notably the many Canadian artists recording outside Canada, such as in Nashville.

Qualifying as Cancon is complicated, but it has value. Cancon certification provides access to various subsidies and funds as well as providing a product that meets airtime and broadcast obligations, where and when they exist. In the aftermath of the enactment of the Online Streaming legislation, a key question is whether streamers (like broadcasters) will be required to meet certain content quotas, if indeed it is even feasible to impose content quotas on streamers. The different delivery model, where it is the consumer who “pulls” content from a broad menu rather than a broadcaster who “serves up” a given offering, makes it almost impossible to impose content quotas. Theoretically, you could require a streamer to make available a specified inventory of Cancon, or even to promote Cancon (referred to as “discoverability”), but there is no way of making consumers actually watch or listen to Canadian productions. Trying to apply a 20th century broadcast model of regulation to 21st century streaming is not a good fit. Regulators around the world are grappling with this reality. One of the arguments for imposing an expenditure requirement on streamers, both domestic and international, to support the creation of Cancon is to compensate for the lack of applicability of content quotas in a streaming environment.

A core feature of certified Cancon at present is that it cannot, by definition, be produced by a non-Canadian regardless of whether all the creative talent (writers, directors, performers, designers, composers etc.) and production spend would otherwise meet Cancon criteria. There is a complicated formula that awards points for creative roles filled by Canadians, with a specified number of points required to qualify under different programs.  The fact that a non-Canadian production may be a Canadian story filmed in Canada with Canadian actors is irrelevant with respect to Cancon certification. In short, the colour of the money (the production company) is a determining factor. Additionally, under CAVCO rules, a foreign studio or producer cannot hold the intellectual property, (the copyright) in a Cancon production. A Canadian production company must be the copyright holder for all commercial exploitation purposes for a minimum of 25 years.

As part of implementing the Online Streaming Act, the CRTC was instructed to review the definition of Cancon. The Commission subsequently held public hearings in which ownership of copyright became a key issue. Opinions ranged from expanding the CAVCO requirements to all forms of Cancon to eliminating copyright ownership as a factor. The streamers, who now have (contested) financial obligations to fund Cancon, generally prefer to own copyright in productions. It is not a surprise that they object to being required to fund Cancon productions while being denied the opportunity to own and exploit the rights. Supporters of a more restrictive Cancon definition point out that foreign streamers are free to license Cancon qualifying productions from the Canadian rightsholder. However, a restrictive definition tied to financing and copyright ownership eliminates the possibility of direct financing by foreign streamers and could mean they would in effect be paying twice, first by contributing to the Fund that financed the production and second, by paying to acquire the rights. Moreover, there is no guarantee that the rights would be available on acceptable terms.

Those advocating for a comprehensive Cancon definition that includes financing and IP ownership as factors argue this is necessary to create and maintain a viable Canadian industry. But such restrictions have two effects. First, if copyrights must be retained, this removes from Canadian producers/rightsholders the ability to sell the rights at a time of their choosing (and possibly use the funds to produce more Cancon). Not all productions will have a sustaining revenue stream over time. It should be left to the producer to judge whether to cash out now or license the product while retaining ownership. Second, requiring that the producer be Canadian for a production to be certified as Cancon disincentivizes foreign streamers from self producing content showcasing Canadian stories, artists, locations etc. They can do so but are denied all Cancon credit for such productions. The cost of such productions does not count against their required financial contribution (currently 5% of revenues) nor does the production qualify as Canadian content in terms of meeting existing (or possibly future) content quotas. If a goal of Cancon policy is to promote expressions of Canadian culture through creation of financially viable productions, disincentivizing foreign producers from putting their toes into the Cancon lake makes no sense. Production of Cancon by global enterprises like the streamers will help ensure global distribution, meeting both cultural projection objectives as well as exposing Cancon to new markets.

There is also the question of subsidies provided to producers of Cancon. Under current definitions, the US studios are not eligible to access funds earmarked to produce Cancon (even though they are required to contribute to these funds). This could be dealt with giving foreign studios “contribution credit” for self-financed Cancon productions. It’s worth noting the studios are already offered generous subsidies–euphemistically referred to as tax credits–to undertake non-Canadian production in Canada, and no-one complains about that, except Donald Trump. Trump has been rattling the chains over so-called “runaway production” and has threatened to impose tariffs on movies made outside the US.

While I think many of the concerns of the foreign streamers could be addressed through a more flexible definition of Canadian content, I am not confident the CRTC will see it this way given the policy instructions it received from the government at the time the legislation was proclaimed. Can it comply with this guidance while not painting itself into a CUSMA corner? The Commission is directed to take international commitments into account, although there is no specific reference to CUSMA, only the 2005 UNESCO Convention on Cultural Diversity.

From my perspective it is not realistic for US streamers to expect a free ride (and they probably don’t) but Canada and the CRTC need to avoid being too greedy. They should also be flexible in defining Cancon, focussing more on the promotion of Canadian stories, music and talent and less on maintenance of an industrial policy that relies on protectionism for a favoured few. A policy that calls on foreign streamers to invest in Canadian creativity, given the revenues that they generate in Canada, is not unreasonable; denying them the ability to take a direct ownership stake in the products to which they contribute funding would be short-sighted. The policy straitjacket that exists with respect to Cancon sets up a search for draconian solutions, like the CCIA’s threats. In short, remove the Cancon handcuffs and keep the required contributions reasonable. Give credit for funds expended on content that meets Canadian artistic and cultural criteria. I think this would help blunt the frontal attack from US audiovisual streamers. Music is more complicated. Meanwhile, Canada needs to be careful not to negate any trade obligations it has taken on and avoid being forced into the Article 32.6 “cultural exemption” corner. 

But wait, I have an idea! If all else fails, there is also CUSMA Article 32.2 (b). “Nothing in this agreement shall be construed to…. preclude a Party from applying measures that it considers necessary for the fulfilment of its obligations with respect to …the protection of its own essential security interests.” If Donald Trump considers that importing kitchen cabinets from Canada threatens the national security of the United States perhaps it is not such a stretch to conclude that the preservation of Canadian culture (whatever that is) is just as essential to Canada’s national security, justifying any measures one chooses to employ. Is this a serious option? You decide.

© Hugh Stephens, 2025.  All Rights Reserved.

In writing this opinion piece, I have drawn on my background both as a former Canadian government official who has had some dealings with international trade issues over the years, as well as past experience as an executive with one of the US companies which, at the time, controlled a major Hollywood studio. (Time Warner). However, whatever “solutions” I have proposed to address US industry concerns regarding Cancon are mine alone. I hope they are a useful contribution to the debate, but I want to be clear that I do not speak for the CCIA or the streamers.

US Retaliation Against the Online Streaming Act: How Real is the Threat?   

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As CRTC hearings on implementation of the Online Streaming Act (formerly Bill C-11) grind slowly forward as part of the Commission’s deliberations as to how foreign audiovisual and audio (music) streaming services may be required to meet Canadian content (Cancon) and discoverability requirements, while determining the extent of their financial contribution to various funds supporting Canadian content, affected US industry players are not sitting on their hands. As you would expect, they are deploying a range of tactics to fight back using their industry associations, the Motion Picture Association (MPA)-Canada, representing Netflix, Disney, Sony, Paramount, Universal, Amazon Prime and Warner Bros. Discovery, and the Computer & Communications Industry Association (CCIA), representing among others Amazon, Apple, Google and Meta, as their vehicles of choice.

MPA-Canada is currently appealing to the Federal Court the CRTC decision that its members must contribute 1.5% of annual revenues to the Independent Local News Fund, arguing that the studios do not produce news and should not be required to contribute to a line of business in which they are not active. Apple, Spotify and Amazon are also appealing the full 5% payment on the grounds it is a tax the CRTC is not mandated to apply. The 1.5% contribution to news is part of the CRTC’s initial decision that the streamers should, as a “downpayment”, contribute 5% of revenues to fund Canadian production.  The MPA has also undertaken a lobbying campaign to point out how much its members already contribute to production in Canada, (CAD$6.7 billion in 2023, more than the CBC, Canadian Media Fund and Telefilm Canada combined) even though much of that content does not count as CanCon under current rules.

