Tag: Cultural Exception

The Recent CRTC Decision on US Streamers and CUSMA

Will the CRTC Decision Requiring US Streamers to Make Additional Financial Contributions to Canadian Production Lead to Retaliatory US Tariffs Impacting Other Sectors because of CUSMA’s Cultural Exception Clause?

Should Canada Rescind the CRTC Decision Now to Facilitate CUSMA Negotiations?

Logo of the CRTC (Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission) featuring stylized lettering and a circular design.

Summary

Since this is a long post on a complex subject, here is the very short version of my answers to these two questions, the Executive Summary if you will. On the first question, I posit that the CRTC decision is not a violation of the terms of CUSMA, and therefore Canada does not need to justify the CRTC measures by using the shield of the Cultural Exception, which if applied could legitimize US tariff retaliation. That is not to say that I agree with the CRTC decision in all its aspects, nor that the Online Streaming Act might not become a bargaining chip in the renegotiation of the Agreement. For the US to justify tariff retaliation on the basis that Canada was using the Cultural Exception as a shield would require a determination by a trade panel. That is most unlikely to happen. Given the general US disrespect for the CUSMA Agreement since the advent of Trump 2.0 and the way in which the US has ridden roughshod over the protections that the Agreement was supposed to provide, the niceties of its text seem largely irrelevant. US streamer’s hopes of securing protection under the CUSMA have been undermined by aberrant US trade policy. As for whether the Carney government should walk back provisions of the Online Streaming Act to facilitate CUSMA renegotiation, the Digital Services Tax climbdown illustrates well the folly of unilateral concessions. The US can wield a big stick, but Canada is not without cards to play. When you are playing with a master bluffer, don’t fold your hand early. That’s the short version. For more detail, read on.

The CRTC Announcement

Since the CRTC announced on May 21 that, among other requirements, it will increase the mandatory contribution to be made to Canadian productions by large foreign streamers (those generating in excess of $100 million annually in Canada) from 5 percent of their Canadian revenues to 15 percent, commentary—largely in the form of criticism– has come from all sides. The CRTC decision itself is not the easiest to understand even with its embedded graphic. The Motion Picture Association-Canada did not mince words;

“The Motion Picture Association strongly condemns the CRTC’s decision to impose unprecedented, unnecessary, and discriminatory investment obligations on American streaming services operating in Canada. This burdensome framework unfairly targets global streamers with requirements that directly violate Canada’s obligations under the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA).”

MPA-Canada and some individual streaming services have already challenged the initial five percent “downpayment” levy on the basis that the requirement for streamers to pay for local news (one of the allocations of the initial levy, not repeated in the new CRTC regulations) is a discriminatory measure exceeding CRTC authority because none of the streamers even produce news coverage. The plaintiffs also argue that the levy constitutes a tax, which is beyond the competence of the CRTC. Indeed, the taxation angle was repeated by Opposition Leader Pierre Polievre who accused the CRTC of imposing a tax that would ultimately be paid by Canadian consumers. He demanded that the Carney government overrule the CRTC, something the government says it does not have the authority to do. If pushed, however, it could of course amend or withdraw the legislation, the Online Streaming Act, that is behind the CRTC actions.

Others were also quick to criticize, including University of Ottawa professor Michael Geist who published the day after the CRTC announcement, pointing out that the Online Streaming Act is already in the crosshairs of the US in the lead up to negotiations to renew the CUSMA/USMCA. Indeed, US Ambassador Pete Hoekstra, who seems to be unable to fathom why Canadians might be upset at a US Administration that has routinely broken the rules it agreed to under Trump 1.0 with the renewal of NAFTA (not to mention the 51st state nonsense), immediately called the CRTC decision “making a bad situation worse”. Geist followed up with another post titled “From Levy to Liability: Why Canada Risks Facing Hundreds of Millions in Retaliatory Tariffs Due to the CRTC’s Online Streaming Act Ruling”.

Copyright Ownership Issues

Now, I am not here to try to justify the CRTC’s Canadian program expenditure announcement, which is a complicated beast. While I believe a legitimate argument can be made that participants in the Canadian broadcast space should be expected to support Canadian content and Canadian production to a certain degree, I have a problem with the requirement that prevents the funders from owning and exploiting, as they see fit, the product they have invested in. I know this view is not shared by many in the Canadian content industry. Part of the CRTC decision involves an obligation to spend 30 percent of their contribution on what is described as “enhanced partnerships”. This is CRTC-speak for production partnerships where Canadians hold the majority of the copyright in the programming.