To this “positive” argument, the CCIA by contrast has added a more hard line, “negative” approach, releasing a study that calculates the amount the CRTC’s compulsory contributions will purportedly cost the US industry. Assuming the levy stays at 5% of revenues (by no means an assured outcome as Canadian broadcasters are urging the CRTC to impose contributions of 20 to 30%, similar to the obligations they face), CCIA estimates this will cost US streamers between $2.19 billion and $6.96 billion (all figures USD) by 2030. The estimate of losses is bundled with CCIA’s claim that the financial obligations constitute a violation of the CUSMA (known as the USMCA in the US) because it creates a preferential regime for Canadian content “thereby discriminating against content classified as American or from a third country”. In the eyes of the CCIA, actions under the Online Streaming Act violate the principle of “national treatment” in which Party A agrees to treat the products and services of Party B “no less favourably” than its own products and services. In support of this claim, CCIA cites the Investment and Digital Trade Chapters of CUSMA/USMCA, Chapters 14 and 19 respectively. According to CCIA, the Online Streaming Act’s “inconsistency with core trade obligations is beyond dispute”. Given this “indisputable” fact, CCIA states thatif challenged, Canada can be expected to invoke its cultural industries exception (Article 32.6) as a basis for justifying the inevitable discrimination….

Article 32.6 is part of the General Exceptions Chapter of the CUSMA/USMCA. It states, in part, “This Agreement does not apply to a measure adopted or maintained by Canada with respect to a cultural industry…” The production, distribution, sale, or exhibition of film or video recordings as well as audio or video music recordings are included in the definition of a cultural industry. As I have written elsewhere (NAFTA and the Cultural Exception) Article 32.6, while in theory exempting defined cultural industries from the obligations of the Agreement (the NAFTA provision was essentially rolled over into the CUSMA), has a sting in its tail. If Canada applies any discriminatory measures that violate the agreement using the cultural exclusion as the pretext, the US is fully within its rights to retaliate with measures of “equivalent commercial effect”, in any sector. The CCIA’s $2.19 billion or $6.95 billion numbers need to be viewed in this context.

The first question, therefore, is would Canada need to resort to Article 32.6 to justify measures taken under the Online Streaming Act? I argued in an earlier paper I wrote for the School of Public Policy at the University of Calgary that given the current structure of the obligations, Article 32.6 would not be in play because the measures in question are not inconsistent with CUSMA, given the Agreement’s precise wording. You can read the detailed arguments in the paper, but essentially my position is that neither the Chapter 14 Investment reference nor the Chapter 19 Digital Trade provision cited by CCIA are relevant because content streaming is covered by a separate part of the Agreement, Chapter 15, Cross-border Trade in Services. The terms of the Online Streaming Act, as applied by the CRTC provide “national treatment” to foreign streaming services. In fact, they impose lesser requirements on foreign streamers with respect to carriage of Cancon than they do on Canadian streamers.

But this interpretation is only my personal view. I have no idea is this is the interpretation of the trade policy gurus at Global Affairs Canada (I haven’t spoken to them and even if I did, they would be unlikely to tell me what their position would be on a hypothetical trade case) and is almost certainly not the interpretation favoured by officials in the Office of the US Trade Representative (USTR). And certainly not by CCIA. CCIA’s position is that a show or track streamed in Canada is a digital product, (even though it describes its members as providing “streaming services”). The Agreement is clear that there should be no discrimination against digital products of the other Party i.e. they should be accorded “national treatment”, although domestic products can be subsidized. On the other hand, if streamed content is not considered a digital product (nor an investment, which according to CUSMA cannot be subject to “performance requirements” as a condition of allowing the investment) but rather a cross-border service, the conditions applicable to delivery of the service are what counts. National treatment needs to apply to service delivery, and insofar as the Online Streaming Act is concerned, it does.

Whether streamed content is a digital product or a cross-border service clearly matters. If the US brought a CUSMA trade complaint against Canada–and if the CCIA view were to prevail–Canada would either have to change the way it treats US digital products carried by streaming services or defend its actions on the basis of the cultural exception, Article 32.6. If it did the latter, it would be opening itself to trade retaliation by the US, at an equivalent commercial level. In my experience and judgement, Canada would be most unlikely to resort to the exception to justify its actions precisely because of the consequences. The US would retaliate not just against the cultural sector, but in other areas that would set one industry or part of the country against another. To avoid this, the government would instead find some other way to comply with the Agreement by modifying the offending provision (as little as possible but as much as necessary), but doing so in a way, if possible, that still met all or most of its policy objectives.

It is also just possible, however, that Canada would be prepared to absorb the retaliation, calculated by CCIA to be between $400 and $500 million annually if the CRTC mandated contribution remains at 5% of revenues. This sounds like a big number but the random way the Trump Administration has been imposing tariffs on a range of Canadian products such as steel and aluminum (50%), lumber (45%), and autos (25%), industries where Canadian exports total tens of billions of dollars annually, makes $400 million in possible retaliation seem relatively minor. In effect, Trump’s erratic punitive behaviour has normalized trade retaliation–and devalued its effectiveness as a threat. But whatever response the Canadian government took, the first step would be to determine whether Canada was in fact in violation of the Agreement. If one Party considers that “an actual or proposed measure of another Party is or would be inconsistent with an obligation of this Agreement”, it can resort to the dispute settlement process. In the first instance, this involves consultation and if no resolution is reached, sometimes the constitution of a panel to decide the issue. (CUSMA/Article 31).

The CCIA itself cannot charge Canada with non-compliance, although it can raise the spectre of retaliation as it is doing. Only the US Government can bring a complaint, and at this stage it is not clear if it would be willing to do so. Given the range of trade disputes between the two countries, including unilateral tariffs on Canadian exports imposed by the Trump Administration on the basis of specious claims that Canada is a major source of fentanyl exports to the US (last year 0.2% of all fentanyl seized at the US border came from Canada; over 90% was from Mexico), or equally questionable grounds that exports of Canadian products ranging from aluminum to kitchen cabinets pose a national security threat to the US, the bilateral trade relationship hardly needs more issues. It will depend on the extent to which the streamers in the US have the ear of the Trump Administration. Given Trump’s insistence that Canada drop its planned Digital Sales Tax if it wanted to keep the current bilateral trade talks going , it is certainly within the realm of possibility that USTR would take up the CCIA’s case.

There is one other wrinkle to the cultural exception clause. Even if Canada does not justify its actions on the basis of Article 32.6, potentially the US could unilaterally declare it considers Canadian measures to fall under that provision and move to initiate retaliatory measures. If it did so, Canada would then be entitled to demand a panel to determine whether Article 32.6 is applicable, and if so, whether the retaliation met the “equivalent commercial effect” test. However, the key issue would still be to determine whether Canada had violated its commitments under the Agreement. If there is no violation of CUSMA’s terms, the cultural exception is moot. If all this has your head spinning, welcome to the green eyeshade world of trade practitioners.

CCIA, in pushing back against the provisions of the Online Streaming Act, has resorted to the threat of trade retaliation as one more tool in its policy toolbox. That is to be expected. With this in mind, the CRTC will be carefully reviewing how much leeway it has in trade policy terms and needs to keep Canada’s CUSMA commitments in mind when implementing policy. In a following blog posting I will outline what I think Canada and the CRTC need to consider.

© Hugh Stephens 2025. All Rights Reserved.  

Policy Overboard! US Trade Talks Stabilized…For Now.

What’s the Next Policy to Walk the Plank? (The Canadian Content Industries Are Uneasy.)

A hand-drawn illustration of a boat labeled 'TRADE TALKS' with a small figure falling overboard next to the word 'POLICY'. The background features simple waves.

Image: Author

It used to be that when concessions were made during trade negotiations, they were announced as part of a final, balanced deal. That appears to be no longer the case, at least with respect to the dragged out Canada-US trade talks that are supposed to address the unilateral imposition of US tariffs on a range of Canadian products, such as steel, aluminum and copper along with many products manufactured from these commodities, and other Canadian products that do not qualify for CUSMA/USMCA tariff-free treatment. Last week, Prime Minister Mark Carney announced that effective September 1 Canada would lift retaliatory tariffs against a range US products that it had imposed back in March when the US imposed steep “fentanyl” tariffs on Canadian products. Since then, the US has confirmed that products falling under the CUSMA/USMCA Free Trade Agreement will be exempt (for now) from the 35% tariffs that the Trump Administration has imposed on non-CUSMA compliant goods. The tariffs that Canada is lifting cover only CUSMA/USMCA compliant goods, thus matching US policy.