This would seem to reverse the flexibility in defining Canadian Content (CanCon) that was introduced by the CRTC late last year. As I explained in a blog post last November, the revised CanCon definition outlined by the CRTC for broadcasting and streaming purposes allowed for up to 80% of the copyright in a production to be held by a foreign enterprise, subject to some other CanCon requirements such as the director and screenwriter both being Canadian. This was designed to encourage co-productions, and was a slight relaxation of the hardline rules that required foreign streamers to contribute to Canadian productions but then denied them the right to own and exploit the copyright (including distribution rights) in those productions. Now whatever flexibility that was introduced has been rolled back; at least one streamer production contribution dollar in three must be invested in a production where the rights are held by someone other than the funder, with that person having to be a Canadian. This is despite the fact that the production might have qualified as Canadian (story, director, location, music etc) in every other way. The purpose of the levy is clearly not to promote Canadian content but Canadian production.

Do the CRTC Measures Violate CUSMA Obligations?

While I, like Michael Geist and others, have concerns that the CRTC decision has flaws, and may be indeed become an additional irritant to be dealt with during the forthcoming CUSMA negotiations, my main quibble is with the argument that Canada will face millions in retaliatory tariffs under the CUSMA framework because of the CRTC mandated contributions. Prof. Geist and others are recycling the argument put forward by a US industry group, the Computer & Communications Industry Association (CCIA), claiming that the CRTC decision violates the terms of CUSMA, specifically, Article 14.10 that refers to investment performance requirements;

“No Party shall, in connection with the establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, conduct, operation, or sale or other disposition of an investment of an investor of a Party… impose or enforce any requirement, or enforce any commitment or undertaking…to achieve a given level or percentage of domestic content”

CCIA argues, echoed by Michael Geist, that given this situation, Canada will therefore be required to defend its action by means of the Cultural Exception clause (Article 32.6). This is an “escape clause” that says;

This Agreement does not apply to a measure adopted or maintained by Canada with respect to a cultural industry.

Broadcasting meets the definition of a cultural industry. However, if the CCIA is right and Canada falls back on the Cultural Exception, this is itself a problem because in that case the US would be entitled to retaliate (take a measure of equivalent commercial effect) in any sector. In other words, the automotive, aluminum, steel, mushroom or maple syrup industries, or any other, could be lumbered with retaliatory US tariffs as a result of measures applied to US streamers that are discriminatory or otherwise non-compliant with CUSMA.

If the measures are non-compliant or discriminatory, that is. If they are not, Article 32.6, the Cultural Exception, does not apply and therefore there would be no grounds for the US to retaliate. (Not that the need to respect the terms of CUSMA would stop them, as I discuss below). In the past, I have argued that the Cultural Exception is not applicable. This is because Article 14.10 refers to investment (Chapter 14) whereas streaming services fall under a different chapter of CUSMA, cross-border trade in services (Chapter 15). National treatment (non-discrimination) applies to cross-border services, and the streamers are in fact treated more favourably than their equivalent Canadian streaming counterparts. You can read all about it here.

But what if I am wrong? My interpretation has not been tested in “trade court”, which in the case of CUSMA (Chapter 31) allows for a state-to-state dispute settlement process through establishment of arbitration panels. The US could call for such a panel but could also simply assert that Canadian actions were in contravention of the Agreement and that Article 32.6, the Cultural Exemption, applied. This would allow for the application of retaliatory tariffs. However, under the terms of the Agreement, Canada could challenge the US assertion, and so, in effect there could ultimately be a panel review to determine the outcome.

US Trade Actions to Date

That is how the Agreement is supposed to work, but that process is now effectively irrelevant given that the US has violated both its terms and spirit several times, basically arrogating to itself the right to do anything it pleases. The so-called “fentanyl” tariffs were the first such example, where the US imposed a 25 percent tariff on Canadian goods on the specious pretext that Canada was responsible for “the extraordinary threat posed by illegal aliens and drugs, including deadly fentanyl” which “constitutes a national emergency under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA)”, according to an announcement issued by the US Embassy in Canada.  Quite apart from the fact the US is responsible for enforcing its own border security, not Canada or Mexico, Canada was the source of less than 1 percent (between 0.1 and 0.2 percent in fact) of illegal fentanyl flowing to the US. More fentanyl probably flowed the other way. The IEEPA tariffs were subsequently struck down by US courts as being an unjustified usurpation of the taxing power of Congress.