Maybe this is a sensible and timely move to preserve the existing but tenuous CUSMA/USMCA zero tariff treatment enjoyed by qualified Canadian products. The fact that US compliance with a carefully negotiated trilateral treaty, personally signed by Donald Trump back in 2016, is considered tenuous speaks to the US President’s respect for international obligations, or rather lack of. If he doesn’t like what the US has agreed to through negotiations, he simply ignores treaty obligations by finding some specious excuse (like the accusations of Canada being a centre for fentanyl smuggling into the US) to renege on signed and Congressionally-ratified commitments. This process, by the way, is just a warmup for the upcoming renewal negotiations for CUSMA/USMCA in 2026. Trump already has Canada, and many other trading partners, on the back foot with his incessant imposition of new trade barriers on fabricated grounds. Soon he will be saying that imports of Canadian maple syrup are a security threat to the United States.

So far Canada has managed to weather the worst of the storm thanks, in part, to the existing CUSMA treaty. Negotiations with Washington to reset the relationship have been underway for some time but famously missed the August 1 deadline that Carney tried to pry out of Trump at the Kananaskis, Alberta, G7 summit earlier this year. As part of these negotiations, Canada has already made two significant concessions, one to dramatically increase defence spending immediately (probably a good idea for a host of reasons, but designed nonetheless to mollify the President), the other to withdraw its Digital Service Tax (DST) legislation. This latter move was required by the Trump Administration as a pre-condition for resuming the trade talks it had unilaterally suspended when Canada announced it was proceeding with its DST.

On the DST, while the US has dragged its feet on finding a multilateral solution to the problem of giant digital businesses engaging in tax avoidance through tax forum shopping, Canada compounded the problem by playing its hand badly. While there is plenty of justification for imposing a tax (DST) on the digital giants based on the level of revenue they generate in a given jurisdiction (since they manipulate their tax accounting to ensure that profits accrue only in offshore low tax regimes like Ireland), to actually implement a unilateral tax in the middle of trade negotiations was asking for trouble. Instead of putting the tax on pause and using it as a bargaining chip, the introduction of the DST–despite warnings of consequences–was a poorly timed move and led, almost overnight, to a hasty retreat and a humiliating climbdown on Canada’s part. And now we have the repeal of retaliatory tariffs that were instituted as part of the “elbows up” response to the unilateral imposition of US tariffs earlier this year. All just to keep the negotiations going. The only benefit Canada has received is a verbal assurance from Trump that lifting the tariffs will “kickstart” the negotiations. Not exactly a bankable document.

Trump’s strategy is to pick off one concession after another in return for just keeping the talks going. So far, he has been successful.  If you impose a DST, we’ll walk! Remove your retaliatory tariffs (remember, it was the US that started the tariff war, thus explaining why Canadian tariffs are “retaliatory”) or the negotiations will go nowhere. What’s next? Canadians have every right to worry. Trump smells weakness, and serial capitulations only encourage him. On the other hand, are there any good options?

The goal clearly must be to protect Canadian jobs. Maybe a little water in the wine at the right time is the way to do this, since the old model of how trade negotiations used to work is no longer on the table. Traditionally negotiating an agreement, a balance of concessions and advantages, was resorted to by smaller economic powers in order to have some guarantees of security and access to larger markets. The larger powers respected what they had negotiated as a means of promoting a more open trading system, to the benefit of all, while winning access for key sectors of their own. Trump has upended all that, using any excuse he can think of to renege on US obligations and impose unilateral tariffs, even if this is likely illegal and a usurpation of the role of Congress.

The end result will be the proof of whether Carney’s policies, which some equate with appeasement, are working. Using hockey analogies, which Carney employed so effectively in the election campaign, (Carney played on both the Harvard and Oxford varsity ice-hockey teams; it is not known whether his opponent, Pierre Polievre, can even skate) we have moved beyond “elbows up” defensive moves to focus instead on scoring goals. But if Trump continues to control the puck, neither elbows up or elbows down will have made much difference. One wonders where Carney will draw the line and how much longer the US can continue to slice the Canadian salami (before it’s all gone).

One can argue that lifting retaliatory tariffs is not a bad idea since they have hurt many Canadian businesses by increasing costs on the imported US goods they rely on (although there were many special exemptions created through duty remission orders). Canadian consumers have also taken a hit. On the flip side, while the Canadian tariffs hurt and caught the attention of some US exporters, the economic pressure was not sufficient to deter the Trump Administration. Over the longer term, Trump’s import tariffs are going to seriously damage the US economy, but Canada and Carney don’t have the luxury of waiting for that to happen. Nonetheless, unilateral concessions are a slippery slope. What’s the next Canadian policy at risk of being pushed overboard?

The content industries in Canada are concerned they might be the next ones to walk the plank. It’s no secret that some large US companies are not happy with Canadian cultural policies such as the Online News Act and the Online Streaming Act. In fact, the whole idea of an exemption from free trade agreement obligations for Canadian cultural industries has long been unpopular in the US although accepted as the part of the balance of give and take that was necessary to reach a mutually beneficial agreement. The “cultural exemption” was embedded in the first Canada-US bilateral agreement in 1987 and has been carried over to both NAFTA and the CUSMA/USMCA. However, the “Art of the Deal” style of negotiating does not put much stock in mutually beneficial win/win outcomes, instead viewing negotiations as a zero-sum game. With Trump generally holding the better cards owing to several decades of economic integration of the Canadian and US economies as a result of the bilateral FTA, NAFTA and CUSMA, Carney is playing against the odds. What is the ultimate price of a deal that Canadians can live with?

The unilateral concessions to date have led to some domestic unease and criticism, but if Carney scores a winning goal, or even achieves a tie, no doubt all will be forgiven. In the meantime, the cultural sector in Canada (and no doubt the supply management industry, especially dairy) are nervously watching the process of the on-again, off-again bilateral trade negotiations, hoping they won’t find themselves the next ones made to walk the plank just to keep the negotiating process going.

© Hugh Stephens, 2025. All Rights Reserved.

Copyright, Cultural Issues and Canada’s General Election, 2025

Image: Shutterstock (AI generated)

As we complete the first few days in what is the shortest election campaign in Canadian history, the minimum 37 days required by law, where do the copyright and cultural industries stand with respect to electoral platforms and public consciousness? Given the overwhelming focus on dealing with economic and even potential political disruption coming from south of the border, along with traditional bread and butter issues like the cost of living, especially food and housing, one could be tempted to say that cultural and copyright issues are largely invisible. Party platforms have not yet been released (and are probably still being worked on) and by the time they are made public, the election will be well underway. So while there still may be a couple of small references to copyright issues in party platforms (as occurred in the 2021 election, none of which led to any substantive legislation), they will simply be part of a laundry list of possible actions in many disparate areas. However, that has not stopped the cultural sector from outlining its policy proposals, which have been laid out articulately by the Coalition for the Diversity of Cultural Expressions (CDCE), an umbrella group that represents more than 350,000 creators and artists, and more than 3,000 cultural enterprises. Despite the fact that copyright issues are not at or even near the top of the agenda, there is a strong undercurrent of Canadian nationalism in this election that will inevitably have an influence on policies in the cultural sector.

In 2021 the governing Trudeau Liberals included a promise to “protect Canadian artists, creators and copyright holders by making changes to the Copyright Act including amending the Act to allow resale rights for artists”. They were re-elected but did nothing. The Conservatives for their part undertook “recognize and correct the adverse economic impact for creators and publishers from the uncompensated use of their works…”. They weren’t elected so the commitment was meaningless. This time proposed changes to copyright legislation are unlikely to move the needle for any party although the issue of the unauthorized use of copyrighted content to train AI still needs to be resolved, since AI will become a front-burner issue for any party elected. The CDCE’s paper addresses this issue, among others, in its 9 recommendations. Broken down into 4 buckets, the CDCE’s proposals address (1) International Trade and Cultural Sovereignty (2) Broadcasting and CBC/Radio Canada (3) Copyright and (4) Artificial Intelligence and Culture.

The CDCE proposal under “International Trade” is to insist that the cultural exemption clause be retained if the CUSMA/USMCA is renegotiated, and that cultural activities, goods and services be excluded from all future agreements. The cultural exemption clause, (Article 32.6 of the CUSMA) is based on a similar exemption in NAFTA and the original US-Canada bilateral trade agreement of 1989 but is more of a political fig-leaf than a real protection since if the provision is invoked, the US can retaliate with equivalent effect in any trade sector. However, it provided comfort to the cultural sector at a time when free trade with the US was seen to make Canada vulnerable culturally. Thirty plus years of bilateral, and now trilateral, trade proved that fear to be unfounded—until now—and the cultural exemption has never been used. During the period from 1989 to the present, even through the ups and downs of Trump 1.0, the fundamentals of the initial bilateral Free Trade Agreement, then NAFTA, and now the CUSMA/USMCA were basically respected by all parties. Under Trump 2.0 this has all been called into question. If the Trump Administration is going to disavow the basic elements of the CUSMA, having a cultural exemption clause becomes less than meaningless.

On April 2, the US will unveil its “reciprocal tariff” regime. It has arrogated to itself the right to include, in addition to tariffs imposed by other countries, self identified non-tariff measures in its calculations. Among these may be various cultural support measures imposed by Canada on foreign entities operating in Canada requiring them to make financial contributions to Canadian content. If that happens, the US will be violating yet again the provisions of the CUSMA/USMCA as it has already done with regard to the imposition of tariffs on some products on the specious grounds of fentanyl trafficking from Canada to the US, (less than 20kg in all of 2024). However, given the surge in Canadian nationalism as a result of the tariff threats but more particularly the verbal diarrhea coming daily from President Trump about Canada becoming the 51st state, it is unlikely that any Canadian government would throw Canada’s cultural identity under the bus for the sake of preserving tariff-free access to the US market for some commodities. Thus, seeing Canada sacrifice cultural support measures that may annoy some US businesses operating in Canada (like online streaming content providers) in return for a degree of tariff relief is an unlikely outcome in the present circumstances.

This surge of nationalism relates to the second of the CDCE’s “demands”, protecting the CBC and the Canadian broadcasting environment. Ever since Pierre Poilievre became leader of the opposition Conservative Party, one of the Party’s mantras has been “defund the CBC”. There is no question that the CBC business model is in need of reform, particularly its English language entertainment television service which captures a very small market share, but CBC radio, CBC news broadcasts and CBC’s French language service, Radio-Canada, remain highly relevant, as this CBC explainer attempts to show. Given the need to protect national identity in the face of the Trumpian onslaught, and the recent rediscovery that perhaps Canada is not so “broken” after all, if ever there was a need for this national institution, it is now.

The third basket of issues raised in the CDCE position paper relates to copyright concerns, which get very little traction among the general electorate but are important to the creative and cultural community. Once again, the CDCE reminds parties of the lack of an Artists Resale Right in Canada (noting previous promises to establish this measure), as well as some other longstanding issues like fair remuneration for writers and publishers for the use of their works in the education sector and extending the private copying regime to electronic devices. This would impose a small levy (about $3) paid by manufacturers and embedded in the cost of a smartphone to compensate for unregulated widespread copying of music on these devices, with the funds flowing back to music creators.

The final bucket deals with Artificial Intelligence (AI) and copyrighted content. At the present time there are some 40 lawsuits in the US pitting rightsholders against AI developers, and even a couple of cases in Canada. Canada has been slow off the mark in addressing this issue; at the moment there is no Text and Data Mining exception in Canadian copyright law and both rightsholders and AI developers are not clear on the ground rules. The CDCE is asking that a legislative framework be adopted that includes the key principles of (1) Authorization (by the rightsholder) (2) Remuneration (payment for use of copyrighted content) and (3) Transparency (the establishment of disclosure rules as to what training data is used in AI systems and ensuring that all AI-generated content is clearly identified). These are reasonable asks but there is no guarantee they will be respected.

In the US, AI developers are pushing the Trump Administration to give them a pass on respecting author’s copyright, notwithstanding the cases before the courts, using the argument that the US will lose the AI race to China if US developers cannot help themselves freely to the content of others. OpenAI (which is being sued by the New York Times) and Google argued in submissions to the US government that giving them unfettered access to data, including content owned by others, is essential for national security. Described by blogger David Newhoff as “tech bro bombast”, OpenAI’s attempt to wrap itself in the national security blanket is a cynical ploy to get around the inconvenient fact that it and other AI developers are hijacking the creative work of authors, artists, and musicians without permission or compensation while creating outputs that in a number of cases can compete with or even displace the original works that contributed to their training. A similar situation is developing in the UK where the creative community is pushing back against the original copyright carte blanche that the UK government seemed inclined to give to the tech community, in the name of AI competitiveness. Canadian governments are not beyond succumbing to the siren calls of the AI community and it is timely to establish some guiding principles, of which Authorization, Remuneration and Transparency are a good place to start.

However, while AI and copyright are not going to become election issues, national identity, which is closely intertwined with cultural sovereignty, surely is. Indirectly, copyright will be important as it is one of the foundation stones of cultural sovereignty, an issue that would have played second fiddle to economic issues like food inflation, carbon pricing, cost of housing, fuel and utility costs etc until Donald Trump started spouting his annexationist nonsense.

Frankly, had Trump really wanted to absorb Canada (eventually) he should have brought Canada inside the US economic tent and made the country even more reliant on the US market, by providing it with an exception to his attempts to take on the world trading system. Instead, he has woken Canadians from a restful, dependent slumber brought on by three decades of relatively uncontroversial free trade and economic integration and made them realize that they have no one to depend on but themselves. In doing so, he has revitalized a sense of nationalism that will play out in this election. Who can best defend Canadian interests has become the litmus test for Canadian voters, leading to a remarkable resurgence for the Liberal Party under new leader Mark Carney after the political corpse of Justin Trudeau was removed from the electoral scene. This may or may not change during the course of this short campaign. One thing is certain; while copyright issues per se will not get much profile, cultural identity issues will certainly be in the spotlight. This is a shift in emphasis that in the long run is likely to benefit the creative sector.

© Hugh Stephens, 2025. All Rights Reserved.

Donald Trump’s Tariff Threats: Their Potential Impact on Canada’s Cultural Industries

Image: Shutterstock.com

With a general election in Canada now set for April 28, attention will be focussed south of the border to see what Donald Trump says and does next. Apart from his tiresome and insulting trope about Canada becoming the 51st US state, how best to deal with the economic fallout from the imposition of unilateral US tariffs on Canadian exports to the US will be the big election issue. Indeed, the drumbeat of tariff threats emanating from self-proclaimed “Tariff Man” is becoming overwhelming, both in terms of tariffs already applied, but also regarding potential future tariffs. As we have already seen, the uncertainty and almost daily changes, (government by tweet), are roiling markets and undermining investor confidence. With respect to Canada there have been repeated threats of what is to come while some tariffs, such as those on steel and aluminum that were applied globally, are already in force. Then there are the threatened 25% tariffs on all Canadian (and Mexican) imports, except for energy products which will be taxed at a 10% level, imposing additional costs on US consumers. (The example of potash, an essential product needed by American farmers is an interesting case study. It is basically only available from Canada, unless you import it from Russia, Belarus or China. The US does produce a small amount but 85% of US potash consumption comes from Canada. So much for President Trump’s mantra that Canada has nothing the US needs. When US farmers squealed loudly, the duties on potash were suddenly lowered from 25% to 10% and then suspended completely under an exemption for all products covered by CUSMA).

The 25% tariffs designed to hinder the export of automobiles and car parts (amongst other products) manufactured in Canada from being shipped to the US —a measure which incidentally contravenes the terms of the US-Canada-Mexico Agreement (USMCA/CUSMA)—are temporarily on suspension given the representations made by US auto manufacturers who had to explain to the White House how integrated North American supply chains work, but any products not covered by USMCA/CUSMA are still subject to the 25% tariff. The pretext for this violation of a ratified trilateral trade agreement is supposedly the “national emergency” created by the flow of fentanyl and illegal immigrants from Mexico and Canada. The only problem with this rationale is that, in the case of Canada,  there is a greater flow of illegals from the US to Canada than vice versa, and the seizures of fentanyl at the northern border by US officials in 2024 totalled less than 20 kilos, less than one percent of the amount seized on the southern border. Thirteen grams (that’s less than half an ounce) were seized in January. This year, US border officials have caught more people smuggling eggs from Canada into the US (where the price of eggs has shot up owing to avian influenza in US poultry flocks) than fentanyl. But the facts appear irrelevant to the Trump Administration; what is important is to create a pretext to violate the USMCA.

That pretext was used to trigger the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA). This legislation allows the President “to deal with any unusual and extraordinary threat, which has its source in whole or substantial part outside the United States, to the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States”. It was first enacted in 1977 and is designed to deal with acts of terrorism or other threats to the security of the United States. It confers wide, albeit temporary, powers on the Executive Branch and has been used in situations like the Iran hostage crisis in 1979, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and to deal with various identified terrorist groups. Using it to punish Canada because under 20 kg (43 lbs). of fentanyl were seized in the course of a year at the Canada-US border is clearly an abuse of the intent of the Act. Notwithstanding, that is what Trump used to impose USMCA noncompliant tariffs on Canada.