Not daunted, the Trump Administration has turned to other legislation, such as Section 232 of the US Trade Act of 1974, to impose tariffs on Canadian steel, aluminum, cars, furniture such as kitchen cabinets, and lumber on the basis that such imports threaten US national security. In addition, Canadian goods that do not have a CUSMA certificate of origin are subject to tariffs under Section 122 of the US Trade Act that deals with balance of payments issues. Then there is the Canadian financed Gordie Howe Bridge that the Trump Administration seems to want to keep in limbo because the owner of the competing bridge is a large Trump donor. I could go on, but the point is, the terms of the USMCA/CUSMA seem to exercise very limited restraint on the Trump Administration. Therefore, why would the Administration care whether Canadian measures imposing a levy on US streamers to fund Canadian productions fall under the Cultural Exemption or not? They don’t. If they want to impose a tariff, they’ll find a pretext.

Should Canada Rescind the CRTC Ruling to Facilitate CUSMA Renewal?

From a trade negotiating perspective, for Canada to roll back the CRTC decision now would be a tactical mistake. Look what happened to the planned implementation of a Digital Services Tax. Long planned, with an implementation date well publicized a couple of years in advance, and with the revenue already booked, the Carney government got cold feet and at the last minute cancelled the tax. This was supposedly to get CUSMA negotiations restarted. As I described it at the time, it was a “humiliating climbdown” to mark Canada Day, 2025. Yes, negotiations resumed for a few weeks until the US pulled the plug once again to signal its displeasure with Ontario Premier Doug Ford’s TV ads during the Super Bowl that enlisted Ronald Reagan to fight tariffs. The DST climbdown achieved nothing. That lesson appears to have been learned. The Canadian Government has made it clear it is not prepared to pay an “entry fee” to begin CUSMA discussions, and will not make concessions simply to get to the table. So, from a trade policy perspective, why should it pull the Online Streaming Act, or intervene with the CRTC?

This is not to say the CRTC got this decision 100 percent right. It is also not to say that, hypothetically, elements of the Online Streaming Act might not be on the chopping block as part of an eventual CUSMA 2.0 deal. That is assuming the US can be trusted to implement what it agrees to. As the smaller partner, Canada has always relied on the US sense of justice, respect for the rule of law and a willingness to surrender some sovereignty for greater overall economic and political security as reasons to expect that the US will honour what it agrees to. Under the Trump Administration, that faith has been shaken. The US streaming industry has every right to invoke the supposed protection of CUSMA and to seek protection under the Agreement. The problem is that the current US Administration has so brutally abused the CUSMA framework as to make it scarcely credible. The streamers are being sideswiped by the aberrations of US trade policy.

But back to the topic at hand. Will the CRTC decision on streaming lead to the imposition of hundreds of millions of dollars in retaliation by the US? Probably not, although such an outcome is not impossible. If it happens, it won’t be because of the Cultural Exception clause in CUSMA, but because the US can wield a big stick and will do so if it suits the mood in the White House at any given time. Canada, however, has some cards to play, to use a Trumpian analogy, and those cards (energy security, critical minerals, lower-cost inputs to US industry such as aluminum, specialty steel, and car parts) are important to the US. The Carney government is playing a waiting game on CUSMA negotiations and renewal. The decision on US streamers is just one more element in this high-stakes poker game. When you’re playing with a master bluffer, you don’t fold your hand before the game is over.

© Hugh Stephens, 2026.

US Retaliation Against the Online Streaming Act: How Real is the Threat?   

Illustration of the Canadian flag overlaid with yellow caution tape labeled 'TARIFFS', featuring American flags, symbolizing trade tensions between Canada and the USA.