The temporary suspension of the 25% tariffs on Canadian (and Mexican) imports will apparently end on April 2, when Trump plans to impose reciprocal tariffs on a global basis. How these will be calculated is anyone’s guess. The President has indicated that in addition to whatever tariff irritant he can find, he might also include other measures in US calculations that in his view discriminate against US goods and services. Thus, while most US products enter Canada tariff free (with the notable and unfortunate exception of most dairy products, which are subject to Canada’s outdated supply management system), Trump could take aim at other policies he doesn’t like. For example, while many US banks operate in Canada, none of them are full-service retail banks allowed to take deposits (but nor are they required to have the same capital requirements). Then there is the fact that Canada, like the EU, imposes a value-added tax (VAT) on most products (basic foodstuffs being the primary exception), called the GST (Goods and Services Tax). This is another potential target even though it is applied without discrimination to US, Canadian or products from any other country. Likewise, longstanding measures that provide protection and subsidies for Canadian cultural industries, like broadcasting (AV and music) content quotas or more recent mandatory financial contributions to Canadian content funds, along with funding obligations to support local journalism, could potentially become targets.

Would Google try to reopen the commitments it finally made to support Canadian journalism in order to avoid designation under the Online News Act? Will the mandatory “contributions” to Canadian content creation that the CRTC has imposed on foreign streamers become an issue? A prominent US trade association, the Computer and Communications Industry Association (CCIA), went so far as to claim that ”the CRTC’s structure of mandatory contributions contravenes Canada’s commitments to the United States under CUSMA”. While I think that claim is doubtful, if the Trump Administration regards the CUSMA as just a piece of paper to be ignored at will, US industries should think twice about using it as a lever against Canada. In any event, in my view the best approach is to continue to stress the value of cooperation and mutual benefit, as Canada has been trying to do by explaining to the Trump Administration why tariffs are self-defeating. In terms of AV production, the contribution that US content producers make to the Canadian production industry is significant even if there are disagreements about the extent to which US production in Canada helps or hinders creation and distribution of Canadian content.

It is important to note that all countries impose investment or trade restrictions of one sort or another, and the US is no exception. These restrictions are weighed in terms of the balance of reciprocal benefits when trade agreements are negotiated, including the current USMCA/CUSMA signed by Trump himself in his first term. But if you are not inclined to respect the commitments you have made, and intend to ignore carefully negotiated and signed treaties, then any domestic measure can become a target. Uncertainty as to what could happen next is a major concern. Two Canadian cultural industries that are keeping their heads down and hoping for the best are art dealers and book publishing.

Earlier this month, the Globe and Mail reported that art dealers and galleries are facing slowdowns in the face of the uncertainty brought about by the Trump tariff threats. Books, art and other informational materials were granted an exemption when Trump first imposed the tariffs on Canada, using the excuse of fentanyl trafficking. Buried within the legislation used to suspend USMCA/CUSMA obligations, (the IEEPA referred to in paragraph 3 above) is a provision that creates certain exceptions, amongst which is “any information or informational materials, including but not limited to, publications, films, posters, phonograph records, photographs, microfilms, microfiche, tapes, compact disks, CD ROMs, artworks, and news wire feeds”, unless controlled by some other authority. (Section 1702 (b)(3)). While US Customs noted the exception when publishing its Notice of Implementation, the on-again/off-again tariff implementation has created anxiety and uncertainty, not least of which is the possibility that any random Customs officer can hold up a shipment based on an individual (mis)interpretation of the regulations. Compounding the issue is the announcement by Canada of 25% retaliatory tariffs that include, among other things (the targets of the retaliation are wide covering everything from toilet paper to drones), “Paintings, drawings and pastels, executed entirely by hand”.

Book publishers are also exempted under the IEEPA and are keeping their heads down, as noted by another article in the Globe. Many Canadian publishers do not ship much to the US but some do, including companies that are exclusively printers rather than full service publishers. In the case of Friesens Corp, a printer in Manitoba, the bulk of their business is from US customers. However, now a new threat has risen for Canada’s independent book sellers. Books have been included on Canada’s retaliation list, and if books from the US are subjected to a 25% retaliatory tariff, the cost will be passed on to bookstores, and ultimately consumers. Independent bookstores already work on very thin margins and an additional charge will likely affect sales. Harm to Canadian business and consumers is the flipside of punishing US exporters, just as harm to US consumers will result from US tariffs on imports. Surely it would be best to leave a cultural product like books out of the trade war.

What happens next with regard to tariffs on exports to the US, from Canada or elsewhere, seems to depend on Donald Trump’s mood of the day. The expected announcement of “reciprocal tariffs” on April 2 will create further uncertainty and likely retaliation, further feeding the spiralling trade war. The fact that import tariffs are levied on the importer and are largely passed on to consumers seems not to have registered with the Trump Administration. They can certainly raise revenues, but if the end goal is to impede imports so that all production is reshored to the US, then presumably the revenue windfall (largely ultimately paid for by US consumers) will ultimately disappear. To depend on tariff revenues to fund more tax cuts in the US is ultimately a self-defeating strategy. In the meantime, the US economy will have suffered the impact of increased prices on all imported goods.

The Trump tariffs have had the effect of causing maximum disruption and chaos, and if that was the goal, then Donald Trump has succeeded. In the meantime, Canadians have until April 28 to figure out which political party and leader is best equipped to help navigate the treacherous waters ahead. Whatever happens, copyright and cultural industries are unlikely to escape getting wet.

© Hugh Stephens, 2025. All Rights Reserved.

This post has been updated to include reference to potential Canadian retaliatory tariffs on US book imports and the impact this will have on independent bookshops in Canada.

Donald Trump’s Punitive Tariffs on Canada: A Personal Commentary

Image: CBC

This blog post is an “extra”. It is tangentially copyright-related (after all, this is supposed to be a copyright blog) but I will admit it’s essentially a non-copyright personal opinion piece. I was incentivized to write it as a result of various conversations I have had with friends and colleagues during this past weekend about the impact and rationale behind Donald Trump’s punitive tariffs on Canada.

Do President Trump’s 25% tariffs on all imports from Canada (except for oil and gas which will be tariffed at 10%) have anything to do with copyright? The short answer is “probably not”, although judging from the vindictiveness of the President toward Canada, as well as an apparent inability to understand how international business is actually conducted, I wouldn’t rule out him finding some excuse to make life difficult for US studios that produce films in Canada, or for Canada to retaliate against US content providers as it desperately searches for a way to get the message through to anyone south of the border who may have Trump’s ear. In either case this would be a mistake. Hollywood is an unlikely source of influence on the President, although Silicon Valley might be a more likely prospect. Both Canada and the US film and TV industry have benefited from having the option of producing in Canada. It’s called win/win, a formula that seems alien to the current President.

So, there could be (but hopefully not) an impact on copyright industries from the fallout from the economic war Trump has declared on Canada, and the inevitable retaliation. (Canada’s initial retaliation list focussed primarily on foodstuffs, appliances and clothing, not affecting copyright industries). Economically, retaliation is a bad idea, inflicting pain on your trading partner but also causing a degree of self-harm. However, in the world of trade negotiations, it is inevitable and frankly is the only thing that Canada can do other than to turn the other cheek and say, “Hit me again”.

However, beyond the world of copyright that I usually write about lies another world, the world of international trade and security, a space in which alliances, cooperation, and mutual respect among trading partners are important. It is what is happening in this world that I want to talk about briefly today, from a personal perspective.

The announcement of the Trump tariffs on Canada has to be just about the most short-sighted policy announcement imaginable. As the Wall Street Journal put it, this is the “dumbest trade war in history”. Not only that, it is a blatant violation of US trade and treaty obligations under the USMCA/CUSMA. What is driving Trump to punish Canada, other than personal spite, is hard to fathom.

Forty years ago, Canada embarked on the path of economic cooperation and integration with the United States through the negotiation of the Canada-US Free Trade Agreement, overcoming decades of suspicion and various failed attempts to establish Canadian manufacturing in a small market behind high protective tariff walls. I was involved in a minor way, buried in the trade bureaucracy of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, and later the Trade Negotiations Office. It was a big roll of the dice for Canada, giving up quite a bit of economic sovereignty in exchange for agreed rules on market access. Both sides negotiated hard, but at the eleventh hour finally got to “yes”. It was a big step forward, promising greater prosperity on both sides of the border. We believed that when the US made commitments, it would respect them. Silly us.

There were economic advantages for Canada to develop an integrated market with the United States, but there were also important advantages for the US and US business. Production could be specialized where it was most economically and geographically advantageous to do so, supply chains could be integrated, tariffs would be (mostly) eliminated and the border would not impede business. Within the agreed rules, people and goods could move freely. US auto companies in particular, (Ford, GM and (then) Chrysler), were particular beneficiaries, but so were consumers in both countries. The rules around this grand bargain were ratified in the form of a treaty, later expanded to include Mexico. The objective was to minimize disruptions and where disagreements occurred, to settle them through a fair and impartial dispute settlement process in a timely way. This process was renewed under the USMCA/CUSMA, signed by Donald Trump in 2018. What Trump is doing now is effectively tearing up the commitments he made and which have been respected since the late 1980s, through both Republican and Democratic administrations.

The legal excuse being put forward for this trade war is the “national emergency” of fentanyl and illegal migrants. The USMCA does have provision for a national security override, Article 32.2.1.(b) which says;

Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to..preclude a Party from applying measures that it considers necessary for the…protection of its own essential security interests.”

By invoking fentanyl and migration as “essential security interests” to justify his actions, Donald Trump is seeking to manufacture a pretext–at least insofar as Canada is concerned–allowing him to renege on US trade commitments enshrined in a Congressionally-ratified treaty that he signed. If there is a crisis, the problem does not lie with Canada. Last year exactly 19.5 kg of fentanyl (43 lbs) was seized at the Canadian border, less than 1% of the total seized at the Mexican border (21,148 lbs). In terms of illegal migration, US Customs and Border Patrol apprehended just under 24,000 illegal migrants coming into the US from Canada (Canada apprehended a greater number trying to sneak into Canada from the US, so the flow of illegals from Canada to the US was actually below zero). By contrast, on the Mexican border, about 1.5 million migrants were arrested by US authorities. Again, the Canadian border “problem” was about 1% of the total of migrants on the southern border. (I am not trying to trash Mexico but simply demonstrate how the rationale put forward to impose the tariffs on both countries is wildly disproportionate when it comes to Canada). How can Trump with a straight face use this “national emergency” as an excuse to try to cripple the economy of a friendly neighbour, an ally, and the largest customer for manufactured US goods globally? (Canada is the top export market for 34 states). Because he can, I guess.

It is apparent that facts have not been allowed to get in the way of what appears to be a personal vendetta. In fact, it appears that Trump is convinced in his own mind that Canada should not exist as a nation. His repetitive and insulting trolling of Prime Minister Trudeau as “Governor” Trudeau and the belief that Canada should become the 51st state is both tiresome and insulting. (Parenthetically, if Canadians ever agreed to become part of the US, why should Canadians settle for just two Senators? After all, the Province of Ontario has a larger population than 46 of the 50 US states, not to mention that Canada is the second largest country on the planet geographically). In reluctantly announcing retaliatory tariffs, which will hurt American workers and consumers, Justin Trudeau made a plea to Americans, recalling the famous words of John F. Kennedy;

“Geography has made us neighbours, history has made us friends, economics has made us partners and necessity has made us allies.”

These wise words are worth recalling. It is estimated that the tariffs, if sustained, will tip Canada into recession, increase the unemployment rate, shave several points off GDP and lead to a further drop in the Canadian dollar. As Ontario Premier Doug Ford put it, “he’s coming after our families and our jobs”. There will be negative impact on the US economy as well, but the unanswered question is “why would you want to deliberately destabilize your friend and ally, best customer and neighbour?”. Is it not in the interests of the US to have a prosperous, reliable, stable and friendly neighbour on its northern border? I would have thought so.

The current situation causes me both great sadness and repressed anger. Sadness because, like many Canadians, I have spent considerable time in the US and in the company of Americans. I grew up not too far from the border like many Canadians, so US television was part of my mispent youth. I attended grad school in the US. I have taken a number of holidays in various parts of the US. During my years on many foreign postings in Canada’s foreign service, I worked with and cooperated closely with my US colleagues in similarly located American embassies. Later I worked for a US company and had, and still have, many American friends and former colleagues. I have never detected any animosity toward Canada or Canadians. Thus I simply cannot believe that when he was elected, Donald Trump was given a mandate to go after Canada. But that is what he has done.

As I said at the beginning of this post, there is not much here related to copyright–but I needed to get this off my chest. I hope that saner heads will prevail, but much damage has already been done in Canada to the goodwill and trust that has long existed between Canadians and Americans. I wish it were otherwise. Maybe one day it will be again.

© Hugh Stephens, 2025.

Just before posting this, news reports indicated that President Trump had agreed to pause the imposition of tariffs on Canadian goods for 30 days after speaking with Prime Minister Trudeau. They were to have gone into effect tomorrow (February 4). Earlier he did the same for Mexico. While a temporary reprieve, this really doesn’t change much.

Fair Dealing, Passwords and Technological Protection Measures (TPMs) in Canada: Federal Court Confirms Fair Dealing Does Not Trump TPMs (Digital Lock Rules)

Image: Shutterstock.com

Anyone who has been following this case, Blacklock’s Reporter v Attorney General of Canada, might be scratching their heads about now, saying, “Wait a minute, didn’t I just read the exact opposite somewhere?”. Yes, if you were reading Michael Geist’s blog, that is precisely what you read. On June 1, Dr. Geist jumped in with both feet with his blog “Huge Win for Copyright User Rights in Canada: Federal Court Rules Digital Lock Rules Do Not Trump Fair Dealing”. That is one interpretation of the outcome of this case but, IMHO, there is one heck of a lot of spin and some wishful thinking in that headline. In fact, if you were to listen to the breathless self-congratulatory podcast on Prof. Geist’s blog featuring the lawyers who represented CIPPIC, the “Samuelson-Glushko Canadian Internet Policy and Public Interest Clinic” at the University of Ottawa (of which Dr. Geist was a founder) in their intervention, you would think that Canadian copyright law had suddenly been turned on its head by this decision.

While there has been a lot of commentary from both sides of the copyright divide on this case, I think some additional perspective is needed. Apart from the “huge win” Geist school of thought (picked up by a number of blogs from law firms), there have been comments that this marks the end of password protection in Canada as well as statements claiming that this decision puts Canada in violation of the CUSMA/USMCA. Although there were indeed controversial aspects of the decision relating to passwords and circumvention, it did not invalidate the role of access control TPMs, nor did it violate the CUSMA (which requires remedies be taken against circumvention without authority), nor did it give a blank cheque to password sharing. Let’s dig a bit deeper.  

First, we could start with my headline above stating that “Fair dealing does not trump TPMs.” This is admittedly a bit of counter spin but is just as accurate as the headline in Michael Geist’s blog. The Court’s decision does not allow or condone circumvention (i.e. the “trumping” or “overriding”) of a TPM, even if the purpose of the circumvention is to engage in a fair dealing activity. That is because the Court ruled there was no circumvention given the circumstances of the case. As the judge noted,

In the case at bar, there is no circumvention of a TPM simply because the password was not circumvented: it was properly obtained and used for a legitimate purpose.” (Para 120)

We may disagree with the conclusion that there was no circumvention, but it is important to note that the Court did not sanction circumvention.

First, a quick clarification of what a TPM is. A TPM (Technological Protection Measure), sometimes called a “digital lock” is defined in the Copyright Act, s. 41, as;

any effective technology, device or component that, in the ordinary course of its operation, (a) controls access to a work, to a performer’s performance fixed in a sound recording or to a sound recording and whose use is authorized by the copyright owner; or (b) restricts the doing – with respect to a work, to a performer’s performance fixed in a sound recording or to a sound recording – of any act [which only the copyright owner has the right to do or authorize].

The ”or” is important, since this distinguishes between two types of TPM, those that control access to a work (Part a of Section 41), aka “access controls” (which is what we are concerned with in this case), and those that control reproduction or other copyright related activities related to a work (Part b). aka “copy controls”.