Image: Shutterstock

As CRTC hearings on implementation of the Online Streaming Act (formerly Bill C-11) grind slowly forward as part of the Commission’s deliberations as to how foreign audiovisual and audio (music) streaming services may be required to meet Canadian content (Cancon) and discoverability requirements, while determining the extent of their financial contribution to various funds supporting Canadian content, affected US industry players are not sitting on their hands. As you would expect, they are deploying a range of tactics to fight back using their industry associations, the Motion Picture Association (MPA)-Canada, representing Netflix, Disney, Sony, Paramount, Universal, Amazon Prime and Warner Bros. Discovery, and the Computer & Communications Industry Association (CCIA), representing among others Amazon, Apple, Google and Meta, as their vehicles of choice.

MPA-Canada is currently appealing to the Federal Court the CRTC decision that its members must contribute 1.5% of annual revenues to the Independent Local News Fund, arguing that the studios do not produce news and should not be required to contribute to a line of business in which they are not active. Apple, Spotify and Amazon are also appealing the full 5% payment on the grounds it is a tax the CRTC is not mandated to apply. The 1.5% contribution to news is part of the CRTC’s initial decision that the streamers should, as a “downpayment”, contribute 5% of revenues to fund Canadian production.  The MPA has also undertaken a lobbying campaign to point out how much its members already contribute to production in Canada, (CAD$6.7 billion in 2023, more than the CBC, Canadian Media Fund and Telefilm Canada combined) even though much of that content does not count as CanCon under current rules.

To this “positive” argument, the CCIA by contrast has added a more hard line, “negative” approach, releasing a study that calculates the amount the CRTC’s compulsory contributions will purportedly cost the US industry. Assuming the levy stays at 5% of revenues (by no means an assured outcome as Canadian broadcasters are urging the CRTC to impose contributions of 20 to 30%, similar to the obligations they face), CCIA estimates this will cost US streamers between $2.19 billion and $6.96 billion (all figures USD) by 2030. The estimate of losses is bundled with CCIA’s claim that the financial obligations constitute a violation of the CUSMA (known as the USMCA in the US) because it creates a preferential regime for Canadian content “thereby discriminating against content classified as American or from a third country”. In the eyes of the CCIA, actions under the Online Streaming Act violate the principle of “national treatment” in which Party A agrees to treat the products and services of Party B “no less favourably” than its own products and services. In support of this claim, CCIA cites the Investment and Digital Trade Chapters of CUSMA/USMCA, Chapters 14 and 19 respectively. According to CCIA, the Online Streaming Act’s “inconsistency with core trade obligations is beyond dispute”. Given this “indisputable” fact, CCIA states that “if challenged, Canada can be expected to invoke its cultural industries exception (Article 32.6) as a basis for justifying the inevitable discrimination….”

Article 32.6 is part of the General Exceptions Chapter of the CUSMA/USMCA. It states, in part, “This Agreement does not apply to a measure adopted or maintained by Canada with respect to a cultural industry…” The production, distribution, sale, or exhibition of film or video recordings as well as audio or video music recordings are included in the definition of a cultural industry. As I have written elsewhere (NAFTA and the Cultural Exception) Article 32.6, while in theory exempting defined cultural industries from the obligations of the Agreement (the NAFTA provision was essentially rolled over into the CUSMA), has a sting in its tail. If Canada applies any discriminatory measures that violate the agreement using the cultural exclusion as the pretext, the US is fully within its rights to retaliate with measures of “equivalent commercial effect”, in any sector. The CCIA’s $2.19 billion or $6.95 billion numbers need to be viewed in this context.

The first question, therefore, is would Canada need to resort to Article 32.6 to justify measures taken under the Online Streaming Act? I argued in an earlier paper I wrote for the School of Public Policy at the University of Calgary that given the current structure of the obligations, Article 32.6 would not be in play because the measures in question are not inconsistent with CUSMA, given the Agreement’s precise wording. You can read the detailed arguments in the paper, but essentially my position is that neither the Chapter 14 Investment reference nor the Chapter 19 Digital Trade provision cited by CCIA are relevant because content streaming is covered by a separate part of the Agreement, Chapter 15, Cross-border Trade in Services. The terms of the Online Streaming Act, as applied by the CRTC provide “national treatment” to foreign streaming services. In fact, they impose lesser requirements on foreign streamers with respect to carriage of Cancon than they do on Canadian streamers.