Access controls provide the gateway that allows business models to function in the digital environment. You cannot access a work protected by copyright unless you are given the “key”, normally by paying for a subscription. (This is where paywalls and passwords come into the picture). Copy controls (Part b of Section 41) protect a copyright owner’s rights with respect to how the work is used. Those rights include the right to reproduce and distribute the work, but these rights are subject to fair dealing, as are copy controls in both Canada and the US, (fair use in the US case). It is only the circumvention of access controls that is prohibited by law. The Blacklock case was about access controls. (Often copy controls are bundled with access controls, in which case the access control protection prevails).

Because a copy cannot be made for fair dealing purposes unless access is licitly obtained (i.e by not circumventing access controls), it seems reasonable to state, as I have done, that fair dealing does not trump TPMs/digital locks.  Content has to be accessed legally in order for fair dealing rights to be exercised. A TPM may be part of that legal access. If a TPM has to be circumvented in order to exercise a fair dealing purpose, that is offside Section 41.1 (1) of the Canadian Copyright Act. The Blacklock’s case does not change this.

The Court was very precise in its language stating that the fair dealing rights of the users, in this case employees of Parks Canada, could be exercised because they had licit access to the content through a licitly obtained password. In other words, there was no hacking, bypassing or decryption of a TPM in order to obtain access to and then subsequently use the content on the basis of fair dealing. At the same time, the Court refrained from ruling on whether or not a password was a TPM. More on this later.

This reaffirmation of protection afforded to a TPM will no doubt disappoint Dr. Geist and others who in the past have argued that it should be legal to bypass a TPM in order to assert fair dealing rights. He has claimed there is a self-described “fair dealing gap” that stops users from accessing content to exercise fair dealing. He has advocated for a “long overdue fair dealing exception for the digital lock rules” and has also called for establishing an exception “to allow for circumvention of a TPM for any lawful purpose”.

There are a few circumstances when it is legal to break a TPM. These are specified in the Copyright Act and include such things as law enforcement and national security; reverse engineering for software compatibility; encryption research; verification as to whether a TPM permits the collection or communication of personal information; security testing of computer systems; accessibility for disabled persons; temporary recordings made by broadcasters for technical reasons; and unlocking cell phones. Fair dealing is not among them.

To grant a legal exception to allow users to bypass a TPM in order to access content for a fair dealing purpose, such as research, would gut the ability of creators to protect content and operate a business model in the digital age. While third parties can use content in accordance with the law, including fair dealing purposes, access must be gained legally. This is just as true in the digital age as it was in the analog world. As one of the lawyers on the Geist podcast himself said, you can’t throw a brick through the window of a bookstore and grab a book just to exercise your fair dealing rights. Nor can you hack a TPM that controls access to a work, whether or not your ultimate purpose is to conduct research. The Blacklock case did not change this. I explained all this in a blog I wrote several years ago (Why Can’t I Legally Pick ‘Digital Locks’ to exercise my Fair Dealing Rights?)

But what about passwords and paywalls? Aren’t they access control TPMs? I would have thought so, and that is what Blacklock’s contended, but it seems that in terms of jurisprudence this may be unclear. A password is certainly a common means to control access, to open the door to protected content once payment or some other form of authorization is given, and is often an integral feature of a TPM. The Attorney General of Canada (AGC), representing Parks Canada, asserted that a password is not a TPM (and thus the use of a password does not constitute circumvention), and asked the Court to so affirm. It did not do so. In the absence of any evidence or expert testimony as to what a TPM is, the Court declined to address the issue. To quote from the decision, (Para 111)

“…the issue raised clearly lacks any evidence of a technical nature…There is no evidence either of what a “password” is and what it was in this case: thus, there was no expert evidence led by either party on what, in this case, constitutes the TPM.”

The Court then went on to a discussion of paywalls and whether a paywall was a TPM, or merely a means of enforcing a TPM. The end result was uncertainty regarding how a TPM (which you will recall is any effective technology, device or component that controls access to a work) is to be defined. The Court also focussed on the word “effective” to dismiss Blacklock’s argument that s. 41 was intended to empower owners to protect their works with any technological tool at their disposal, yet “effective” has been interpreted in CUSMA to simply mean that it cannot be accidentally bypassed. (Article 20.66 FN 72).

Another loose end is the meaning of circumvention. Password sharing, apparently, is not circumvention according to the Court.

Key takeaways:

  1. The absence of expert testimony as to what constitutes a TPM was not helpful to Blacklock’s case. The judge admitted that a password could arguably constitute a TPM (Para 133) but in this case there was a paucity of evidence to allow that determination.
  2. The fact that the password was obtained licitly was also not helpful to Blacklock’s. The password was not circumvented (defined as descrambled, decrypted, or otherwise avoided, bypassed, removed, deactivated or impaired). A subscription had been paid for, and a password provided, albeit shared within the organization-but for a fair dealing purpose.
  3. The terms and conditions under which the subscription was purchased were ambiguous. This case dates back more than a decade. Memories are not precise. No exact replication of the Blacklock’s website at the time the subscription was purchased (2013) is available, having vanished into internet history. Testimony as to what it contained was contradictory and inconclusive. The terms of use were contradictory, allowing circulation of Blacklock’s content for personal and non-commercial use, but then referring to bulk subscriptions. Moreover, the terms and conditions did not require explicit acknowledgement by the user, opening it to claims that the terms may not have been read in full or understood. In short, there were a number of unfortunate loopholes that weakened the case. To use a cricket analogy, the Blacklock’s case was played on a regrettably weak wicket.
  4. The use of the content was, in my view, consistent with fair dealing. It constituted non-commercial research. Of that there can be little doubt. It met the fair dealing test.

All of these elements created a perfect storm of conditions that undermined Blacklock’s case, although the Court specifically rejected the AGC’s low-blow allegation of entrapment and deception by Blacklock’s.

Going forward, the issue of whether a password or paywall is a TPM needs to be clarified. If it is, does unauthorized sharing of a password constitute circumvention? The circumstances of the sharing will certainly be relevant. As the Court stated (Para 125),

how the password was obtained is significant as this may prevent a user from invoking the fair dealing provisions of the Act. Obtaining content by descrambling a signal or decrypting a communication may render invoking fair dealing very difficult to establish successfully.”

Properly drafted terms and conditions can provide protection against unauthorized sharing of passwords, avoiding a weakness faced by Blacklock’s in this case. The Court also went on record to note that its decision was decided on the evidence presented in this case alone and is not to become a reference at large.

It is legitimate for Blacklock’s to feel cheated by the Court’s ruling that there was no circumvention of a TPM in this case, and I can sympathize with their frustration. At the same time, it is important to note that the Court did not legitimize the circumvention of a TPM for fair dealing purposes. The law remains that a fair dealing purpose does not legitimize the circumvention of a TPM, (or the breaking of a digital lock if you will).

Commentators and analysts are free to take what they wish from any case, emphasizing this or that aspect. Michael Geist and CIPPIC have provided their interpretation, or spin. Now you have an alternate perspective. While the outcome is not what Blacklock’s hoped for, bypassing or circumventing a TPM in the name of fair dealing has not been legitimized. In other words, “Fair Dealing Does Not Trump a TPM”.

© Hugh Stephens, 2024. All Rights Reserved

The CRTC and Online Streaming: Money Now; Details Later

Photo: Author

The first shoe has dropped for foreign online music and video streamers in Canada, at least those generating more than $25 million a year in “contribution revenues” from the Canadian market. On June 4, the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission (CRTC) announced it will be imposing “base contributions” of 5 percent of annual Canadian contribution revenues on streamers such as Netflix, Spotify, Amazon Prime, Disney + etc. as part of the implementation of the Online Streaming Act passed last year. (Canadian streamers associated with a Canadian broadcast entity, i.e. Crave, are exempt). The Act brings online streaming services under the regulatory purview of the broadcast regulator. The “base contributions” are to begin in the 2024-25 broadcast year, beginning September 1 of this year, and are expected to generate in the range of CAD$200 million annually. According to the Minister for Canadian Heritage, Pascale St. Onge, the levy is about “fairness in the system” and will be good for the streamers because it will create more content that will “most likely” go back on their platforms. So why are they not happy? (And they are not).

They are not happy because this is just the first shoe to drop, and while they now know the cost of this shoe, they don’t know what the other shoes are going to cost, what exactly those shoes will look like, or indeed whether they will be allowed to try them on. Because, you see, the rules about who can access the Funds that their money will be going into, and on what terms, have not yet been determined. Key decisions regarding the definition of Canadian content and who can own or control Canadian content (through holding the copyright) are a couple of years down the road. With those decisions could come other requirements, such as allocating a percentage of revenues to production of local content on top of the current “base contribution” to existing Funds, discoverability obligations, and possibly others.

With regard to the top-up of existing funding mechanisms, just about anybody who is anyone in film, TV or music will be lining up to get a share of the $200 million pie. The list includes (and I am not kidding) no less than 11 identified recipients named by the CRTC;  the Canadian Media Fund, the Independent Local News Fund, the Black Screen Office Fund, Certified Independent Production Funds supporting OLMC (Official Language Minority Communities), the Indigenous Screen Office Fund, FACTOR and Musicaction, a new temporary fund supporting local news production by commercial radio stations outside designated market, the Canadian Starmaker Fund and Fonds RadioStar, the Community Radio Fund of Canada, direct expenditures targeting the development of Canadian and Indigenous content and, last (and least, in terms of percentage of the funding from audio online undertakings), the Indigenous Music Office. Is anyone missing? What about the Punjabi Weather Network or the Lawn Bowling Broadcast Fund? This is micro-management gone wild.

The 5% contribution funding is divided up into various slivers, some larger than others, by the Solomons at the CRTC. As for the Minister’s optimistic belief that those making the contribution will “most likely” benefit from the content produced, I struggle to see how Netflix or Disney+ will get much out of the Independent Local News Fund (which is currently funded by Canadian cable platforms) or Francophone productions in British Columbia or Alberta. The argument, no doubt, is that this is the price for participating in the Canadian broadcast ecosystem, that now includes online streaming undertakings. Music streamers, on the other hand, will probably benefit from the development of more Canadian talent.

As a consumer of music and audio-visual content, I am also a participant in the broadcast ecosystem and already pay in various ways, through income and sales taxes, and streaming and cable (yes, I am still one of them) subscription fees. I have a hunch I am about to pay more. For several years now the AV streaming services have been on a spending spree in an attempt to grab market share. Profitability came second, but that is rapidly changing as the market matures. And that means subscription fees are going up. (Netflix is killing off the basic subscription I have had for a number of years and given me the choice of a slight price reduction if I put up with ads, or else face a roughly 50% increase in monthly subscription fees. I am still dithering). And this was before the CRTC dropped its latest bombshell. If the CTRC is going to take 5% or more of revenues, simple math tells you there are only a couple of ways to make that up, cut costs or raise prices. “Costs of doing business” inevitably get recovered from customers. If the price of supporting a viable content industry in Canada was limited to a 5% increase in my monthly subscriptions, I would gladly pay but I doubt that my contribution will be limited to 5%.

Ironically, the issue of whether the CRTC should regulate streamers was postponed for years in Canada because of aversion of what was referred to at the time as the “Netflix tax”. No-one knew for sure what that meant; it could have meant imposing sales taxes on a Netflix subscription (which has since been done), or it could have meant a levy on Netflix (which was the first streaming service to enter Canada) to fund Canadian content. But while people weren’t clear on what a Netflix tax was, they knew they didn’t like it. It became a symbol of piling yet one more nuisance fee onto consumers (“carbon tax” anyone”?) and while a small fee on a streaming subscription was unlikely to send anyone to the poor house, politicians from all parties outdid themselves by swearing to avoid any form of Netflix or internet tax.

Serendipitously, I have just finished reading Howard Law’s new book, “Canada vs California-How Ottawa Took on Netflix and the Streaming Giants”, a fascinating deep dive on Bill C-11, which became the Online Streaming Act, and its unsuccessful predecessor Bill C-10. (For those who don’t know, Howard also publishes a weekly blog, MediaPolicy.ca, another essential read for anyone interested in the Canadian media scene). Law devotes an early chapter to “No Netflix Tax 1999-2019” and then goes on to take the reader through the painful teething pains of Bills C-10 and C-11. The term “Netflix tax” has fallen out of use these days but the end result of the imposition of the CRTC “base contribution” on foreign streamers is really no different from an indirect tax.

Alternatively, if the streamers do not fund this new “base contribution” by raising prices to consumers, they will likely compensate for it by spending less elsewhere, i.e. on Canadian production, the very objective for imposing the contribution in the first place. According to MPA-Canada, in 2021-22 “foreign investment in production” (FIIP, a metric for international participation in the film and television production industry in Canada) contributed $875 million to production of Canadian content, about 13% of total financing for Canadian-owned content productions. (This is in addition to the much larger Foreign Location Shooting spend on US productions made in Canada). By comparison, the Canadian Media Fund contributed only 7% of total financing for Canadian productions. The foreign contribution to Canadian production was not far off the $1.09 billion spent by Canadian broadcasters on in-house production. A similar scenario exists in Australia, where the government is also exploring various options to require foreign streaming services to fund local production. Yet the streamers are currently the leading source of production funding for Australian adult drama. In Australia, streaming services invest more in this drama than public, commercial and subscription broadcasters combined, despite having no legal obligation to do so.

What does the US government think of the CRTC’s announcement? That will depend on how hard the foreign streamers push the US Administration to intervene, and right now it is not clear what they will do. Part of the issue is those other dangling shoes. The outcome might not be all that bad for the streamers if they are given fair access to the content they will be required to fund. After all, they need to spend on content to fill their pipeline. But the terms of what payback they will get from their required investments are not clear. A lot will depend on what amount of spend the Commission imposes on foreign streamers for production of Canadian content (Cancon), and how Cancon is defined.

Right now, the Canadian content definition is a complicated formula, set by different funding and regulatory bodies, as I outlined in a blog a couple of years ago,  (see “Unravelling the Complexities of the Canadian Content (Cancon) Conundrum”) and as Law outlines in his book. The core is the infamous points system, based on the nationality of key players in the production, plus amount of local spending. In addition, one of the current conditions for a production to be considered Canadian—and thus qualify for tax credits (funding)–is that the copyright and catalogue rights must be held by a Canadian (normally the producer) for a minimum of 25 years. However, the CRTC does not impose a copyright requirement when defining Cancon for broadcast quota purposes. Will this continue when the Commission finally gets around to addressing this issue? That shoe is still hanging there.

If the Cancon definition is tweaked in such a way that the foreign streamers are required to spend a set percentage of local revenues on Canadian content, but at the same time are excluded from being able to acquire such production (i.e. restricted to licensing content they have already invested in), this will be a problem. It is one thing to apply strings when a producer is applying for tax credits (AKA a subsidy). It is quite another to be required to fund production but be excluded from recouping a return on that investment in a way that makes most sense for the funder. With the Cancon definition shoe still dangling, trying to enlist the US Administration to bring pressure on Canada right now may not be the best strategy. Not that this has stopped some of the usual suspects, like the National Foreign Trade Council and the US Chamber of Commerce from weighing in. Their comments are no doubt a marker for future reference if needed. CUSMA/USMCA obligations need to be kept front and centre.

As I noted in an article last year, (“Could or Would the US Retaliate Against the Online Streaming Act (C-11) Now That it is Law?”),the CRTC must be mindful that foreign streamers who contribute to Canadian productions need to be able to access, acquire and distribute them on an equal footing with Canadian streamers, who face no such limitations”. The CUSMA/USMCA trade agreement requires that cross-border digital services be dealt with on a national treatment basis, i.e. accorded no less favourable treatment than Canadian streaming services. The current proviso that exempts Canadian streaming services associated with a Canadian broadcaster from the 5% levy on revenues is not an auspicious start, but we will have to wait to see what happens.

Regarding the link between Cancon and copyright ownership, I know there are people in the industry in Canada whom I respect who argue this is very important to maintain cultural sovereignty. They feel strongly that it is essential for Canadians to hold the copyright in productions to avoid becoming just service producers. They have a point, although there are other considerations that need to be borne in mind. A Canadian producer should be able to hold the copyright (and assume the risk that the production may not be big earner in future) if they wish, or else assign it, take the money and move on to the next project without the government putting its thumb on the scale of commercial negotiations. And it is not unreasonable for those who provide the funding and invest in a project to be allowed to negotiate commercially on how the asset is exploited.

The CRTC’s June 4 announcement can be considered a down payment or perhaps a first shot across the bow, depending on how you want to look at it. We are in for months, if not years, of more consultations. The CRTC’s own announcements project consultations into 2026, well past the next election. There will be several more shoes to drop, and the political landscape could well change. In the meantime, the streamers will have to start paying into a mixed bag of Funds as directed by the CRTC. As for those all-important details about the regulatory framework, they will come later.

© Hugh Stephens 2024. All Rights Reserved.