But this interpretation is only my personal view. I have no idea is this is the interpretation of the trade policy gurus at Global Affairs Canada (I haven’t spoken to them and even if I did, they would be unlikely to tell me what their position would be on a hypothetical trade case) and is almost certainly not the interpretation favoured by officials in the Office of the US Trade Representative (USTR). And certainly not by CCIA. CCIA’s position is that a show or track streamed in Canada is a digital product, (even though it describes its members as providing “streaming services”). The Agreement is clear that there should be no discrimination against digital products of the other Party i.e. they should be accorded “national treatment”, although domestic products can be subsidized. On the other hand, if streamed content is not considered a digital product (nor an investment, which according to CUSMA cannot be subject to “performance requirements” as a condition of allowing the investment) but rather a cross-border service, the conditions applicable to delivery of the service are what counts. National treatment needs to apply to service delivery, and insofar as the Online Streaming Act is concerned, it does.

Whether streamed content is a digital product or a cross-border service clearly matters. If the US brought a CUSMA trade complaint against Canada–and if the CCIA view were to prevail–Canada would either have to change the way it treats US digital products carried by streaming services or defend its actions on the basis of the cultural exception, Article 32.6. If it did the latter, it would be opening itself to trade retaliation by the US, at an equivalent commercial level. In my experience and judgement, Canada would be most unlikely to resort to the exception to justify its actions precisely because of the consequences. The US would retaliate not just against the cultural sector, but in other areas that would set one industry or part of the country against another. To avoid this, the government would instead find some other way to comply with the Agreement by modifying the offending provision (as little as possible but as much as necessary), but doing so in a way, if possible, that still met all or most of its policy objectives.

It is also just possible, however, that Canada would be prepared to absorb the retaliation, calculated by CCIA to be between $400 and $500 million annually if the CRTC mandated contribution remains at 5% of revenues. This sounds like a big number but the random way the Trump Administration has been imposing tariffs on a range of Canadian products such as steel and aluminum (50%), lumber (45%), and autos (25%), industries where Canadian exports total tens of billions of dollars annually, makes $400 million in possible retaliation seem relatively minor. In effect, Trump’s erratic punitive behaviour has normalized trade retaliation–and devalued its effectiveness as a threat. But whatever response the Canadian government took, the first step would be to determine whether Canada was in fact in violation of the Agreement. If one Party considers that “an actual or proposed measure of another Party is or would be inconsistent with an obligation of this Agreement”, it can resort to the dispute settlement process. In the first instance, this involves consultation and if no resolution is reached, sometimes the constitution of a panel to decide the issue. (CUSMA/Article 31).

The CCIA itself cannot charge Canada with non-compliance, although it can raise the spectre of retaliation as it is doing. Only the US Government can bring a complaint, and at this stage it is not clear if it would be willing to do so. Given the range of trade disputes between the two countries, including unilateral tariffs on Canadian exports imposed by the Trump Administration on the basis of specious claims that Canada is a major source of fentanyl exports to the US (last year 0.2% of all fentanyl seized at the US border came from Canada; over 90% was from Mexico), or equally questionable grounds that exports of Canadian products ranging from aluminum to kitchen cabinets pose a national security threat to the US, the bilateral trade relationship hardly needs more issues. It will depend on the extent to which the streamers in the US have the ear of the Trump Administration. Given Trump’s insistence that Canada drop its planned Digital Sales Tax if it wanted to keep the current bilateral trade talks going , it is certainly within the realm of possibility that USTR would take up the CCIA’s case.

There is one other wrinkle to the cultural exception clause. Even if Canada does not justify its actions on the basis of Article 32.6, potentially the US could unilaterally declare it considers Canadian measures to fall under that provision and move to initiate retaliatory measures. If it did so, Canada would then be entitled to demand a panel to determine whether Article 32.6 is applicable, and if so, whether the retaliation met the “equivalent commercial effect” test. However, the key issue would still be to determine whether Canada had violated its commitments under the Agreement. If there is no violation of CUSMA’s terms, the cultural exception is moot. If all this has your head spinning, welcome to the green eyeshade world of trade practitioners.

CCIA, in pushing back against the provisions of the Online Streaming Act, has resorted to the threat of trade retaliation as one more tool in its policy toolbox. That is to be expected. With this in mind, the CRTC will be carefully reviewing how much leeway it has in trade policy terms and needs to keep Canada’s CUSMA commitments in mind when implementing policy. In a following blog posting I will outline what I think Canada and the CRTC need to consider.

© Hugh Stephens 2025. All Rights Reserved.